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Preface
Results of a South American Dialogue Series
When World Bank staff  members meet with representatives of a country’s microfi nance sector, microfi nance institution (MFI) managers often assume that they will receive some kind of new fi nancing—credit 
lines, guarantees, or grants—to support their development eff orts. Th ey do not expect the Bank to provide 
technical assistance or best-practice information.
More recently, however, representatives in four countries have observed that, in keeping with the World Bank’s 
new role as a “knowledge bank,” the Bank’s new knowledge-sharing priorities mean that it can provide more than 
just new funding. It can provide access to recent developments in international best practices in microfi nance 
management, build South-South learning dialogues, and address strategic and operational challenges. As a 
result of this realignment of Bank priorities, MFI managers have access to world-class expertise, innovative 
technologies, and tools in risk management.
Th is report brings together the results of an eight-part series of presentations by leading experts in issues 
directly related to microfi nance institutional sustainability. It is intended for MFI board members, managers, 
and staff  members—as well as for government regulators, supervisors, and donor staff  members. Th e fi rst four 
chapters include topics in risk management: (1) risk management systems, (2) good governance, (3) interest 
rates, and (4) microinsurance. Th e last four chapters include four topics in new product development and 
effi  cient delivery methodologies: (5) housing microfi nance, (6) microleasing, (7) disaster preparedness products 
and systems, and (8) new technologies.
Microfi nance practitioners and government supervisors and regulators in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 
participated in the presentations and discussions.  In addition, a group of Argentine practitioners was able to 
view the presentations through simultaneous Webcasts. Th e objectives of the series were as follows:
• To strengthen MFIs by disseminating innovative approaches in risk management, cost control, governance, 
and new technologies
• To promote a South-South exchange of experiences and lessons learned
• To promote greater ties among the MFIs in the region and between MFIs and government supervisors 
and regulators
• To highlight the Bank’s ability to mobilize international technical expertise in microfi nance 
Th e World Bank’s move to engage with MFIs in the four countries began in 2006, which was a critical year 
for microfi nance in Latin America. In that year, the Bank identifi ed a new trend of fi nancial sector policies—
represented by newly elected governments in Bolivia and Ecuador—that would ultimately and artifi cially 
lower microfi nance interest rates, interfere with the sustainability of MFIs, and reduce outreach. Rather than 
expanding product menus and introducing cost-saving technologies, the new governments sought to improve 
access to credit by mandating interest rates below the rate of infl ation. Experience has shown that such a policy 
leads to credit diversion and a decrease in sustainable lending to microbusinesses and poor households. 
In contrast, the Peruvian and Colombian governments moved to ensure the growth of a commercial microfi nance 
industry through a number of sound regulatory and supervisory options. Given such developments, the Bank 
saw an opportunity to sponsor a broad policy dialogue with the policy makers and representatives of national 
microfi nance industries to review policy options and new approaches. Th is book refl ects the technical support 
and dialogue that developed.
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1Risk Management:
                        Preparing for the  
                        Unexpected
                                   Living at risk is jumping off  the cliff  and      
                                               building your wings on the way down.
                            Ray Bradbury*
* Ray Bradbury, undated, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/r/ray_bradbury.html.
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In business, the only constant is change. In a world of change, successful businesses and fi nancial institutions have learned that it is wise to be prepared for unexpected events, in other words, to manage risk. While 
risk management has been a part of business planning for large businesses and fi nancial institutions for some 
time, it is a fairly new discipline among microfi nance institutions (MFIs). Th is new focus is the result of 
recent crises and experiences and represents a new understanding of the importance of anticipating unexpected 
events, rather than merely reacting to them. Th is chapter reviews risk categories and measurement for fi nancial 
institutions, additional risks confronting MFIs, ways to develop a risk management system, and special risks 
faced by rural MFIs.1
In the wake of recent tragedies, MFIs around the world have had to cope with an array of fi nancial, political, 
and weather-related crises, and MFI managers have learned the importance of risk management. For example, 
hurricanes in Nicaragua, fl oods in Poland, and currency crises in the Russian Federation and Indonesia have had 
devastating eff ects on the microfi nance industries in those countries. Whatever the emergency or the country, 
the eff ects are the same: higher costs, liquidity problems, and loss of assets. MFIs with risk management plans 
in place before the emergency are more likely to survive, remain stable, continue serving their clients, and even 
prosper.
Risk Categories 
Th e most common risks can be included in three categories: fi nancial, operational, and strategic. In addition, 
risks are either internal or external to the institution. Internal risks are largely within the MFI’s control—
related to operational systems and management decisions. External risks are largely outside the MFI’s control. 
Table 1.1 illustrates the risks an MFI might confront.2
Because an MFI’s loan portfolio is its most valuable asset, the fi nancial risks—credit, market, and liquidity—
are of greatest concern. Financial risks begin with the possibility that a borrower may not pay the loan on 
time with interest (credit risk). Th ey include the possibility that the MFI might lose a signifi cant part of the 
value of its loan portfolio as a result of an economic downturn, hyperinfl ation, and other externally generated 
causes (market risk). Financial risk can also include changes in interest rates of government lending programs 
(as in Bolivia and the República Bolivariana de Venezuela) or the possible enforcement of old usury laws (as 
in several Latin American countries). Market risks include lower prices for borrowers’ products and services, 
which could directly aff ect their ability or willingness to repay an outstanding loan.
1.  Th is chapter is based on the December 2006 dialogue with Rochus Mommartz (Boulder Institute of Microfi nance), Hans 
Dellien (Women’s World Banking), and Fernando Fernández (Development Alternatives Inc.). 
2. Because of the diff erent ways of understanding risk, an institution might organize risks diff erently from the presentation in table 1.1. 
See, for example, van Greuning and Bratanovic (2000: 257–60).
4 Chapter 1 - Risk Management: Preparing for the Unexpected
Table 1.1 Urban Risk Categories
Risk Category Subcategories Specifi c risks
Financial risks Credit Loan porƞ olio (internal)
Interest rate (internal or external)
Loan enforcement pracƟ ces (internal)
Loan rescheduling and refi nancing pracƟ ces (internal)
Market Prices (external)
Markets (external)
Exchange rate (currency) (external)
Value chain (external)
Liquidity (internal) Cashfl ow management issues (internal)
OperaƟ onal risks TransacƟ on (internal)
Fraud and Integrity (internal) Branch-level authority limits on lending
Technological (internal) InformaƟ on and technology
Human Resources (internal) Staﬀ  training
OperaƟ onal manuals
Legal and Compliance (internal) OperaƟ onal audits, fi nancial audits
Environmental (external) Specifi c environmental impacts
Strategic risks Performance (internal) GeneraƟ ng profi ts and returns on assets and on equity 
to aƩ ract investors
External Business (external) New fi nancial sector laws
ReputaƟ onal (external) CompeƟ Ɵ ve pressures (exisƟ ng, new actors)
Governance (internal)a Changes in regulatory pracƟ ces (licensing and reporƟ ng 
requirements) (external)
Lack of board consistency and direcƟ on (internal)
Country (external) RelaƟ onships with donors and government programs 
(external)
Producer risks Experience
Technology
Management Ability
Note: This table was developed by the authors and is based on a variety of sources. See, for example, Fernández (2006) and Steinwand 
(2000). See also Deutsche GesellschaŌ  für Technische Zusammenarbeit, hƩ p://www.gtz.de/en/.
a. See chapter 2 of this volume.
Given the rapid pace at which demand for funds can grow, MFIs should be particularly aware of liquidity 
risk—the lack or shortage of funds for current and future expenses or loans. Liquidity risk can result from an 
overly aggressive lending strategy, low levels of on-time payment, seasonal variations of demand (such as the 
Christmas season or the planting and harvest cycle), or unanticipated expenses. 
To prepare for these risks, MFIs usually hold in reserve between 15 and 20 percent of assets in cash and 
in short-term assets. Compared to the holdings of other fi nancial institutions (which maintain liquidity of 
between 5 percent and 10 percent), this reserve is high, but it allows for a great degree of short-term fl exibility.
A recent review of a Honduran MFI illustrates the increased risk of an overly aggressive lending strategy. Over 
time, the MFI had invested 93 percent of its assets in the loan portfolio, leaving only 7 percent in cash and in 
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short-term assets. As a result, to meet its fi nancial obligations, the MFI had to decide whether to liquidate its 
assets or obtain more expensive funding.
Like liquidity risks, operational risks are within the MFI’s control. Th ey include the risk of loss through faulty 
internal processes, poorly trained personnel, and inadequate information systems. Operational manuals, clear 
terms of reference for key positions, loan offi  cer rotation, checks and balances systems (such as separation of 
certain responsibilities), and internal and external audits all contribute to sound operational systems, and they 
help to manage those risks. 
Strategic risks include long-term choices and changes in the business environment. Strategic risks can include 
inappropriate business strategies, introduction of riskier products, branch location decisions, choice of strategic 
alliances, and changes in market structure (caused by new entrants, new laws, and new regulations).
Management of the Biggest Risks 
Th e type of MFI can aff ect the institution’s risk level.3 State-owned banks engaged in microlending, for 
example, can be subject to political pressures to forgive debt or divert credit, both of which can result in poor 
loan recovery rates. Private commercial banks that undertake microfi nance pilots may be limited by regulatory 
norms, such as the prohibition on lending without adequate collateral. However, specialized microfi nance 
banks are better equipped to manage the risks involved in lending to informal sector businesses. 
Membership-based MFIs develop close and long-term relationships with clients. Financial cooperatives (credit 
unions and savings and loans cooperatives) provide both savings and credit to members. Multipurpose cooperatives 
provide inputs, marketing, transportation, and other services that make it easier for members to sell their products 
and to repay their loans on time. Th ose complementary services tighten the bond between individual members 
and the MFI. Community-based fi nancial organizations (such as village banks and self-help groups) also know 
their members intimately and can respond to needs while managing the accompanying risks.
Regardless of the type of institution, the nature of microfi nance itself often increases certain risks faced by 
fi nancial institutions, while off ering innovative means of dealing with them. Th e biggest risks include (1) client 
selection, (2) product risk, (3) portfolio composition, and (4) loan processing and information management.
Client selection risk
Adverse client selection occurs when the MFI agrees to loan funds to a risky client because of incomplete 
information. Adverse selection can lead to a decline in the quality of the portfolio because the high-risk clients 
cannot or will not repay the loans. Adverse selection can also lead to moral hazard, which is the possibility that 
clients who know that they are fully protected from risk will act less responsibly and more speculatively than 
if they were fully exposed to the consequences of risk taking. For this reason, well-publicized guarantee funds 
often run into serious problems in the early stages; they can attract clients speculating in high-risk ventures. 
When the MFI enforces loan repayment, it demonstrates to potential clients that the loan contract is 
a serious commitment of future resources and that there are specifi c consequences for failure to repay 
a loan. Easy restructuring and refi nancing policies make it diffi  cult for good loan offi  cers to enforce contracts 
with good clients. After all, why shouldn’t good clients get the same lenient treatment as poor performers? 
However, additional charges and higher interest rates when loans are restructured improve the incentive to 
3. For more detailed information on the specifi c risks of each type of microfi nance service provider, see Ritchie (2007: 43–48).
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repay on time. Th e penalties for late payment or nonpayment should be transparent, credible, and enforceable—
while rewards, such as interest rate rebates for perfect performance, should also be clear.
To ensure portfolio quality, the internal control or risk assessment unit should defi ne risks, establish credit 
limits and selection criteria, and learn to recognize early signs of trouble. For example, a credit information 
system can be constructed to identify the characteristics of poor performers and to lower the risk to the MFI 
over time. Th is system will promote a sound credit culture.
Product risk
Using experiences, demand studies, and other techniques, the MFI management team designs credit, savings, 
and other fi nancial products. Every design choice, no matter how small, can create additional risks. Key elements 
of the design include 
• Maximum and minimum loan amount
• Grace period
• Loan maturity
• Eff ective interest rate
• Payment schedule (monthly or seasonal payments)
• Collateral requirements
• Currency of the loan
Th e wrong product design choices can lead to disaster because they do not match the local culture and 
limitations of the MFI’s clients. For example, loans that are too large can lead to overindebtedness. Loans that 
are too small can make it diffi  cult for the borrower to meet operational expenses. Moreover, a long grace period 
may increase the risk of loan default, because there is no early indication of the client’s ability or willingness 
to repay on time. If long-term loans dominate the portfolio, the MFI could experience a loss in the event of a 
sudden spike in infl ation. 
Lending in a foreign currency can be popular with clients because it allows them to import machinery more 
easily. However, the foreign exchange risk exposure can hurt the MFI’s fi nancial position if the foreign currency 
strengthens. In 2001, the Superintendency of Banks in Peru was concerned about the foreign currency mismatch 
for the Cajas Municipales de Ahorro y Crédito system. Th e portfolio—equivalent to 40 percent of foreign 
currency liabilities—left the MFIs vulnerable to a relative appreciation of the dollar. As the MFIs became 
aware of the currency risk, they began to monitor their currency exposure and adjusted the asset and liability 
sides of the balance sheet. By 2004, the foreign currency portfolio had reached more than 70 percent of the 
liabilities in dollars, a more manageable currency match.
Th e MFI may also include the “rules of the game” such as group requirements (meetings), participation in 
technical training, or forced savings (also known as compensatory balances). However, the MFI should consider 
each requirement’s potential impact on the client’s ability to pay and its own fi nancial health. Th e MFI can 
reduce the risks by off ering loan products designed to refl ect the client’s preferences, cashfl ow profi les and 
ability to repay, and seasonal and other opportunities or risks. For savings, the product can be based on the 
saver’s preferences and seasonal excess liquidity holdings. However, if savings and loan products are based on 
the cashfl ow, liquidity, and other needs of the MFI, risks are very likely to increase. For instance, forced savings 
represent short-term liquidity and a kind of collateral to the MFI. However, forced savings take working capital 
out of the microbusiness and can increase the likelihood of late payment or nonpayment.
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Portfolio composition 
Th e types of loans in the MFI’s portfolio can create or balance the risks inherent in lending money to informal 
businesses. Understanding the risks should lead to adequate loan loss provisions and reserves. Such reserves 
are a useful mechanism in risk management. For instance, a portfolio consisting of small short-term loans to 
rural borrowers can be sensitive to droughts, crop and animal diseases, fl oods, and hurricane winds. Urban 
transportation strikes, protests, and fl ooding from heavy rains are examples of urban portfolio risks. In 
both cases, inadequate management of overdue loans can put the MFI at risk. 
Maintaining adequate loan loss provisions will permit the institution to cover the likely losses. Th is maintenance 
is commonly achieved by building reserves based on the length of time a payment is overdue. For instance, an 
MFI may set up a reserve equal to 25 percent of loan balances with an overdue payment of 30 to 60 days; 50 
percent of loan balances with an overdue payment of 61 to 90 days; and 100 percent of those with an overdue 
payment of more than 90 days. Finally, write-off  policies play a complementary role to loan loss provisioning 
and reserves; a common practice is to write off  loans more than 180 days past due.
Loan processing and information management
Another source of risk includes the processes, practices, and information systems used to track the loan portfolio. 
A management information system tracks individuals, groups, sectors, and branches to identify quickly any 
threats to strong portfolio performance. Th e German microfi nance management fi rm Internationale Projekt 
Consult GmbH has developed the ProCredit banking system, a standardized management information system 
that provides daily delinquency reports to loan offi  cers. Th is system emphasizes the importance of timely 
follow-up and rewards loan offi  cers with bonuses based on the performance of their loan portfolio.4 
Finally, other internally and externally determined risk factors aff ect an MFI’s ability to manage the client 
development and loan collection processes. Th e internally determined risk factors include hiring policies, 
incentive systems, operating policies and procedures, employee evaluations, management information systems 
and reports, asset and liability management, currency management (hedging), and internal controls and audits. 
External factors are the accessibility and usefulness of credit bureaus, the ease of collateral valuation and recovery 
(when necessary), competitive pressures, and the availability of insurance for clients.5
Producer Risks 
Th e producer risks that urban microbusinesses represent are largely the result of the businesses’ informal 
operations. Microbusinesses usually fail to diversify their sources for key components and raw materials, relying 
instead on a few local suppliers. Because they often work out of home-based workshops, they rarely have formal 
warehouses to store raw materials, work in progress, and fi nished products. Th ose businesses also rely heavily 
in many cases on neighborhood clients, rather than developing long-lasting relationships with institutional 
clients. Th eir scale of operations is very limited, often making it diffi  cult to meet the demands of schools, 
universities, and hospitals. Many microbusinesses use outdated designs and substandard materials, which limit 
their ability to fi nd clients. Th ey can also be aff ected by general strikes, which paralyze urban markets with little 
4. See Internationale Projekt Consult GmbH, http://www.ipcgmbh.com/. 
5. See chapter 4 of this volume for a discussion of microinsurance. 
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warning. Finally, some cannot provide enough character references and transparent records to compensate for 
the lack of physical collateral.
Additional Risks for MFIs with Rural Portfolios
MFIs serving rural clientele confront risks related to the natural resource base, the environment, and the cycles 
and risks of agricultural production. Many experts encourage urban MFIs to expand into the countryside 
and meet the challenges of the credit-hungry rural zones. MFIs already serving rural areas are aware of the 
challenges—yet they often fail to reach scale, control costs, or eff ectively enforce contracts when necessary. 
Table 1.2 lists the risks associated with rural areas.6
Table 1.2 Rural Risk Categories
Market risks Price volaƟ lity
Irregular access to markets
Poor infrastructure 
Inadequate informaƟ on
ProducƟ on risks Land producƟ vity
Pests
Disease
Postharvest risks
Producer risks Experience
Technology
Management ability
Climate risks Drought
Flood
Wind
Freeze
Hail
Heat Wave
Source: Authors.
Market risks
Market risks specifi c to rural lending include changes in interest rates, exchange rates, prices for inputs 
and outputs, and relationships between key actors in value chains. To manage exposure to these risks, the 
microbusiness operator and the MFI focus on those factors they can control. For example, an MFI with a 
rural client base can link its borrowers to regularly updated databases on input and output prices. An MFI 
can also promote strategic relationships among its clients, super markets, agro-industry buyers, and exporters. 
International buyers are eager to build direct links to producer associations in Latin America—as the networks 
developed by the Starbucks, Home Depot, and Whole Foods chains have done. With the Calvert Foundation, 
Starbucks provided a US$1 million loan for onlending to small coff ee farmers and cooperatives in Costa 
6. See chapter 7 of this volume for a discussion of climate risks.
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Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua.7 In Guatemala, for instance, the national coff ee growers’ association Anacafé 
provides updated prices for diff erent types of coff ee to more than 100,000 coff ee producers. Th is timely market 
information helps producers to sell at the most advantageous time.8
New market relationships come with new challenges. For those new links to become permanent, urban 
microbusinesses and farmers alike must show that they can meet standards for product design, handling, 
packaging, labeling, and timely delivery. With the appropriate technical assistance, the small producer can 
develop a production and marketing plan to meet the new demand. Although it is not the MFI’s direct 
responsibility to build such links, the advantages can include a growing client base that has assured markets 
awaiting their products and that will contribute to a healthier loan portfolio over time.
Production risks
From seed selection and warehousing to transport and fi nal sales, microbusinesses confront a variety of 
production risks. To ensure reasonable risks, the MFI needs to develop a profi le of the typical producer and the 
agricultural region. Th e profi le will include
• Size of the cultivated area 
• Crops produced in each season
• Number of growing seasons per year
• Regional average, maximum, and minimum productivity
• Production systems and level of technology
• Local warehousing issues
• Sales channels 
With this deeper understanding of the region’s producers and the environment in which they work, the MFI 
should collaborate with agricultural and technology transfer agencies to ensure adequate levels of capacity and 
technology. Subsector analysis, which off ers maps of the key production and market relationships, can be a 
useful tool to identify risks and opportunities for high-impact technology innovations.
Producer risks
Rural microbusinesses are largely informal operations and represent a signifi cant source of risk for the MFIs. 
Rural clients are often dispersed, increasing the costs of reaching them and enforcing loan contracts. Rural 
producers often have a subsistence mentality, rather than the profi t maximization goal of a business. Th eir 
yields can be very low, since the rural producers frequently depend on traditional technologies, local seeds, and 
low-quality fertilizers. Th ey tend not to diversify the source of inputs and are, therefore, vulnerable to sudden 
price increases and availability problems. Postharvest losses can compound the low productivity of the rural 
producer, with losses often amounting from 10 to 20 percent of total production. Finally, like their urban 
counterparts, most rural microbusinesses cannot provide suffi  cient character references and transparent records 
to compensate for the lack of physical collateral.
7. See Calvert Foundation, http://www.calvertfoundation.org/. 
8. See Anacafé, http://www.anacafe.org/. 
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Development of a Risk Management System
To prepare for unexpected events and their costs, an MFI can identify and prepare for the most common 
and expensive risks. All fi nancial institutions—large or small, regulated or unregulated—should design a risk 
management system that is based on the institution’s particular needs, clients, products, legal status, and internal 
capacity. 
For example, an MFI with a large share of loans in animal husbandry should prepare for a sudden drop in 
demand for its clients’ products in local markets. A small rural MFI working with solidarity and communal 
groups—and providing credit only—should develop a risk management plan to deal with overdue loans, 
liquidity management, and fi xed asset security. However, an urban-based regulated MFI, with a larger number 
and variety of fi nancial products, is subject to the norms and procedures of a government supervisory institution. 
Its risk management system will have diff erent goals and strategies. In addition, the Basel II accords (see box 
1.1) serve as an international standard for capital requirements to balance the risks inherent in microfi nance.
Box 1.1 Basel CommiƩ ee: InternaƟ onal Standards and PracƟ ces for Risk Management
Supervisor and regulators play an important role in fi nancial insƟ tuƟ on risk management, using the 
internaƟ onal standards and defi niƟ ons codifi ed by the Basel CommiƩ ee in 2005. The system protects creditor 
and savers in regulated fi nancial insƟ tuƟ ons by ensuring capital adequacy. Capital adequacy is a key measure 
of the fi nancial insƟ tuƟ on’s ability to withstand shocks and refl ects sound management of resources. In 
addiƟ on, an ongoing evaluaƟ on of capital adequacy protects against fi nancial sector instability, a breakdown 
in payments systems, and the risk of internaƟ onal contagion eﬀ ects. Basel I set the internaƟ onal standard 
by defi ning capital adequacy in terms of risk-weighted assets. Basel II reinforced the standard by introducing 
risk-based supervision pracƟ ces. 
Do the Basel requirements aﬀ ect MFIs? When microfi nance is a business line of a large regulated fi nancial 
insƟ tuƟ on, the naƟ onal supervisors take microfi nance into account as part of an integrated review of the 
insƟ tuƟ on’s risk management performance. However, for specialized, smaller MFIs, Basel standards are 
unlikely to be applied. This deviaƟ on is due to the MFI’s small share of fi nancial sector assets, the lack of 
complex operaƟ ons, and the absence of signifi cant interacƟ ons with internaƟ onal markets. Finally, MFIs are 
typically well capitalized. Very few cases of correcƟ ve acƟ on have been taken. If leverage should increase 
signifi cantly, Basel standards could be applied using the risk-weighted approach and risk-based supervision 
requirements. This occurrence would have implicaƟ ons for both MFIs and their clients in the form of higher 
costs and higher interest rates.
Source: Adapted by authors from Imboden (2005). See: www.microfi nancegateway.org/p/site/m/library/.
 
An MFI that develops an early warning system can respond before the risks become larger and more costly. 
Th e early warning system will evolve with the changing risks confronting the institution, thereby protecting its 
short-term solvency and long-term viability (see Steinwand 2000).9  Th e management team is responsible for 
periodically assessing the MFI’s exposure to risk and determining its risk management strategy. For instance, the 
assessment will be based on the institution’s particular circumstances—the legal and regulatory context, infl ation, 
the sources of funds (such as the mix of loans and grants, grace period, rates of interest, repayment terms), client 
location (rural or urban) and activities (agriculture, animal husbandry, commerce, services or production).
9. See also Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, http://www.gtz.de/en/.
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Steps in Risk Management
Table 1.3 describes the steps in risk management. Th e fi rst step is to identify the institution’s unique risk 
profi le by analyzing the institution’s goals, needs, costs, and profi tability. Th is step identifi es the institution’s 
social and fi nancial goals. It also assesses whether the operation is profi table and whether costs are adequately 
covered. In the second step, the MFI defi nes those unexpected events, or risks, that are most likely to occur 
and most important to manage. Th is process can be based on recent trends and experiences of other MFIs, 
as well as on potential political and economic changes. Management should focus on the top fi ve internal 
and external risks. Using this analysis, in the third step, the MFI sets exposure limits for each line of 
business, for example, the percentage of total loans to a particular sector or a region or the percentage of 
loans delinquent beyond 30 days. In the fourth step, once a limit has been passed, the institution implements 
its risk analysis and control activities. Finally, the MFI adjusts the risk management system periodically—
revising its risk profi le and operational systems, as the political and business environments change over time.
Table 1.3 Steps in Risk Management
Step AcƟ ons
IdenƟ fy risk profi le, in delivery of fi nancial services. IdenƟ fy
• Goals, needs, costs, and profi tability
• Internal risks
• External risks
Defi ne most important risks (reviewed annually by 
management).
Select
• Top 5 internal risks
• Top 5 external risks
Set limits. Set
• Acceptable delays
• Acceptable costs
• Acceptable level of losses
• Acceptable risks at the branch level
• Risk levels measured in other ways
Implement analysis and control system of regular checks 
and balances.
Implement and monitor processes, reviews, and internal 
audits—when limits are passed.
Manage and monitor risks. Look for risk paƩ erns, and address them strategically and 
operaƟ onally.
Source: Adapted by authors from Mommartz (2006).
For each risk category—internal or external—the successful MFI assesses the possible eff ects on its loan 
portfolio and policies. Th e portfolio includes all the outstanding loans, whether they are timely or overdue. Th e 
loans may be of diff erent size and character (individual or group) and to diff erent productive sectors. According 
to its mission and strategy, the MFI may have made preferential loans to women or productive sectors. In 
addition, its interest rates may or may not be competitive. Finally, the MFI’s holdings in other currencies will 
subject the portfolio to changes in the exchange rate. Th e portfolio assessment will identify risks and help 
management to establish a balanced mix of loans. Th e following criteria will assist in developing the assessment:
• Sectors to be served
• Training level of the staff 
• Geographic coverage and depth
• Level of tolerance for delayed payments
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• Products to be provided the various markets or niches
• Market niches—based on the mission statement and management and the board of directors
Internal tools and externally provided services help to measure these risks. Table 1.4 and box 1.2 describe the 
risk analysis tools used by Shorebank Advisory Services and the CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity Management) approach used by ACCIÓN International, respectively. 
Other specialized external ratings services that focus on MFIs include Microfi nanzas, Planet Finance, and 
Microrate. Microfi nance Information Exchange provides an international rating service. Th e Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor off ers a risk identifi cation tool in its appraisal handbook.10
Table 1.4  Shorebank Advisory Services (USA) Credit Risk Grading System
General Risk Credit risk grade DescripƟ on
Low risk Grade 1 – Excellent
Grade 2 – Good
Grade 3 – SaƟ sfactory
Loans develop according to projecƟ ons or beƩ er, and no problems with 
repayment have ever occurred or are anƟ cipated.
PotenƟ al risk Grade 4 – Watch List Loans show deviaƟ ons from the project’s business development 
scenario, and problems with repayments can be anƟ cipated.
High risk Grade 5 – Substandard
Grade 6 – Doubƞ ul
Grade 7 – Loss
Loans have diﬀ erent terms of delinquency, and they are associated 
with diﬀ erent probabiliƟ es of being fully repaid. The longer the loan is 
delinquent, the less likely it is that the balance would ever be repaid in 
full.
Source: Adapted by the authors from the PalesƟ nian Network, Fact Sheet 5, “Risk Management and the Credit Risk Grading System,” 
hƩ p://www.shorebankcorp.com/bins/site/templates/default.asp.
10. For more information, see Microfi nanzas, http://www.microfi nanzas.org/; Planet Finance, http://us.planetfi nance.org/; Microrate, 
http://www.microrate.com/; Th e Microfi nance Information Exchange, http://www.themix.org/; Th e Microfi nance Information 
Exchange Market, http://www.mixmarket.org/; and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/.
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Box 1.2  Risk Measurement Systems
North American bank regulators fi rst adopted the CAMEL methodology to evaluate the fi nancial and 
managerial soundness of U.S. commercial lending insƟ tuƟ ons. The CAMEL reviews and rates fi ve areas of 
fi nancial and managerial performance:
• Capital Adequacy
• Asset Quality
• Management
• Earnings
• Liquidity Management
Using the original CAMEL’s conceptual framework, ACCIÓN InternaƟ onal developed its own instrument. 
The ACCIÓN CAMEL reviews the same fi ve areas, but the indicators and raƟ ngs refl ect the challenges 
and condiƟ ons of the microfi nance industry. The methodology requires the MFI to provide the following 
informaƟ on:
• Financial statements
• Budgets and cashfl ow projecƟ ons
• Porƞ olio aging schedules
• Funding sources
• InformaƟ on about the board of directors
• OperaƟ ons and staﬃ  ng
• Macroeconomic informaƟ on
The ACCIÓN CAMEL performs the following adjustments: (1) loan loss provision, (2) loan write-oﬀ s, 
(3) explicit and implicit subsidies, (4) eﬀ ects of infl aƟ on, and (5) accrued interest income. The ACCIÓN CAMEL 
analyzes and rates 21 key indicators, with each indicator given an individual weighƟ ng. The fi nal composite 
raƟ ng is a number on a scale of zero to fi ve, with fi ve as the measure of excellence. This numerical raƟ ng 
corresponds to an alphabeƟ cal raƟ ng (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, C, D, and unrated).
Source: Global Development Research Center, hƩ p://www.gdrc.org/.
Approaches to Managing Risks
Successful MFIs employ several risk management strategies. Th ey develop strong internal information systems 
to allow managers to understand and mitigate the risks related to liquidity, internal fraud, and new product 
development. Th ey ensure better information on the cashfl ow, productivity, and other characteristics. Th eir 
credit management systems keep a watchful eye on portfolio quality issues, allowing for swift responses to 
willful default. Th ey recognize the value of microinsurance to protect borrowers from insurable risks (see chapter 
4 of this volume for microinsurance). Th ey consistently enforce the loan contract. Finally, their incentives for 
loan offi  cers are linked directly to portfolio performance.
In addition to these general approaches, specifi c recommendations exist for the special conditions in rural 
fi nance markets. Greater information on borrowers, crop cycles, productivity levels, and market cycles can 
reduce the risks of serving rural clients and provide a sound basis for product design. Using such information, 
MFIs can design the loan product’s specifi c characteristics (including any grace period, the repayment schedule, 
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installment or lump sum payments, and the eff ective interest rate) to accommodate price volatility and the 
client’s cashfl ow.
To address the issue of low crop productivity, the MFI can help microbusinesses form an alliance with business 
service providers—an agricultural technology institute, for example. Th is relationship can provide farmers (MFI 
clients) with access to improved seeds and pesticides, recent developments in land management techniques 
and production technologies, and improved postharvest practices. It would also help the clients move from 
traditional to more commercially oriented production and business practices. 
Finally, to improve access to clients in dispersed rural settlements, MFIs should take advantage of low-cost 
technologies such as mobile phone–based microfi nance transactions or banking service correspondents (see 
chapter 8 of this volume on technologies).
 
Because risks are unavoidable, they must be managed. Risk management systems are, in eff ect, the wings needed 
before taking the leap of faith of lending to large numbers of informal microbusinesses. MFIs with eff ective 
risk management systems in place are far better prepared for the unexpected, and this preparation can be the 
diff erence between growth, stability, or bankruptcy. By instilling a culture of risk management throughout the 
institution, from the board of directors to loan offi  cers and internal operations staff  members, the MFI and its 
clients should be able to manage unexpected events—and even thrive.
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* Th e Art of War by Sun Tzu: Special Edition, trans. Lionel Giles (El Paso, TX: El Paso Norte, 2005).
2 Good Governance:
Managing Internal 
Risk
If words of command are not clear and 
distinct, if orders are not thoroughly 
understood, the general is to blame.
 Sun Tzu*
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Eff ective management is critical for a microfi nance institution (MFI) to achieve long-term fi nancial success and its social mission. MFIs must manage change and make diffi  cult decisions with clarity and consistency 
of vision and mission. To be able to off er new products and services, successful MFIs must navigate changing 
laws and regulations, increasing competition, entrance of new types of competitors (for example, banks), and 
changes in technology, among other challenges. At the same time, they must deal with risk and vigilantly guard 
against fraud and loss of assets. 
Th is chapter describes governance concepts as they apply to the microfi nance sector. It begins with a brief 
discussion of MFI owners and their eff ect on MFI governance. It then addresses the board and the board’s 
pivotal role in sound MFI governance, outlining general best practices in MFI board operation. Finally, it 
includes a governance self-evaluation tool (see annex) and a short reference list of relevant resources.1
Th e role of governance may be defi ned broadly as the system of people and processes through which an 
organization maintains its focus and ensures institutional success. It includes the checks and balances needed 
to “manage managers.” Ultimately, good governance seeks
• To uphold the organization’s goals and mission
• To guide the organization’s major strategic direction
• To maintain an organization’s health over time and to mitigate risks
• To ensure accountability throughout the organization2
Despite the availability of resources that detail sound corporate and nonprofi t governance, a 2008 survey found 
quality of governance to be the second-greatest risk facing MFIs during times of rapid change. Th e survey 
revealed that many in the sector have strong doubts that many MFIs have the ability to adapt to new demands 
and still retain their social objectives.3
Ownership, Legal Form, and Th eir Impact on Governance4
Governance of any institution is closely related to its ownership. Th e ownership structure has a signifi cant eff ect 
on board structure, its eff ectiveness, and the risks it faces. Owners provide or control the institution’s funds or 
capital and are interested in the institutional mission and results. Th erefore, they want enough infl uence to 
ensure adequate accountability through institutional governance.
Diff erent types of owners have particular sets of concerns, all of which tend to be closely linked to what 
the owner is hoping to gain from the investment. Because most MFI investors have fi nancial and 
nonfi nancial goals and priorities, they frequently use a “double bottom line” system, which balances 
fi nancial goals with a social mission, or a “triple bottom line” system, which adds environmental 
concerns: thus, they can evaluate the MFI’s success. Some owners are more sensitive to loss of fi nancial or 
physical assets; others, to loss of reputation, developmental goals, or institutional mission.
1. Th is chapter is based on the April 2007 dialogue with presentations by Todd Farrington (ACCIÓN International), Tillman Bruett 
(Alternative Credit Technologies LLC), and Juan Manuel Díaz Parrondo (Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral). Tillman 
Bruett was primarily responsible for this chapter, using the presentations, additional interviews, and research. He also developed the 
good governance instrument presented at the end of the chapter.
2. Council of Microfi nance Equity Funds (2005), http://cmef.com/governancefi nal.pdf. 
3. Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (2008), http://cmef.com/CMEF5-BananaSkins.pdf. 
4. Th is discussion of ownership structure draws heavily from Otero (2001).
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An institution’s legal form also determines many aspects of its governance. Good governance is a challenge for 
all types of organization—from small nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to large corporations. MFIs 
face most of the governance challenges of banks and fi nancial institutions and some that are particular to 
socially oriented businesses. First, many MFIs are nonprofi t entities or are owned by nonprofi t entities and 
often have an unclear ownership structure. Second, the growth in assets and clients frequently leads to a change 
in an MFI’s legal form or status requiring an evolution of its governance: from an NGO to a shareholder-
owned institution, from a nonregulated to a regulated MFI. Finally, the legal and regulatory framework in 
which MFIs operate is dynamic and often either inadequate or excessively complicated. As a result, no one 
governance structure is universally applicable to all MFIs at all times. Good governance must be relevant for an 
MFI’s particular situation and stage of development. It should also anticipate the next stage of development.
NGOs
In Latin America, NGOs continue to play a signifi cant role as MFI owners and as operators. In most cases, 
donors—private foundations, governments, international aid agencies, or individuals—provide the bulk of 
capital to start and sustain the NGO. Because NGOs are nonprofi t organizations with no real owners, the 
founders cannot lay claim to the organization’s fi nancial and physical assets.
Th is lack of specifi c owners makes it diffi  cult to identify the person or institution to whom the board is 
accountable or for whom it acts as a fi duciary. In this case, the board is accountable fi rst and foremost to the 
institutional mission as it is defi ned, approved, and understood by the various stakeholders, including those 
donors and agencies that have funded the NGO.
 
A common governance risk associated with NGO ownership (particularly where the NGO is the sole or majority 
shareholder) is the concentration of power in the hands of one person or a few people, usually the founders. At 
the same time, management may depend on the MFI for its livelihood. Th ose who provide fi nancial support 
may lack the time, interest, or ability to adequately oversee the MFI. Th is may lead to management operating 
the MFI for the primary benefi t of management. Th is risk is avoidable. Numerous MFIs have diligent and 
capable NGO board members who value their reputation and have strongly identifi ed with and protected the 
institutional mission. Th e key is to understand the motivation and what is at stake for the MFI’s leaders.
Private Investors
Th e challenge with private investors is to ensure that their concerns are adequately addressed and 
evenly balanced with the interests of other investors and stakeholders. Because they have something 
to lose (or gain), private investors tend to be active board members (see box 2.1). Private investors in 
microfi nance may be divided between two types of owners: profi t seekers and patient capitalists. Profi t 
seekers are primarily interested in making a high return on their investment, attracted by the impressive 
fi nancial results that some MFIs have achieved. Institutional mission is not an overriding concern for 
this group of investors, and there is a temptation to forgo longer-term objectives and sustainability for 
short-term profi ts. Th ey require an exit strategy to ensure that they can take out profi ts in the near to 
medium term. Patient investors are motivated by long-term return on their investment and a sense of their own 
social responsibility. Th ey generally support the institutional mission and are motivated to protect the fi nancial 
health of the organization as the basis for future returns.
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Box 2.1 Investors as Board Members
The Council of Microfi nance Equity Funds surveyed MFIs and funders to determine the main concerns related 
to the parƟ cipaƟ on of investors in governance. The concerns were as follows:
• Finding an appropriate balance between management and board; avoiding management capture of 
governance
• Determining appropriate management compensaƟ on
• Agreeing on an appropriate balance between social and fi nancial goals
• Working eﬀ ecƟ vely as minority shareholders, protecƟ ng minority shareholder rights, and forming 
eﬀ ecƟ ve shareholder groups
• Establishing commonly accepted standards for confl ict of interest, board member compensaƟ on, use 
of independent directors, and so forth
Although many public investors prefer to keep a distance from board parƟ cipaƟ on, an increasing number 
of private microfi nance funds are not as reƟ cent. They have tried to follow the ProFund example. ProFund 
was located regionally, giving it the opportunity to stay involved on a conƟ nuous, real-Ɵ me basis, and 
was “universally appreciated” as a very engaged board member. In parƟ cular, it is well informed; in close 
contact with other board members, management, and other relevant parƟ es; and willing and able to 
acƟ vely parƟ cipate beyond formal board meeƟ ngs as necessary. Private investors such as MicroVest Capital 
Management and Blue Orchard Finance, S.A., consider governance part of their investment strategy. In 
addiƟ on to ensuring adequate returns, such investors maintain a rigorous focus on the return of principal 
and fi duciary responsibiliƟ es of the board.
Source: Council of Microfi nance Equity Funds 2005.
Government
Government funding for microfi nance has a long history in Latin America, where national and local governments 
have created microfi nance banks, savings banks, and other entities involved in microfi nance. Governments 
often fund microfi nance for a specifi c social or policy objective, such as combating poverty or fostering rural 
development. Th ree of the most common vehicles for channeling government money to microfi nance include 
so-called state banks (entities that may be involved in retail lending), apex institutions (wholesale facilities that 
invest or lend in MFIs), and independent microfi nance programs that may be administered by one or more 
government agencies (De Montesquiou, El-Zoghbi, and Latortue 2008). 
Governments are mostly concerned with maintaining power and serving the population. In general, local 
government ownership models for microfi nance have struggled because of politicized policies, targeted 
subsidized credits that distort markets, political interference in operations, and corruption. However, there are 
a few examples of publicly owned MFIs that perform well, such as the municipally owned Cajas Municipales 
de Ahorro y Crédito (CMACs) of Peru. Th ose CMACs, while subject to regulation by the Banking 
Superintendency, have fi nancial and administrative autonomy. Th eir institutional structure is rigidly defi ned by 
legislation to ensure that each CMAC is an economically and politically independent organization. CMACs 
are governed by separate boards comprising local representatives, including, the private sector.  Each CMAC 
reports to a federation that monitors performance and conducts internal auditing.
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External Public Entities and Aid Agencies
External public entities include bilateral donor agencies and multilateral agencies (for example, the World Bank 
and the Corporación Andina de Fomento, among others), and public and international fi nancial institutions 
(the International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank). External public entities invest in MFIs 
primarily because of the social and economic benefi ts they hope to achieve, such as increased employment 
and income levels or promotion of solutions to social and economic problems. Donors may also have political 
concerns based on their relationship with the host country. In general, those institutions do not play an 
active governance role. Th eir policies usually require them to take a minority stake and often preclude their 
participation in governance. Th ey are most concerned with avoiding losses and the consequent damage to their 
reputation or credit rating. Moreover, the public entities’ internal structures and operating procedures can limit 
their contribution to good governance. Turnover among agency personnel, lack of microfi nance expertise, and 
lack of time or budget to focus on governance issues are common problems.
Microfi nance Investment Vehicles 
A relatively new type of fi nancial intermediary that mobilizes funds from public and private funders and channels 
them to MFIs is called a microfi nance investment vehicle (MIV). While MIVs have been funding MFIs for more 
than a decade, their growth in recent years has been explosive—in 2005 alone, it is estimated that the combined 
MIV portfolio nearly doubled to US$1 billion by year’s end (MicroRate 2006). According to a geographic 
investment analysis, 56 percent of this investment was done in Latin America and the Caribbean. Th e MIVs’ 
primary concern is to recover their principal with a small return. Th ose funds are usually regional, closer to the 
MFI than are multilateral or international funders. Th e MIVs often allocate experienced staff  members and 
resources to monitor the performance of the MFI. Th ey are often able to provide input into key board decisions.
MFIs in Transformation 
As an institution transforms from a nonprofi t ownership structure to a for-profi t structure, governance must also 
change. Th is usually means transitioning from an institution dominated by a founder or social entrepreneur into 
a more professionally managed institution with broader ownership and a formal governance structure. Such a 
transition requires signifi cant delegation of authority to management with a wider array of checks and balances 
(see box 2.2). Th e original board must share institutional control with incoming shareholders; must fund the 
transformation; and must adopt a new structure, bylaws, and agreements that safeguard the rights of the new 
owners.5 Th is transition is a diffi  cult process for boards, as it requires the original board members to give up control 
to entering investors. Th ose new entrants may not share the same charitable goals and social agenda, or at least 
may ask for equal emphasis to be placed on commercially oriented goals and concerns. It is also important to note 
that members of corporate boards can be sued; members of NGO boards, generally, cannot.
Becoming a deposit-taking institution places additional functional and legal responsibilities on the board. If an 
MFI becomes regulated, its board will become the offi  cial point of contact between regulators and the MFI. 
Regulations often dictate how MFI governance is to be carried out and specify the necessary committees and 
their functions. Regulators may have the right to approve board members and determine whether they are “fi t 
and proper” and bring the requisite skills.
5. For an internationally recognized set of corporate governance standards and guidelines, including the rights of shareholders, 
equitable treatment of shareholders, and the responsibilities of the board, see OECD (2004).
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Box 2.2 QuesƟ ons to Assess the ImplicaƟ ons of an MFI’s Ownership Structure
The following quesƟ ons should be used to assess an MFI’s ownership structure:
• Do the owners have the necessary experƟ se to govern eﬀ ecƟ vely?
• Do the owners have “deep pockets”—the fi nancial resources to support the MFI’s growth?
• Are the owners appropriately neutral or immune to poliƟ cal infl uence?
• Are the owners able to stay in for the “long haul” or are they interested in selling and turning over 
ownership to others?
• Do new investors bring necessary knowledge, skills, and personal qualiƟ es to the board? Do they 
share the mission of the organizaƟ on?
• Is the ownership structure forward looking, anƟ cipaƟ ng the resources and skills needed for the 
future, not just for today?
Source: Adapted from Ledgerwood and White (2006).
Th e Board of Directors: Functional Responsibilities
Governance takes place within a broad context; however, the board of directors is the “pivot point” through 
which all players connect. Th e board is a group of individuals who are either elected or appointed by shareholders, 
stakeholders, or members and who work with MFI management to guide the MFI to achieve its vision and 
mission. Th e functional responsibilities of the board of directors can be categorized into four broad groups: 
fi duciary, strategic planning, supervision, and management development (Clarkson and Deck 1997).
Fiduciary
A fi duciary is a person to whom property or power is entrusted for the benefi t of another. In the case of an 
MFI board, the fi duciary is entrusted with fi nancial and physical assets and must ensure their appropriate use 
while maintaining their value. In some cases, the law may make the MFI’s board members personally and 
legally liable. While maintaining the MFI’s adherence to the institutional mission, a board of directors must 
protect and promote the solvency, liquidity, and fi nancial performance of the organization. Fiduciaries are 
most eff ective when they are proactive and encourage management to create a process that identifi es, assesses, 
and controls risks. Fiduciaries should also encourage management to ask diffi  cult questions, and then make or 
approve strategic decisions that balance the potential costs or benefi ts of taking particular risks.
Strategic planning
Th e board plays an important role in the development of the MFI’s long-term strategy, usually in the form 
of a strategic plan. Th e board considers the principal risks facing the MFI and approves plans presented by 
management. In keeping with its role to ensure fi nancial and operational survival of the institution, the board 
must examine whether the institution has adequate resources to implement its strategies. It also approves key 
strategic decisions, such as the opening of new branches; the introduction of new products and services or the 
entering into alliances, partnerships, or contracts with other organizations. Additionally, the entire board or 
specifi c members may participate directly in strategy development sessions.6
6. For young institutions, fundraising to fulfi ll plans may also be part of the board’s role. 
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In executing its strategic responsibilities, the board must keep in mind all of its stakeholders. It is accountable 
to the MFI and its shareholders—and has a duty to act in their best interests—but should also consider the 
interests of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and the local communities. Moreover, it should observe 
relevant environmental and social standards (OECD 2004) (see box 2.3).
Box 2.3 The Board and Social Performance Management
Nearly all MFIs have social goals: their very existence—at least in part—is to serve a social purpose. An MFI’s 
social goals must be clearly expressed within its mission. “Mission driŌ ” occurs when an MFI’s focus on 
social issues is lost because its purpose is vague or is neglected in pursuit of other goals (such as profi tability 
or growth). One key role of an MFI’s board is to protect and balance social and fi nancial goals and to guard 
against mission driŌ . This is no easy task.
Social performance management (SPM) is an insƟ tuƟ onalized process that involves seƫ  ng clear social 
objecƟ ves, monitoring and assessing progress toward their achievement, and using this informaƟ on to 
improve overall organizaƟ onal performance. SPM engages a wide spectrum of stakeholders into the MFI’s 
operaƟ ons, including board members.
The key reference in SPM within microfi nance is the global acƟ on-research Imp-Act Programme, which has 
worked with more than 30 organizaƟ ons worldwide to develop an overarching framework that promotes 
SPM as a core business funcƟ on. The framework combines regular monitoring of client status, analysis and 
communicaƟ on of fi ndings, and corresponding adjustments to products or service delivery that will improve 
the MFI’s program.
Source: Campion, Linder, and KnoƩ s 2008.
Supervision
Th e board delegates operational and administrative responsibilities to the chief executive offi  cer (CEO) and 
the management team. However, it is responsible for monitoring management’s performance in executing 
approved plans and for evaluating their performance against planned goals and timelines. For this reason, and 
to judge management impartially, the board should resist involving itself in the MFI’s management of daily 
operations. If it becomes a surrogate for the staff , it will fail in its supervisory capacity. In times of institutional 
crisis or succession of a CEO, a board may be required to assume temporary management. However, this role 
should be relinquished as soon as competent management is restored. Finally, the board should periodically 
evaluate its own performance and eff ectiveness (see box 2.4).
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Box 2.4 EvaluaƟ ng Board Performance
In theory, the board is responsible to insƟ tuƟ onal shareholders and ensures that management acts in 
accordance with shareholder wishes. In pracƟ ce, both within microfi nance and elsewhere, many boards 
become servants of the CEO or one dominant shareholder. Recent high-profi le corporate scandals involving 
boards that failed to act in shareholders’ best interests raise an important quesƟ on: how can shareholders 
evaluate whether or not the board is doing its job?
There are no set guidelines for conducƟ ng a board assessment: each board formulates its own plans for 
evaluaƟ on. However, as with the evaluaƟ on of the CEO, board assessment must be done regularly and 
against preset, well-defi ned criteria. These criteria should be established in board policy. The key areas to 
evaluate are as follows:
1.    Board and commiƩ ee structure
• Does the board as a whole or an individual commiƩ ee have the staﬀ , skills, and experience to tackle 
its current or expected problems?
• Are more independent directors needed to ensure fi nancial and legal survival of the insƟ tuƟ on?
• Do the commiƩ ees meet oŌ en enough to fulfi ll their duƟ es?
• Do the commiƩ ees receive and process informaƟ on in an eﬃ  cient and eﬀ ecƟ ve manner?
• Do the commiƩ ees keep the board apprised of risks and uncertainty in their areas of experƟ se and 
responsibility?
• Do potenƟ al confl icts of interest or personal issues exist that may disrupt the cohesiveness of the 
group?
• How strong is group cohesiveness? If defi ciencies exist, how do they hinder the performance of 
certain commiƩ ees or the board as a whole?
2.    The responsibiliƟ es of the board
• Is the board evaluaƟ ng the company’s fi nancial and operaƟ onal performance appropriately, or should 
other measures (quanƟ taƟ ve or qualitaƟ ve) be used?
• Is the CEO fulfi lling his or her duƟ es and providing solid leadership?
• Has the board adequately assessed the growth potenƟ al of the company?
• Can the board beƩ er address the needs and concerns of its stakeholders (both equity and debt)?
3. The physical process that boards use to conduct business
• Does the board or any individual commiƩ ee spend enough Ɵ me on vital issues or areas that can 
enhance stakeholder value?
• Is the board using all of the available tools and resources to come to a conclusion?
• Is there good communicaƟ on between the board and management?
Source: Adapted from CurƟ s (2007).
Management development
During the early stages of an MFI’s development and the transitional periods that follow, the board must 
guarantee the survival of the organization. Th is responsibility means having the right people at the right time. 
For example, the board supervises the selection, evaluation, and compensation of the management team. Th is 
supervision includes anticipating and preparing for management succession. Th e board must ensure that the 
management team has the needed skills to handle current operations and take on new challenges. Th e best 
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means to achieving this skill set is the continuous measurement of managers’ performance and professional 
development. 
Th e Board of Directors: Eff ective Structure
To carry out its duties eff ectively, the board must establish a formal, participatory structure in which its roles 
and responsibilities are clearly defi ned.7 Some key considerations are discussed below.
Board size
Board size varies from institution to institution. Th e number of stakeholders involved and their investment 
in the MFI should determine the appropriate number of board members. In microfi nance, boards normally 
range from between 5 and 25 members; boards with membership between 7 and 11 are the most common. 
Whatever its size, the board should be large enough to provide adequate staffi  ng to complete the governance 
work, obtain the necessary funding, promote the institution, and ensure that a quorum regularly attends the 
meetings. However, the board should be small enough to make decisions effi  ciently and to develop a personal 
relationship of trust among members. An odd number of seats will help prevent tie votes (though consensus 
decision making is preferable).
Th e board chair
Th e person who is chair of the board, or board chair, is responsible for providing leadership, presiding over 
meetings, and guiding the disparate points of view of the board’s membership to consensus. Th e board chair 
should regularly interact with the MFI’s top management. Th is interaction should be transparent and adhere to 
appropriate segregation of duties to avoid the appearance of collusion or impropriety. To be eff ective, a board 
chair must possess a range of characteristics and skills. He or she should be “a good leader, navigator, planner, 
organizer, communicator, interpreter, confi dant, liaison, conscience, caretaker and troubleshooter” (Oregon 
School Boards Association 2009). 
 Th e board chair and the CEO should not be the same person. While this has been a common practice in 
corporate governance in the United States, current views are veering from this practice. In the microfi nance 
sector, this practice is now considered a warning sign that control of the institution may be too concentrated in 
one person (see box 2.5).
7. Th is discussion of setting up an eff ective board structure draws from the Council of Microfi nance Equity Funds (2005).
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Box 2.5 Some “Do’s” and “Don’ts” for Boards
To maintain the appropriate independence of the board and management, some direcƟ on is provided as 
follows:
Do the following:
• Clearly defi ne roles between management and the board.
• Separate the role of the board chair and the CEO.
• Maintain distance from daily operaƟ ons by delegaƟ ng authority for operaƟ ons to management through 
the CEO.
• Set clear, measurable goals for management, and monitor performance against those goals.
• Supervise the selecƟ on, evaluaƟ on, and compensaƟ on of the senior management team.
• Use board commiƩ ees (audit, fi nance, compensaƟ on, personnel, risk management, and so forth) to 
perform specifi c funcƟ ons.
• Require that members follow basic codes of conduct to carry out roles and responsibiliƟ es in good faith.
• Make binding decisions as a group.
• Work to achieve board consensus.
• Require accurate, Ɵ mely informaƟ on in order to make good decisions.
• Rely on external audits, independent internal audit reports, and third-party evaluaƟ ons to verify 
reporƟ ng accuracy.
Don’t do the following:
• Form a board composed of friends of the CEO.
• Appoint the same person as both CEO and board chair.
• Allow management to occupy a major share of seats on the board.
• Exercise too much oversight of management and interfere with its work.
• Fail to meet regularly or meet in a pro-forma fashion.
Source: Compiled by Tillman BrueƩ .
Some duties of the board chair include the following:
• Serve as the chief nonexecutive offi  cer (offi  cer not involved in daily management) of the MFI.
• Chair meetings of the board according to agendas developed together with the CEO.
• Appoint all committee chairs within the board.
• Take an active role in recruiting board members.
• Oversee succession of board members.
• Serve ex offi  cio on board committees and attend their meetings when possible.
• Evaluate the eff ectiveness of the board and its members, and ensure the board carries out its mandate.
Board committees
In well-functioning boards, most of the work occurs in committees. Committees meet before the full board 
meetings and discuss issues relevant to their specifi c mandate. Th ey report any fi ndings and progress to the 
full board. Committee meetings may be supported by written agendas and recorded minutes. Common board 
committees include the following:
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• Th e Audit Finance Committee meets and works with internal and external auditors without the 
participation of management in an eff ort to understand issues of control and the veracity of accounting 
and fi nancial statements. Th is committee is involved in selecting external auditors and in hiring and 
overseeing the work of the internal auditor. 
• Th e Compensation Personnel Committee oversees the administration of human resources and the 
development of personnel policies and procedures. Th is committee ensures appropriate hiring of and 
compensation for the CEO and other top managers. Th e committee may also be responsible for 
evaluation of the CEO’s performance.
• Th e Risk Management and Investment Committee examines issues of asset and liability management. 
Th is examination includes making sure that management is adequately monitoring and addressing 
portfolio risks, maturity mismatches, and currency risks, as well as the need for fi nancial resources in 
the form of loans and equity investment. Th is committee may also address the MFI’s compliance with 
legal, regulatory, and funder requirements, as well as the timeliness and completeness of reporting.
Th e role of the CEO
Th e CEO guides and supports the board’s activities. As the MFI’s top manager, the CEO has the advantage of 
having intimate knowledge of the institution’s operations and performance. A primary function, therefore, is to 
ensure that the board has adequate information to make informed decisions in governance and oversight. Th e 
CEO’s main responsibilities include the following:
• Articulate MFI strategy to the board, and assist members to review, modify, and approve the business 
plan.
• Supply and structure information and materials to the board meetings to facilitate board action and 
decision making.
• Provide timely and accurate fi nancial and operational reports to the board and committee meetings to 
assist in monitoring performance and progress.
• In conjunction with the board, develop institutional performance indicators in line with the institutional 
mission and the triple bottom line.
• Attend all appropriate board and committee meetings, and be available to answer questions of board 
members prior to and during such meetings.
• Assist in selecting and orienting new board members.
Th e Board of Directors: Eff ective Processes
Board meetings
Th e purpose of the full board meeting is to exchange information and make key decisions. Th ese meetings may 
be held quarterly or monthly (as mandated by government regulation or board bylaws) and should be structured 
to deal quickly with routine tasks to leave suffi  cient time for strategic issues. To allow board members time 
to read and prepare for the meeting, a board should develop a standard agenda with relevant materials that is 
distributed in advance (see box 2.6). A board secretary should be appointed to record detailed minutes of the 
meeting. During the meeting, the chair should guide the meeting according to the agenda and try to adhere to 
the meeting timetable, but also allow time for adequate discussion and input by members. 
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Most of a board’s work occurs in committee meetings and is brought to the full board for discussion and fi nal 
decision. In the interest of full transparency, board members should never discuss agenda items outside of the 
committee meeting or full board meeting. Board decisions should be taken by consensus whenever possible. 
Voting on issues may be necessary from time to time, but frequently resolving issues by vote may indicate that 
members are divided by vision or priorities.
Management reviews
Th e primary role and challenge of the board is to hold management accountable. Th ere are formal means to do 
this during board meetings, committee meetings, and regular reporting, but boards should schedule an annual 
or semi-annual performance review of the CEO. Perhaps the most important role for the board is to establish 
transparent, fair, and measurable benchmarks for management’s performance. Th ese rules should be closely linked 
to the MFI’s business plan, but should include elements that measure the CEO’s eff ective management of staff , 
physical and fi nancial resources, and management’s demonstrated commitment to the institution’s mission.
Box 2.6 Sample Board MeeƟ ng Agenda
  1. Review of agenda and addiƟ on of new items
  2. Review of previous meeƟ ng minutes
  3. CEO’s presentaƟ on of management report, including acƟ on items from previous meeƟ ng
  4. Review of fi nancial performance:
    a. Year-to-date performance versus plan
    b. Asset quality (loan porƞ olio and other investments)
    c. Key indicators (profi tability, eﬃ  ciency and producƟ vity, and outreach)
    d. Credit exposure (by product, geography, and industry)
    e. Individual branch performance
  5.  Review of social performance versus plan
  6.  Management presentaƟ on on external environment
    a. Market
    b. CompeƟ Ɵ on
    c. Funders
    d. RegulaƟ on
7.  Compliance report
    a. RegulaƟ ons
    b. Report on Ɵ meliness of external reporƟ ng
    c. Contract covenants and targets 
8.  Treasury report and risk management issues
    a. Budget update
    b. Liquidity and access to funds
    c. Asset/liability mismatches 
  9.  Human resources update
10.  Internal auditor presentaƟ on
11. Technology updates and other items
12.  IdenƟ fi caƟ on and documentaƟ on of acƟ on items
Source: Ledgerwood and White 2006.
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Information and disclosure
Board oversight quality is heavily dependent on the quality and timeliness of information supplied to members 
by the MFI’s management. Th is dependence is closely tied to the quality of the MFI’s management information 
systems, accounting personnel and practices, and internal controls systems. To avoid faulty decision making, the 
board should clearly understand what information it needs, what should and can be tracked regularly, and how 
the management information systems are able (or unable) to gather that information. 
Th e board should be aware of the MFI’s reporting requirements. A good starting point in designing a fi nancial 
performance monitoring system, for example, is for the board to do an inventory of existing reporting 
requirements. Th e board should pay particular attention to how well management is using information to 
inform operations, make decisions, and propose new strategies. A list of common reports and information 
provided to board members includes the following:
• Financial and operating reports on a monthly or quarterly basis, including a set of carefully chosen indicators 
for tracking progress against fi nancial goals, operational plans, and the MFI’s social mission. Th ese reports 
should give the board a complete and focused picture of progress regarding the triple bottom line.8
• A complete board information package for each monthly or quarterly meeting including (1) the current 
agenda, (2) minutes of the prior meeting, (3) management reports, (4) board committee reports, and (5) any 
additional information relevant to issues to be raised in the meeting.
Additionally, the board should use the following to verify reports it receives from management: independently 
audited fi nancial statements, together with the auditor’s management letter and any responses given by MFI 
management on a yearly basis, and internal audit reports as frequently as deemed necessary by the Audit Committee.
Training and development
Good governance must be developed over time. Eff ective boards undertake specifi c activities aimed at helping 
members to learn and grow in their ability to support and lead their MFI to the achievement of the institutional 
mission and objective (see box 2.7). Common training and improvement activities include
• Training sessions on best practices in microfi nance and understanding of key fi nancial and social indicators 
for measuring progress, which may involve internal MFI staff  members or external experts
• Retreats to build relationships and consensus between board members regarding the balance of fi nancial 
and social objectives
• Client visits to acquaint members with the MFI’s operations, products, and services and also to gain the 
clients’ perspective
• Self-evaluation on a yearly or biannual basis to measure eff ectiveness, identify strengths and weaknesses, 
and develop further strategies to improve board performance
8. For more information on fi nancial performance monitoring from a board’s perspective, see Bruett and Natilson (2002).
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Box 2.7 A Case Study: The Dominican Integrated Development InsƟ tute
The Dominican Integrated Development InsƟ tute (InsƟ tuto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral, or IDDI), founded 
in 1984, is a nonprofi t insƟ tute focused on infrastructure, health, local development, and biosustainability. Its 
microcredit department was founded in 1990. UnƟ l 2002, management by the board of directors was largely 
absent, and this lack of leadership was refl ected in IDDI’s porƞ olio.
The board met only every two or three months, with liƩ le rotaƟ on of its membership and low levels of 
assistance. Its composiƟ on was not diverse, and it used very few sources of support. Moreover, the 
microfi nance department was not insƟ tuƟ onally independent. Although it could show good fi nancial 
indicators and growth potenƟ al, few funds were available to meet demand. Worse, the systems of control 
and audiƟ ng were weak. As a result, IDDI had grown very liƩ le and its porƞ olio—with 90 percent equity—
was out of balance.
The 2002 reforms addressed these weaknesses by improving management and oversight by the board of 
directors. Today, the board consists of seven members, each serving for two years. Board members meet 
every month. The assembly, with 21 members, meets yearly. The board has rededicated itself to preserving 
the mission and assets of the insƟ tute. To that end, it sponsored a CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity Management) evaluaƟ on (see chapter 1 of this volume), separated the 
accounƟ ng and fi nancial funcƟ ons from the other departments, and restructured its debt-to-equity raƟ o. 
Finally, IDDI’s microcredit center has grown by an outstanding 400 percent to US$2.5 million, 2,800 clients, 
and 14 employees.
Source: Compiled by Tillman BrueƩ .
Th ird-party reviews
Boards can benefi t from a third-party review that includes an evaluation of the board itself. Reviews such as 
regulatory reviews or external audits may be legally. Others, such as rating reviews or internal evaluations, 
may be voluntary. A board should not hesitate to ask reviewers to consider its performance and activities. An 
experienced regulator, rater, or consultant can often identify the strengths and weaknesses of a board’s structure, 
its monitoring procedures, and its activities and then make recommendations to improve board eff ectiveness. 
Th e following checklist presents an eff ective approach to board self-evaluation (Curtis 2007: 62):
• Get directors on board.  
• Focus on group dynamics, such as committee and overall board performance. Be aware that peer 
evaluations can cause friction and disrupt board cohesiveness.
• Design the process internally.
• Do not overlook individual board member assessment. 
• Focus on issues that will allow the board to do its job. 
• Pay particular attention to
- Staffi  ng needs
- Skill set of individual directors
- Board members’ ability to communicate with one another
- Experience of individual board members
- Potential confl icts of interest
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- Th e board’s ability to access accurate information and thereby enable it to assess future business 
opportunities
- Th e board’s ability to communicate with management
• Consider the legal ramifi cations: Limit access to board evaluation results, and limit the paper trail.
• Generate actionable results: Focus on strengths and weaknesses. Use the information garnered to 
build team cohesiveness and improve decision making.
Th e Board of Directors: Member Selection and Participation
For development of an eff ective board, fi ve critical considerations contribute directly to the board’s performance 
and transparency: board member characteristics, board composition, the service period, confl ict of interest 
policies, and compensation policies. Each of those is discussed next, with some specifi c good practices provided.
Necessary characteristics of board members
An eff ective MFI board needs members with a variety of skills. Board members should ideally possess an 
abundance of leadership characteristics and multiple technical skills (see table 2.1). Banking laws and regulations 
require that fi nancial institution board members meet a “fi t and proper” test. Th is term generally means that 
members should be of good moral character with no record of bankruptcy or criminal convictions and possess 
an appropriate level of experience. All board members should develop the capacity to analyze fi nancial reports 
because each one assumes fi duciary responsibility on a personal level. Special attention should also be given to 
educate board members on risk management as it relates to MFIs.
Table 2.1 Recommended CharacterisƟ cs and Background of a Board Member
Leadership CharacterisƟ cs
• Commitment to the MFI’s mission
• Integrity and trustworthiness
• Demonstrated success as a leader
• CommunicaƟ on skills
• Common sense and good judgment
• Willingness to make the Ɵ me commitment
• Understanding of the personal commitment
• Ability to work well with other board members
Technical Background
• Banking
• Microfi nance 
• AccounƟ ng
• Law 
• Public relaƟ ons
• MarkeƟ ng
• Human resources
• Entrepreneurial or business management
• Community or social development
• InformaƟ on technology
• Fundraising
Source: Author.
Board composition
In new MFIs, board member selection is often based on a personal relationship with a dominant founder. 
Funders may request the authority to appoint board members as part of their investment agreement. As a result, 
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management and other board members may be limited in their ability to infl uence the profi le of investor-
appointed board members. Important checks and balances are often disregarded when long-standing personal 
relationships prevent board members from eff ectively overseeing management activities. Th is type of board is 
not uncommon in the early stages of an organization, yet as the MFI grows and changes, those board members 
should cede control to individuals who are not constrained by this potential confl ict of interest.
As the needs of the organization change and the membership of the board rotates, members should be recruited 
to match the organization’s current and future needs. For example, if an MFI introduces microinsurance 
products, it may wish to invite a professional with experience in underwriting to join the board. In addition, 
cultural, ethnic, and gender diversity ensures that the board maintains a broad perspective. For example, the 
board of an MFI that serves female clients should seek to maintain signifi cant female representation on its 
board. 
Varying opinions exist regarding the inclusion of clients and employees on the board. One school of thought 
(associated with Continental Europe) maintains that employee representation is healthy, while another school 
of thought (more Anglo-American) maintains that staff  participation blurs the line between the government, 
management, and staff . In addition, while the client’s perspective is undoubtedly important to maintaining 
eff ective governance, the inclusion of clients on boards has not been particularly successful. Client representatives 
often lack the skills or broader perspective to participate in a meaningful way.
Service period and participation
Th e service period for board members should be suffi  ciently long to develop a strong leadership unit, but 
short enough to continually introduce new members with fresh perspectives and novel ideas. Th e typical board 
member commitment ranges from two to four years. Board member terms should be staggered to prevent a 
large, simultaneous replacement of directors; it is important to maintain a continuity of ideas and objectives on 
the board. Members who do not participate during a specifi c period or who fail to meet board standards should 
be removed. Also, the number of sequential service periods should be limited.
Letters of appointment and confl ict of interest policies
Two useful tools to formalize the participation of board members include the letter of appointment and confl ict 
of interest policies. Th e letter of appointment should include detailed information on expected responsibilities, 
expected time commitment, compensation structure, legal liabilities and obligations, codes of conduct for board 
members, and confl ict of interest policies (see box 2.8).
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Box 2.8 ResponsibiliƟ es and Standards of Conduct for Board Members
Commitment to accountability, someƟ mes termed the fi duciary responsibility of board members, must 
infuse the performance of individual board members. Board members should act as follows:
• Know the mission, purpose, and goals of the MFI and its policies and programs.
• Understand the organizaƟ on’s strengths and weaknesses; a strategic role is to address these strengths 
and weaknesses.
• Prepare for, aƩ end, and parƟ cipate in board and commiƩ ee meeƟ ngs. 
• Ask substanƟ ve quesƟ ons; a key role of the board is to probe and to make policy decisions. 
• Review and understand the MFI’s fi nancial statements and related informaƟ on.
• Avoid making an uninformed judgment or policy decision. If informaƟ on is inadequate, work with 
management to get the informaƟ on needed.
• Represent the interests of the MFI as a whole, not those of any individual investor.
• Support the majority view once a decision is made.
• Maintain confi denƟ ality.
• Maintain independence, objecƟ vity, personal integrity, and ethical standards.
• Avoid confl icts of interest, inter-related transacƟ ons, insider lending, and nepoƟ sm.
• Meet personal disclosure requirements.
Source: Council of Microfi nance Equity Funds 2005.
It is particularly important that the MFI board have clear policies relating to confl ict of interests. Hidden or 
inappropriate relationships between board members and their institutions are one of the largest single causes 
of fi nancial institutional demise. Even minor confl icts of interest can damage an MFI’s internal trust or public 
image. What constitutes an unacceptable confl ict of interest varies between countries and cultures, but certain 
key elements of a sound confl ict-of-interest policy include
• No related lending to directors, their relatives, or businesses in which they have a stake
• Full disclosure of all confl icts and withdrawal of members from decision making on matters in which 
confl ict exists
• Prohibition of business transactions between an institution and its board unless they are carried out on an 
arm’s length basis with acceptable competition, market prices, and limits or special approval requirements
Board member compensation
Th ere is some disagreement over compensation of MFI board members. Some people argue that directors who 
volunteer their time share the MFI’s social commitment and serve MFIs with a strong sense of mission. Others 
believe that compensation is important to help attract skilled people to the board and motivate them to take 
their responsibilities seriously. One approach to compensation is to pay board members for their time spent 
working on board matters at a rate commensurate with senior level professionals and benchmarked against fees 
paid by similar organizations in the country. Many MFIs cover related expenses for board members who must 
travel to attend meetings.
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Summary and Conclusions
Good governance is a challenge for all types of organization—including MFIs. Although no one governance 
structure is universally applicable to all MFIs, or even to the same MFI at diff erent developmental stages, the 
board of directors is the pivot point that connects all concerned with good governance. A board consists of 
appointed or elected persons who represent institutional stakeholders and provide oversight and direction to 
managers of the institution.
A well-functioning board carefully attends to its fi duciary, strategic, supervisory, and management development 
roles. Much the board’s work is achieved through committees, which prepare their work before board meetings. 
Th e board chair and the CEO play important roles in board activities, but neither should dominate the board. 
One person should not fi ll both of these roles at the same time.
Important characteristics of the board include its size, its composition, and the skills that each member brings 
to the board. Upon selection, board members should have their roles, duties, and responsibilities explained 
to them; a letter of appointment is a useful way to clearly communicate such information to new members. 
Codes of conduct for board members and confl ict of interest policies are also necessary documents for guiding 
members in appropriate board behavior. Th e board should evaluate its eff ectiveness, as well as the eff ectiveness 
of its individual members, on a regular basis. Boards should also undertake development activities aimed at 
helping members and the collective to grow in ability and unity in successfully leading their institution to 
achieve its mission and objectives.
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Annex: Table 2A.1 Sample Board Self-EvaluaƟ on QuesƟ onnaire
The board of a Kazakhstani microfi nance insƟ tuƟ on used the quesƟ onnaire in table 2A.1 to assess its eﬀ ecƟ veness.
Please evaluate the following statements according to the scale:
4 – strongly agree, 3 – agree, 2 – disagree, 1 – strongly disagree
1. Vision and Mission: Is the Board united around a common vision and a shared 
understanding of strategy for the future? Consider:
4 3 2 1
Members of the board have a shared vision of the nature, purpose and prioriƟ es of the 
organizaƟ on.
Members of the board demonstrate a common view of the kind of organizaƟ on it wants to be, 
as well as of the most important aspects of its performance (i.e. the criteria by which success or 
failure is to be evaluated).
The above points are documented.
This is a board which knows where it is going.
Your comments:
2. Roles and ResponsibiliƟ es: Are the board’s responsibiliƟ es and the roles of board members 
clearly defi ned and understood? Consider:
The duƟ es of the board, of individual board members, and of board commiƩ ees, are clearly 
defi ned in wriƟ ng.
The legal obligaƟ ons of board members are well understood.
New board members are adequately briefed about the organizaƟ on, its history, consƟ tuƟ on, 
acƟ viƟ es, aspiraƟ ons, and performance.
There is an ongoing process of board training and development.
Your comments:
3. Governance Style: Does the Board manage by policy, or by intervenƟ on in areas of 
execuƟ ve responsibility? Consider:
The board focuses its aƩ enƟ on on “top level” performance indicators and strategic direcƟ on.
The Board looks for feedback on the eﬀ ecƟ ve implementaƟ on of its decisions without 
intervening in operaƟ onal detail.
The disƟ nct roles of board chair and execuƟ ve director are documented so that there is no 
overlap (or gap).
The Board strives to empower staﬀ  to do their jobs subject to periodic performance review 
without constant board intervenƟ on.
Board commiƩ ees concentrate on policy and direcƟ on and do not slip into “micro-
management”.
Your comments:
4. Board AdministraƟ on: Is board administraƟ on carried out in a fully professional and legally 
correct manner? Consider:
Board meeƟ ngs are correctly and legally administered, including calling noƟ ces for meeƟ ngs, 
agendas, minutes, annual general meeƟ ngs, and so forth, as appropriate.
Board meeƟ ngs are managed eﬀ ecƟ vely, making good use of everyone’s Ɵ me.
Board meeƟ ngs deal with important and strategic issues.
Processes for the appointment of new board members are documented and are designed so as 
to ensure a diverse and capable board.
Your comments:
Source: Compiled by Tillman Bruett.
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*Benjamin Franklin, 1758, Poor Richard’s Almanac, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/29923.html.
3Interest Rates:
                                 Paying for Risk 
Creditors have better memory than 
debtors.*
Benjamin Franklin
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Introduction
Access to commercially priced credit can have a positive eff ect on the welfare of low-income households. Credit can fi nance new equipment purchases or enable new business opportunities. It can provide better 
housing or help parents feed, educate, and clothe their children. In addition, it can help households and 
businesses recover from disaster. However, to provide regular access to credit, microfi nance institutions (MFIs) 
must be able to sustain their operations independently and grow to meet demand.
To that end, MFIs must charge an interest rate that covers their costs and risks and generates a profi t. Th ese 
rates are high compared to banks—sometimes by a large margin. Th is comparatively high cost of microloans 
has led to questions about whether MFIs are overcharging and overindebting the poor (see, for example, 
Epstein and Smith 2007).
Th is chapter presents data on the rates MFIs are charging their customers and examines the components 
of microcredit interest rates, especially the pricing of risk. Th e chapter then addresses the question whether 
microfi nance interest rates are too high and points to a number of key actions MFIs can take to lower rates 
without jeopardizing institutional sustainability or growth potential. Finally, it discusses the reasons why 
government policies and programs that aim to lower interest rates by imposing rate ceilings or subsidizing 
credit usually yield poor results.1
Interest Rate Setting
To succeed, MFIs must be able to meet a number of fi xed and variable costs and guarantee a certain profi t. 
Costs include operating costs, the cost of funds, and expected loan losses. Operating costs include offi  ce space 
and supplies, employee remuneration and training, transportation and communications, and equipment and 
building depreciation, among others.
Operational costs often make up the single largest component of the rates MFIs charge borrowers. In a 2002 
study, operating (also called administrative) costs were between 10 and 25 percent of the average loan portfolio. 
In a 2007 study, average operating expenses for 894 MFIs in 94 countries were around 19.2 percent of a loan 
portfolio (MIX 2007; Rosenberg 2002).2 Figure 3.1 shows that for a set of sustainable MFIs, average operating 
costs in 2004 and 2005 accounted for about 10 percent of the interest rates (using returns on loan portfolios as 
a proxy for interest rates).
1. Th is chapter is based on the June 2007 dialogue with Adrián González (the Microfi nance Information Exchange), Juan Buchenau 
(formerly with the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, now with the World Bank), and Narda Sotomayor (Superintendency of 
Banking, Insurance, and Pension Funds, Peru).
2. Rosenberg (2002) includes investment income as a component in his interest rate calculation. Th is chapter does not discuss 
investment income, but an MFI should deduct the revenue it earns on its assets, not including its loan portfolio (such as a certifi cate 
of deposit), when calculating the interest rate. Where necessary, the MFI might also need to include taxes in its calculation.
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Figure 3.1 Percentage Components of Real Interest Rates 2004 – 05
Source: PresentaƟ on by Adrian González (2008).
Figure 3.1 also gives an indication of how capital costs contribute to interest rates, as calculated by measuring 
the MFIs’ fi nancial expenses against portfolio returns,3 which were between 3 and 10 percent. Th e cost of capital 
typically includes weighted averages of the rates paid by the MFI on the loans or deposits used to fi nance its 
portfolio, as well as the cost of equity.4 Costs are adjusted for subsidized loans and grants. Self-sustaining 
institutions paying market rates will have higher fi nancial costs.
Sustainable interest rates also cover the risk that the loan will not be repaid. Th e risk price can be set on the 
basis of the historical loan loss rate for the entire portfolio, or it can be estimated and priced for categories of 
borrowers. Th e fi rst method is a simple calculation based on the portion of the gross loan portfolio that must be 
written off  due to borrower defaults every year. Th e MFIs analyzed in fi gure 3.1 averaged loan losses of about 
2 percent of their portfolios, which translates into roughly 2 percentage points in the interest rates that the 
institutions must charge borrowers, on average.5
More complex risk-pricing methodologies assess the probability of default at the client level and assign 
higher interest rates to riskier classes of borrowers. Using segmented risk-evaluation techniques, for 
example, one can analyze groups of borrowers with similar characteristics to determine how those 
characteristics correlate with loan performance. Th e data and analysis for this segmentation can be drawn from 
an MFI’s own database or, preferably, from a database that contains information from other MFIs, as well as 
businesses that are likely to have payment and transaction histories for lower-income borrowers (domestic 
goods retailers, agricultural input suppliers, and mobile phone service providers).6
3. Financial expenses as defi ned by Microfi nance Information Exchange are the “total of fi nancial expense on liabilities, net infl ation 
adjustment, cost-of-funds adjustment and other expenses from fi nancial services.” See González (2008).
4. In theory, the cost of equity is the return shareholders require on the capital they invest in an enterprise. While MFIs rarely have 
shareholders expecting dividends, Rosenberg (2002) recommends they calculate the expected erosion in the value of their equity 
caused by infl ation and add this component to the cost of capital.
5. A 5 percent loan loss rate would translate into about 5.25 percent as a component of an interest rate calculated using this method, because 
MFIs must plan to earn enough interest on the loans that are repaid to cover the losses on the larger amount that is lent. See Rosenberg (2002).
6. For more information about the development of credit reporting systems that include data relevant to lower-income borrowers, see the 
International Finance Corporation’s Credit Bureau Knowledge Guide, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfm.nsf/Content/FinancialInfrastructure. 
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Using data from their own client histories, however, MFIs can improve their assessment of client risk by 
analyzing how characteristics like gender, length of time at current address, and length of time at current 
employment correlate with loan performance. From this analysis, the loan offi  cer can determine if a prospective 
borrower is more or less likely to repay the loan on the basis of the performance of clients with similar profi les. 
For repeat borrowers, the performance of their past loans also enters in the calculation (Schreiner 2003). 
Using segmented risk evaluation along with traditional risk assessment methods, like workplace visits and 
interviews with references, MFIs can determine which borrowers pose the highest risk of default. Usually, 
the highest-risk clients are rejected, but other clients may be grouped into risk categories of average to high, 
average to low, and low, for example. Th e risk component of the interest rate charged on their loans would then 
be priced according to the historical loss rates associated with borrowers in their same category. 
Finally, the profi t component of an interest rate should be determined on the basis of the MFI’s growth targets. 
Without additional equity, the institution is constrained in the amount of money it can borrow and lend to its 
own clients. To support long-term growth, MFIs should target a capitalization rate between 5 and 15 percent 
of the average outstanding loan portfolio. Internally generated capital is arguably the best source of new equity 
because it enables the MFI to expand services to more borrowers or loan more money to existing clients. Th e 
MFIs represented in fi gure 3.1 were earning between 3 and 7 percent returns on their portfolios.
Are Microfi nance Interest Rates Too High?
Some observers seem to think that MFIs are taking advantage of their clients with abusively high interest 
rates. Worldwide, the MFIs for which data are available charge their borrowers an average interest rate of 35 
percent (Kneiding and Rosenberg 2008). Is this too much to charge poor people for borrowing money? Th ere 
are several ways to approach this question. First, from the borrowers’ perspectives, the costs and other terms of a 
loan from an MFI must generally be better than the terms off ered by alternative sources. Otherwise, borrowers 
would not take the loan from an MFI. Indeed, thousands of MFIs extend credit to the poor around the globe. 
Th is fi nding suggests that the price is not a determining factor for a large pool of low-income clients.7 In 
addition, while 35 percent may be high compared to rates in mainstream banking, the costs of making many 
small loans are higher than the costs of making larger loans—box 3.1 explains why.  Moreover, most MFIs are 
not profi ting greatly from their customers. Most of those MFIs that report their fi nancial data declare a modest 
median rate of return on capital of only 1.1 percent.
7. See the interview with Richard Rosenberg (CGAP 2008). See also, for example, Rosenberg (2007) and Epstein and Smith (2007). 
Th e data suggest that MFI rates are less than informal moneylending charges (CGAP 2008).
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Box 3.1 Microcredit Cost Structure
Compare the costs of two hypotheƟ cal lenders, Big Lender and MicroLender, each of which lends US$1,000,000. 
Big Lender makes a single loan, while MicroLender makes 10,000 loans of US$100 each.
The costs of capital and loan loss risk vary proporƟ onally with loan size. Both lenders need to raise US$1,000,000 
to fund their loans and will have to pay the same market rate—say, 10 percent—for the money. If both lenders 
have a history of losing 1 percent of their loans to default each year, they will need a loan loss provision of 
that amount. Both lenders can cover the cost of their capital and their risk by charging 11 percent (10% + 1% 
= 11%) on the loans they make to their customers.
AdministraƟ ve costs are not proporƟ onal to loan size. Making a single loan of US$1,000,000 might cost Big 
Lender US$30,000 (3 percent of the loan amount) in staﬀ  Ɵ me and other expenses involved in appraising, 
disbursing, monitoring, and collecƟ ng the loan. Big Lender can cover all its costs by charging the borrower an 
interest rate of 14 percent (10% + 1% + 3% = 14%).
However, MicroLender’s administraƟ ve costs for each US$100 loan will be much higher than 3 percent of 
the loan amount. Instead of US$3 per borrower, MicroLender is more likely to have to spend US$20 or more 
per borrower. Big Lender has to deal with only a single borrower, but MicroLender has to deal with 10,000 
borrowers who typically do not have collateral, fi nancial statements, or records in the database of a credit 
reporƟ ng bureau. Many of these clients may be illiterate. Lending to and collecƟ ng from such clients require 
Ɵ me-consuming personal interacƟ on.
If Big Lender’s client repays the loan every three months, Big Lender processes only four payment transacƟ ons 
per year. MicroLender’s borrowers probably make repayments monthly or even more frequently, generaƟ ng 
at least 120,000 transacƟ ons per year. While Big Lender’s administraƟ ve cost is US$30,000 per year, 
MicroLender’s cost is at least US$200,000. Covering this cost requires a 20 percent charge on loaned amounts, 
resulƟ ng in an interest rate of at least 33 percent (10% + 1% + 20% = 33%). AdministraƟ ve costs may be much 
higher in young MFIs that are too small to take advantage of economies of scale.
Source: Helms and Reille 2004.
Lowering Interest Rates at the Institutional Level
Yet, many MFIs can achieve substantially lower rates. Operating costs are both the largest and the most 
manageable component of interest rates, and effi  ciency gains at the institutional level could signifi cantly lower 
rates for the industry as a whole. MFIs can use a number of technological innovations (see chapter 8 of 
this volume) and operational strategies and tactics to improve productivity, better manage risk, and reduce 
administrative costs.
Operational risk management
Operational risks generally pose the greatest potential threat of loss to an MFI. Th ey include credit risk, and 
the risk of fraud and theft. MFIs can often greatly reduce the likelihood of losses and contain the scale of 
their damages by identifying vulnerabilities, designing and implementing controls, and monitoring their 
eff ectiveness.8
8. See the Operational Risk Management course developed by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2009c), http://www.cgap.
org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.4915/. See also chapter 1 of this volume.
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Loan offi  cer incentives
One particularly important way an MFI can reduce the risk of loan losses and generate higher productivity per 
offi  cer is to create appropriate incentives for loan offi  cers to maintain large and healthy loan portfolios. Th ere 
are many ways to design an incentive program. For example, the MFI can off er a bonus for each successful loan 
repayment, or it can target specifi c productivity measures, like number of clients visited per day.9 
Management Information Systems
Th e MFI’s management information system is its system of collecting, archiving, retrieving, and using 
information. Th e system tracks the loan offi  cers’ productivity and clients’ repayment schedules and balances, 
among other things. A good information system is vital for making timely assessments of the quality of the loan 
portfolio and other variables that most aff ect cost and risk.10
Lowering Interest Rates through Government Policy
Concerned with the high cost of microcredit, governments want to enable microbusinesses and poorer 
households to have access to cheaper credit to improve productivity and engage in welfare-enhancing economic 
activities. Governments also want to protect the poor from abusive lending practices. However, two of the most 
common policy and programmatic tools used by the public sector to achieve these goals—subsidizing credit or 
setting limits on interest rates—tend to lead to counterproductive results.
Subsidized credit programs are usually administered by state-owned fi nancial institutions or take the form 
of credit lines extended by the government to public or private lenders at below-market rates. Usually, the 
subsidized loans are directed toward specifi c groups of borrowers, like poor women, or specifi c economic 
activities, like housing or agriculture. 
Such programs often have many repercussions and serious problems. Government institutions may 
lack the incentives to monitor such loans eff ectively or control administrative costs, because success is 
often defi ned in terms of credit disbursements rather than loan portfolio quality or operational effi  ciency. 
Subsidized credit can be an enormous fi scal drain on governments as well, because borrowers often 
view the loans as lightly disguised grants, with no penalty for incomplete repayment. Th is perception 
is especially true in countries with a history of debt forgiveness. Box 3.2 describes other eff ects of subsidized 
interest rates.
9. See the MicroBanking Standards Project, http://www.gdrc.org/icm/rating/rate-5.html. 
10. See the management information system training off ered by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP 2009b).
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Box 3.2 Eﬀ ects of Subsidized Interest Rates
There are a number of important distorƟ ons that occur when interest rates are subsidized, for example,
• Subsidized loans distort the opportunity costs of investments, leading to the misallocaƟ on of capital 
to higher-risk and lower-reward opportuniƟ es.
• Subsidized onlending rates could result in a lack of fi nancial discipline by the fi nancial insƟ tuƟ on or 
its clientele, since cheap loans are oŌ en regarded as grants that do not have to be repaid.
• Low-cost loans discourage savings mobilizaƟ on because the loans preclude remuneraƟ ve interest 
rates on deposits. 
• Government budget constraints, combined with subsidized interest rates and poor enforcement, 
mean that fewer borrowers will be served over Ɵ me.
• Below-market onlending interest rates aƩ ract rent seekers and result in credit raƟ oning, which 
typically favors the wealthy and poliƟ cally connected. 
• Subsidies constrain the fi nancial insƟ tuƟ on from achieving long-term fi nancial sustainability, since 
the interest rate is inadequate to cover all operaƟ ng and fi nancial costs, and thus constrain the 
supply of credit.
• Withdrawal or cancellaƟ on of subsidies by the government or donors could cause fi nancial distress 
for the fi nancial insƟ tuƟ on and its client.
Source: Yaron, McDonald, and Piprek 1997.
Governments also try to lower the price of credit by simply mandating that interest rates stay below a preset 
ceiling. Oftentimes, such policies aim to protect borrowers from abuses. Unfortunately, this approach tends to 
hurt rather than protect microbusinesses and low-income households by rationing credit artifi cially. Interest 
rate ceilings make it diffi  cult or impossible for formal and semiformal microlenders to cover their costs, driving 
them out of the market (or keeping them from entering in the fi rst place). Potential clients either lack access 
to fi nance or must go to informal credit markets, which are generally more expensive (see Helms and Reille 
2004). Interest rate ceilings can also lead to less transparency about the costs of credit, because lenders cope 
with interest rate caps by adding confusing fees to their services. Table 3.1 summarizes the eff ects on supply 
and demand for microfi nance services when governments impose interest rate ceilings.
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Table 3.1 Eﬀ ects of Ceilings on Microcredit Interest Rates
Supply Side Demand Side
Short-term eﬀ ects
• Lenders are compelled to reduce their rates.
• Excess demand creates incenƟ ves for rent-
seeking among lending staﬀ .
• Viability of lending to the poor is reduced.
• Lenders’ profi ts on loans to the poor are 
reduced.
• IncenƟ ves to make loans to the poor are 
reduced.
• IncenƟ ves to increase investments to expand 
loans to the poor are reduced.
• Policy risk on lending to the poor increases 
(threat of new ceilings).
• A negaƟ ve signal is sent to potenƟ al investors.
• Risk of lending to microlenders increases.
• IncenƟ ves to commercial banks to enter the 
microcredit market are reduced.
Short-term eﬀ ects
• Demand for loans increases at the ceiling rate.
• Some new potenƟ al clients seek loans at the 
new rates.
• An excess demand for loans is created at the 
ceiling rate.
• Price of credit to some of those who actually 
get loans is reduced.
• Some borrowers pay higher transacƟ on costs 
than before.
Medium- to long-term eﬀ ects
• Microlenders’ creditworthiness declines.
• Price at which microlenders can borrow in the 
market increases.
• Microlenders’ profi t declines.
• Supply of funds from some donors declines.
• Some lenders leave the market.
• Supply of loans to the poor declines.
• Microlenders’ quality of services to the poor 
declines.
• Interest rates paid on deposits are reduced by 
aﬀ ected microlenders.
• Microlenders increase transacƟ on costs of 
small deposits.
• Supply of microlenders’ other fi nancial 
services to the poor also declines.
Medium- to long-term eﬀ ects
• Some borrowers shiŌ  to informal commercial 
markets.
• Many former borrowers become worse oﬀ  
because of the decline in supply.
• Defaults increase.
Source: Adapted by authors from Fernando (2006).
Although interest rate ceilings do not have the desired eff ect, concerns about the high costs of microfi nance in 
many countries are valid, and the government has an important role to play in expanding access to microfi nance 
and lowering its cost. If government can create the market conditions that lead to competition among lenders, 
evidence exists that lending prices can be driven downward, while access expands. In Peru, for example, rapid 
growth of the microfi nance industry over the past ten years has led to microfi nance penetration rates of between 
25 and 35 percent of eligible borrowers, and interest rates have been halved over the same period (Mapstone 
2009). Policies to promote competition among credit providers encompass a wide range of programmatic and 
regulatory issues: (1) market intervention, (2) fi nancial sector supervision and regulation, and (3) macroeconomic 
and trade policies.
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Market interventions
Governments can support programs to extend the reach of microfi nance. Th ese programs include loan 
guarantees, grants of technical assistance or equipment to MFIs, or grants to microborrowers to supplement 
loan funds. Each intervention has its own track record and recognized design and implementation pitfalls.11 
Financial sector supervision and regulation
In the creation of competition among fi nancial service providers, the regulatory framework is pivotal to providing 
a level playing fi eld and safeguarding the interests of the households and business. Th ere are many specifi c issues 
and topics to consider related to government supervision and regulation as it aff ects microfi nance.12 Concerns 
for government’s role include decisions about how to (1) apply prudential versus nonprudential regulation 
(prudential regulations require supervision of the banking authorities), (2) harmonize the treatment of diff erent 
types of fi nancial intermediaries to avoid regulatory arbitrage, (3) protect borrowers against abusively high rates 
or aggressive lending practices, (4) promote the development of accessible credit information and payments 
systems, and (5) enable innovations in the use of technology and institutional partnerships.
Governments can enable signifi cant effi  ciency gains in microfi nance markets by promoting the sharing of credit 
information, increasing institutional access to the electronic payments systems, and enabling innovations in 
payments technologies. As important, governments should enforce laws that protect against money laundering 
and other fi nancial crimes.13
Macroeconomic and trade policies
Finally, governments can create an enabling environment for a sustainable and competitive microfi nance sector 
by ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment and allowing the entrance of foreign competitors into the 
fi nancial markets.14
Conclusion
Th e debate about microcredit interest rates can quickly reach a highly politicized level. Evidence suggests, however, 
that MFIs are not profi ting excessively or charging their borrowers inappropriately high rates. Even at its most 
effi  cient, microlending will inevitably cost more than conventional lending. Th e rates refl ect the high costs of 
delivering small loans to a large number of diverse clients. Th e alternatives in informal markets represent even 
greater costs. However, this should not be interpreted as a justifi cation for ineffi  ciency. MFIs have an important 
role to play in lowering interest rates, and there are many lessons learned they can apply to the task.
While governments may be tempted to force rates downward by imposing interest rate ceilings or subsidizing 
credit, such means have proven ineff ective when it comes to expanding access to aff ordable credit. Alternatively, 
governments can help to expand access to fi nancial services and lower the price of microlending through 
the careful development of a legal and regulatory framework that promotes competition, creates adequate 
fi nancial infrastructure, enables innovation, and engenders stable fi nancial markets.
11. Two good starting points for information are CGAP (2009a) and World Bank (2005). 
12. See the U.S. Agency for International Development’s microLinks service, http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php. 
13. See Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg (2003). 
14. See World Bank (2008). 
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4 Microinsurance: 
Anticipating 
Client Risks
Microinsurance comes from the heart,
but it is a business and not a charity.* 
Alvaro Uribe, President of Colombia
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In microfi nance, governments, donors, and microbusinesses share one objective: to build productive assets and smooth consumption so that low-income producers and their families can live better. Donors, governments, 
and millions of households have invested heavily during the past two decades to create productive assets, and 
very little has been done to protect them. Unpredictable shocks—hurricanes, earthquakes, and illnesses, among 
others—aff ect the most vulnerable businesses and their assets disproportionately. Th us, there is growing interest 
in developing a menu of risk mitigation products, known collectively as microinsurance. Th ose products can 
reduce the economic damage of unanticipated events and can protect low-income households, microbusinesses, 
and the fi nancial institutions that serve them. Th is chapter defi nes microinsurance and discusses the development 
of microinsurance products and markets, including examples from Latin America.1
Insurance Products and Low-Income Clients
Insurance comes in a variety of products; it off ers diff erent levels of coverage and is provided by a variety of 
institutions. Th e key elements of insurance are payment of a premium, risk pooling, and reimbursement of 
loss. Th e insured person, household, group, or business pays a premium in exchange for coverage. Risk pooling 
enables economies of scale to provide coverage of such events or risks. Insurance reimburses an individual, 
household, group, or company for some or all of a fi nancial loss that is linked to an unpredictable event or risk.
Th ere are four groups of insurance products: (1) life, (2) disability, (3) health, and (4) property. Table 4.1 lists 
examples of coverage that each group can provide. Life insurance is one of the most popular; it includes funerals, 
pensions, endowments, education, and credit (to cover an outstanding loan in the event of the borrower’s 
death. Disability insurance can include partial or total coverage and may off er payments for temporary or 
permanent disability. Some disability products cover dismemberment, while others include coverage of credit 
commitments. Health insurance can cover hospitalization, outpatient services, optical and dental services, and 
specifi c diseases. Finally, property insurance can cover loss from fi re, theft, accident, or natural disaster.
Table 4.1 Types of Insurance
Type Examples
Life Credit , educaƟ on, pension, funeral, and endowments
Disability Permanent and temporary disability; total and parƟ al dismemberment; and debt coverage 
due to disability
Health HospitalizaƟ on; out-paƟ ent, opƟ cal, surgical, and dental services; and specifi c diseases
Property Fire, theŌ , agriculture, fl ood, drought, and prices
Source: Adapted by authors from McCord (2007c).
Design of the Product for Low-Income Markets
Microinsurance off ers an insurance product especially designed for low-income clients—households and 
microbusinesses. As a match to the cashfl ow needs of the client, microinsurance products are simple to 
understand, arrive in a package with other products, and have a low premium. Because most clients have never 
used insurance, providers typically off er client education as an integral part of the insurance package. Th e 
education eff ort describes the plan’s premium, coverage, deductions, claims processing, and payment. 
1. Th is chapter is based on the February 2007 dialogue with Michael McCord (MicroInsurance Centre LLC), Carlos Arce (World 
Bank), and Héctor Rivas (Financiera FINSOL). Ramanathan Coimbatore also contributed to this chapter.
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An eff ective microinsurance program should be based on an understanding of the priorities and options faced 
by the poor households in a specifi c market. Th e product’s promotion, delivery mechanism, and other aspects 
must be adapted to the special needs and circumstances of poor households and microbusinesses. Th e product 
should respond to the client’s perceived needs, risks, and ability to pay. Th ese factors are based on local, cultural, 
and national practices and available services. For instance, in a country with a reliable, free, and accessible public 
health infrastructure, health insurance needs will be a lower priority. In a community with a strong tradition 
of mutual support in times of death (such as burial societies), death benefi ts and coverage will be lower on the 
list of priorities.2
Th e potential insurance market includes the traditional market (households and businesses wealthy enough 
to aff ord insurance) and the microinsurance market (households and businesses just above and just below the 
poverty line). Th e very poor and destitute households are best served through state assistance such as government 
transfers and other programs. Figure 4.1 shows the potential insurance market and the millions who are too 
poor to aff ord commercial microinsurance. Table 4.2 compares ex ante risk coverage (with insurance) with ex 
post results and shows how the costs of shocks can be greatly reduced by insurance.
Figure 4.1 TradiƟ onal and PotenƟ al Insurance Markets
Source: Adapted by authors from McCord and Roth (2006).
2. See MicroInsurance Centre LLC (2009).
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Table 4.2 Risk Coverage and Outcomes
Ex ante risk protecƟ on Outcomes
Individuals Crop diversifi caƟ on
Intercropping 
BeƩ er land use 
Income source diversifi caƟ on
Asset and inventory accumulaƟ on
AdopƟ on of new producƟ on technologies
Community groups and 
associaƟ ons
Risk pooling through group coordinaƟ on
Ex post risk absorpƟ on Outcomes
Individuals and community 
groups and associaƟ ons
MigraƟ on
Asset sales
Increased daily labor
Human capital decapitalizaƟ on (withdrawal of children from schools, no 
health care investment)
Mutual community help (in some cases)
Source: Authors.
If one assumes that low-income households want insurance, how can a microfi nance institution (MFI) provide 
coverage on a cost-eff ective massive scale? What makes microinsurance attractive to the uninsured and the 
insurance providers? Th e MicroInsurance Centre has identifi ed several factors that shape a client’s decision to 
purchase insurance coverage:3
• Client’s perceptions of insurance
• Client’s understanding of how insurance works (premium, coverage, deductibles, and requirements)
• Product matches demand
• Ease of payment
• Cost of coverage
• Client’s disposable income
• Cost and frequency of health care or other needs 
To be attractive and eff ective, microinsurance providers need to generate an appreciation of the product 
through client education. As fi gure 4.2 shows, often clients set clear priorities. Once a large group of clients has 
been convinced that microinsurance off ers useful protection from high-priority risks, a number of institutions 
become involved in the defi nition and delivery of the product. Th is chain of institutional actors includes 
the policyholders and benefi ciaries, delivery channels, regulated and unregulated insurers, and reinsurance 
companies (see table 4.3).
3. See MicroInsurance Centre LLC (2009).
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Figure 4.2 Demand for Insurance: Risk Management Needs of the Poor in 11 Countries, 2002–06
Source: McCord 2007b.
Table 4.3 The Microinsurance Supply Chain
Who they are What they do
Reinsurer Interpolis Re mutual, AXA, Ethiopia 
index, Swiss Re-India weather index
Cover parƟ al risk of insurer, health and 
index.
Regulated insurer 
and unregulated 
insurer
MulƟ -naƟ onal and domesƟ c 
commercial, mutual, CBOs, NGOs, 
funeral parlors, informal groups
Manage insurance risk, set pricing, set 
policyholder requirements, and manage 
controls.
Delivery channel MFIs, banks, CBOs, NGOs, agents, 
employers, government, churches, 
retailers
Manage contract with policyholders, sell 
insurance, aid clients with claims, and 
forward or pay claims.
Policyholder Individuals, groups Pay premiums, make claims and buy 
group coverage for members.
Covered lives Family members, group members Have a premium paid.
Benefi ciary Any person or group idenƟ fi ed by 
policyholder
Become idenƟ fi ed as a benefi ciary on 
insurance policy, make claim, and receive 
payment.
Source: MicroInsurance Centre LLC, hƩ p://www.microinsurancecentre.org.
Note: CBO = community-based organizaƟ on; NGO = nongovernmental organizaƟ on. 
Microinsurance for Rural Clients
Beyond traditional livestock insurance, microinsurance providers, governments, and donors have responded 
to the rural sector’s needs with weather-indexed insurance. Because many MFIs have client networks in rural 
areas, they play an important role in helping rural households, smallholder farmers, and rural microbusinesses 
improve their risk management practices. Th is approach includes risks from weather (hurricanes, droughts, 
fl oods, El Niño, and La Niña) and other exogenous events. 
Weather-indexed insurance, which uses a rainfall index, is the most recent risk management tool available for 
small agricultural producers. It is eff ective because the weather outcome (such as the rainfall level) is easily 
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measured in an objective and transparent way. Th e level can be verifi ed by a specialized institution, and levels are 
frequently reported (daily if possible). A historical record of the outcome enables the system to set acceptable 
and unacceptable outcome ranges. In some cases, MFIs provide this product as part of a package of services. 
Th e index is based on historical data on rainfall and yields for certain products, and payment is generated 
automatically after verifi cation. 
Th e most eff ective indexed insurance systems have transparent contracts, low administrative costs, and 
standardized contracts for small producers, and they fully cover costs without requiring ongoing subsidies. 
Th is approach makes weather the variable, but the specifi c outcome is chosen because it directly aff ects the 
level of crop production and the household income. Examples of these weather variables include rainfall, 
temperature, and wind. Some indexes use satellites to confi rm certain aspects, such as vegetation loss, daily 
sunshine requirements, animal losses, and hurricane paths to determine aff ected areas. Box 4.1 provides an 
example of the mechanism of weather-indexed insurance.
Box 4.1 The Mechanisms of a Weather-Indexed Insurance System
The following illustrates the mechanisms used in a weather-indexed insurance system.
Assume that the expected value of the harvest of a crop is US$10,000. If rainfall is less than 1,000 millimeters 
(mm) over a specifi c period, it is considered a drought. The esƟ mated loss of crop sales income has been set 
at US$10 per mm. Rainfall is measured at 700 mm for the period; the loss is 300 mm of rainfall—resulƟ ng 
in US$3,000 in lost income. This is the amount that would be automaƟ cally compensated by the weather-
based index insurance system.
Source: Adapted by authors from Arce (2007).
Delivery of the Product
Whether it is a life insurance product, a weather-indexed product, or another type of coverage, the effi  ciency and 
scale of coverage depends, in part, on the supply chain. Th is chain includes all actors involved in the promotion, 
delivery, servicing, and risk-sharing (reinsurance) required for the eff ective provision of microinsurance. Table 
4.3 illustrates the actors involved and the challenges of coordination that can develop in microinsurance.
Th e four institutional models to deliver microinsurance are (1) the partner-agent model, (2) the cooperative 
model, (3) the mutual-based association model, and (4) the community-based model (see table 4.4). Under 
the partner-agent model, insurance companies underwrite the contracts and agents distribute the insurance 
products. Under the cooperative model, the insurance company performs both functions of underwriting and 
distributing the products. Under the mutual-based association model, the owners are the policyholders, but 
the insurance is professionally managed by an insurance expert. Under the community-based model, local 
communities are the owners and managers. Th e organization serves, is accountable to, and is governed by a 
local constituency with limited resources. Th ose resources might include the residents of a village or members 
of a market group, or they might represent single or multiple communities or a network of communities with 
similar interests.
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Table 4.4 CharacterisƟ cs of the Four Insurance Delivery Models
Criteria Partner-agent CooperaƟ ve Mutual-based
associaƟ on
Community-based
Ownership Insurance company Co-operaƟ ve 
(policyholders and 
owners can be 
diﬀ erent)
Members of 
the associaƟ on 
(policyholders and 
owners are same)
Local communiƟ es (single 
or mulƟ ple communiƟ es 
or a network of 
communiƟ es)
ObjecƟ ve Profi t-making MeeƟ ng of member 
needs (profi tability 
is not a moƟ ve)
Balance between 
profi t moƟ ve and 
member needs
Service of social needs 
(profi tability is never a 
moƟ ve)
Nature of 
management
Professional 
managers who 
report to the board
Manager with 
insurance skills 
(member or external 
resource)
Professional 
management by an 
insurance expert 
(not a member)
Management by local 
communiƟ es who lack 
insurance experƟ se
DistribuƟ on 
mechanism
MFIs, telecom 
company, uƟ lity 
company, retail 
stores, post oﬃ  ces, 
religious insƟ tuƟ ons
Member oﬃ  ces 
at the district and 
municipal levels and 
through MFIs in case 
of nonmembers
DistribuƟ on at the 
Ɵ me of signing up as 
a member
Network of members who 
join to receive benefi ts
Licensing Licensed under the 
Insurance Act
Not licensed under 
the Insurance Act
Licensed to operate 
insurance
Not licensed
Examples ICICI Bank and Vimo 
SEWA 
(India)
La Equidad 
(Colombia)
CARD MBA 
(Philippines)
UMSGF (Guinea)
Source: Goldberg and Ramanathan 2007.
Note: CARD MBA = Center for Agriculture and Rural Development Mutual Benefi t AssociaƟ on; MFI = microfi nance insƟ tuƟ on; 
SEWA = Self-Employed Women AssociaƟ on; UMSGF = Forestry Guinean Mutual Health OrganizaƟ on Union. 
Given the distribution networks required to reach large numbers of clients, the most effi  cient and eff ective way to 
achieve large-scale microinsurance coverage is the partner-agent model. Th is model pairs commercial insurance 
companies with MFIs, public utility companies, or telecom companies. Th e insurance company provides the 
coverage, and the partners provide local knowledge, local networks, and services that can lower costs.
Microinsurance providers can reach large-scale coverage when a reinsurance partner and a clear and supportive 
legal and regulatory framework are present. Providers are limited in their capacity to underwrite individually 
each contract without support from reinsurance companies. Reinsurance companies play a huge role in the 
development of complex microinsurance products and in dissemination of the best practices in the sector. 
Simple microinsurance products that cover death, disability, and illness are easy to underwrite because the 
clients have diff erent risk profi les and their claims do not occur at the same time. More complex products, 
like index-based weather and livestock insurance policies, represent exposure to events that are diffi  cult to 
predict and that aff ect all policyholders at the same time—a drought or excess rain, for example. 
Special legal and regulatory issues exist for weather-based insurance products. Regulators should ask whether 
the product is insurance or a derivative. Th ey will also have operational questions such as the defi nition of an 
insurable interest (ownership), the legality of a climate-based index, and the acceptable proof of loss. Regulators 
may also be concerned with the eff ect of those products on the soundness of the insurance industry and on 
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the fi nancial sector in general. Such concerns lead to norms on reserve levels and capital adequacy. Finally, 
regulators should be concerned with consumer protection and transparency, which can be especially 
challenging when dealing with dispersed rural populations (Arce 2007).
Important reinsurance issues exist with weather-based insurance. Such products can cover the needs and 
risks of several countries in a region. Th e World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the European 
Development Bank, and Partner Re (a leading international reinsurance company) have contributed 
€100 million in initial capital to a regional weather-based approach. Services include reinsurance, technical 
assistance, and data cleaning. Th is eff ort became eff ective in September 2007 and will serve as a model for 
future programs (Arce 2007).
Clients and benefi ciaries should be informed of the coverage, means for registering claims and presenting 
proof, deductibles, and limitations. Th ey also need to know about changes in policy coverage and requirements. 
Th e institutions that have direct and regular contact with the policyholders—MFIs, banks, community-based 
organizations, the government, churches, or post offi  ces—are the best prepared to guarantee clients and 
benefi ciaries access to this information. Th e government can also play a role through consumer protection 
laws and complaint processes that protect clients when purchasing insurance and ensure that their rights are 
protected in practice.
How Does Latin America Fare in Microinsurance Coverage?
Microinsurance varies widely throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, as a landscape study by the 
MicroInsurance Centre showed. Map 4.1 shows microinsurance coverage rates in Latin America. Th e survey 
on which this map is based focused on the world’s 100 poorest countries. Th e Latin American leaders in 
this group are Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, all with relatively good insurance networks. Brazil, Mexico, and 
other wealthier countries in the region were not included in the survey. Although Brazil and Mexico have low 
insurance coverage rates for the poor, given their relative size and wealth, the case studies in boxes 4.2 and 4.3 
prove that microinsurance is progressing in those countries as well (Roth, McCord, and Liber 2007).
60 Chapter 4 - Microinsurance: Anticipating Client Risks
Map 4.1 Microinsurance Coverage in LaƟ n America, 2007
Source: Adapted with permission from Roth, McCord, and Liber (2007). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to number of lives covered. The specifi c number of lives covered was not available for Belize, 
Guyana, HaiƟ , and Jamaica.
MFIs and the Barriers to Mainstreaming Microinsurance
MFIs can play a decisive role in the design, delivery, monitoring, and evaluation of microinsurance products 
and, ultimately, the scale of coverage of such products. Th ey cannot provide the complete package by 
themselves, but they make very valuable partners for insurance companies, government agencies, and other 
actors in the microinsurance chain. To maximize the benefi ts to MFIs of providing microinsurance products, 
the MicroInsurance Centre recommends the following approach: 
• Leverage the market for desired products and terms: Encourage insurers to off er products that respond 
better to the needs and demands of clients.
• Encourage competition: Use a number of insurers, tender off ers, and provide annual policy reviews.
• Improve integration of microinsurance with MFI incentives and policies: Generate appreciation, 
provide sales incentives, and ensure client education.
• Recognize the value of a broad range of insurance products to MFI clients and indirectly to the MFI 
itself: Understand the full range of benefi ts to client and institution to provide additional incentives 
to push insurers to off er good products and to sell these products in a professional manner to clients.
• Understand your cost structures.4 
4. See MicroInsurance Centre LLC (2009). 
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Because the delivery supply chain requires close coordination of a number of actors, limitations often exist 
at various points. Th e delivery channel must reach large numbers of interested clients, provide appropriate 
incentives, and respond to claims. Benefi ciaries need to develop an appreciation of the benefi ts of insurance, 
a product that has odd characteristics compared to loans, grants, and other services. Given the unique needs 
and sheer number of this pool of uninsured households and microbusinesses, the products should be simple 
to understand and determined by available delivery channels. As boxes 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate, those principles, 
along with strong leadership, can have impressive results.
Box 4.2 Mapfre Seguros: Microinsurance in Brazil
In 2003, when Antonio Cássio dos Santos became the chief execuƟ ve oﬃ  cer of Mapfre Seguros, his fi rst objecƟ ve 
was to oﬀ er insurance to people in all income segments in Brazil by expanding the network of delivery channels and 
increasing the product menu. The results have been outstanding. In a span of fi ve years, Mapfre Seguros has covered 
3.5 million people through group life and funeral insurance policies, insured 50,000 rural houses, and provided 
unemployment insurance coverage to 3.7 million people. 
Mapfre Seguros achieved massive outreach as a result of three factors: (1) product prices are appropriately based on 
special mortality tables; (2) product design is based on the risk prioriƟ es of the target segment (demand driven); and 
(3) new delivery channels (retail stores, uƟ lity companies, consumer goods companies, and faith-based insƟ tuƟ ons) 
were developed. Its emphasis on using diﬀ erent distribuƟ on channels to sell demand-driven products at a reasonable 
price paid huge dividends in terms of outreach and sustainability.
Source: Authors’ interview with Antonio Cássio dos Santos, Rio de Janerio, Brazil, March, 2008.
Box 4.3 FINSOL: Life and Funeral Insurance in Mexico
In 2002, a group of fi nancial sector investors created Financiera FINSOL, a regulated, limited objecƟ ve 
fi nancial company in Mexico. FINSOL began operaƟ ons in August 2003, and by mid-2007, it was serving more 
than 200,000 clients through 105 branches in 28 states. Microcredit methodologies include village banks, 
solidarity groups, and individual credit. FINSOL also serviced remiƩ ances. The next step is the formaƟ on of a 
Popular Financial Society to enable FINSOL to provide a broader range of fi nancial services, including savings. 
As the insƟ tuƟ on evolved, FINSOL’s management noƟ ced another gap in the market—a lack of insurance 
coverage for borrowers. The high costs of promoƟ on and operaƟ ons and the potenƟ al clients’ geographic 
isolaƟ on made them unaƩ racƟ ve to tradiƟ onal providers. The MFIs did not have the specifi c insurance design 
and delivery skills. Yet, in combinaƟ on, they could assemble a product that would be aƩ racƟ ve to FINSOL 
clients and marginally profi table for the insƟ tuƟ ons. Within one year of start-up, FINSOL life insurance had 
reached more than 180,000 borrowers. The insurance policy includes (1) no required medical examinaƟ on 
for coverage, (2) low policy costs, (3) US$3,000 coverage, (4) immediate payout of 30 percent for funeral 
expenses, (5) remaining payout within three days, (6) coverage of people age 16 to 65, (7) use of a collecƟ ve 
policy format, and (8) double coverage for accidental death.
Source: Adapted by authors from Rivas (2007).
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Conclusion
Th e microinsurance industry is still in its infancy, but it can play an important role in the risk management and 
consumption smoothing of low-income households. It can also contribute to the growth of microbusinesses 
and their fi nancial service providers. Low-income households and microbusinesses face a wide range of 
unpredictable shocks, both large and small. Th ese can include slow onset problems (such as a drought) or 
sudden, devastating shocks (such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and illnesses). Rural producers are also exposed 
to a series of production-related risks that can be addressed in an effi  cient and cost-eff ective way by innovative 
microinsurance products.
Because of the needs and limitations of clients, microinsurance has important diff erences compared to 
commercial insurance. It has special characteristics in design, delivery, claims processing, and premium 
structuring that make microinsurance an important alternative risk pooling mechanism for the poor. Although 
alternative models have shown success in some cases, in many countries the path to large-scale microinsurance 
coverage will be through traditional insurance companies. Th ese companies already have the skills, information, 
and risk management systems required for microinsurance.
Governments and donors can help to foster the partnerships that can result in large-scale coverage by supporting 
research to develop actuarial tables, client education campaigns, fi nancial literacy eff orts (including insurance), 
and conferences and exchanges to share experiences in the region.
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    5 Progressive Housing
          Microfinance:
            Building One Room at a 
Time
A house is a machine for living in.*
 Le Corbusier
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Housing is a basic need. It provides security; protection from the elements; and, in the case of microentrepreneurs, a place to conduct business. Housing microfi nance provides the fi nancial resources 
for new or additional construction in small, manageable amounts using an incremental lending approach that 
mirrors the building process of poor households. In so doing, it can help the poor guarantee themselves a 
place to live and work. Th is chapter describes housing microfi nance and its progressive housing approach and 
discusses issues in the design of a housing microfi nance product.1
Th e Housing Microfi nance Approach
Compared to traditional housing fi nance, housing microfi nance has more fl exible requirements. For example, 
its proof-of-title requirements are less stringent, and it does not require the borrower to fi nish building the 
house within a given period. Given this fl exibility, microfi nance institutions (MFIs) can address the need 
for decent housing and enhance their portfolios with a housing microfi nance program. Th ey can fi nance 
land acquisition, new home construction, purchase of a complete house, home improvement, construction of 
additional rooms or other structures (new bedrooms, a garage, or a workshop), home repair and maintenance, 
and new or upgraded infrastructure. Moreover, these gradual improvements can contribute to the broader goal 
of community development and slum improvement (Painter, Campa Sole, and Moser 2006).
In Latin America, the demand for housing fi nance for the poor remains largely unmet because traditional banks 
and mortgage institutions will not change their lending practices to meet the needs of the poor. Traditional 
mortgages and home improvement loans fi nance the cost of home building in a single loan, usually distributed 
over the building period. Th ose loans have strict underwriting requirements that include full legal title to the 
property and the ability to make monthly payments for a long time. Th ey also require the borrower to complete 
the building process in a specifi ed time. 
Th e poor usually cannot comply with those requirements. Th ey may be unable to prove title to their property. 
Or they may be unable or unwilling to commit to a large loan amount or a long repayment period. With a 
housing microfi nance program, MFIs can use the methodologies of microfi nance to fi ll this gap and address 
the housing needs of the poor based on their own building practices. 
Housing microfi nance shares a number of similarities with traditional business microfi nance, including (1) 
small loan amounts (compared to traditional housing fi nance), (2) no collateral requirement, (3) commercial 
interest rates, and (4) creditworthiness determined by cashfl ow and character. Its diff erences from microfi nance 
are in its eff ect, loan size, nature of the client, and repayment plan. Table 5.1 describes some of the diff erences 
between housing microfi nance and traditional business microfi nance.
1. Th is chapter is based on the January 2008 dialogue with Richard Shumann (Cooperative Housing Foundation, CHF 
International) and Jesús Ferreyra (MiBanco, Peru).
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Table 5.1 Diﬀ erences between Microfi nance Loan Types
TradiƟ onal microfi nance loan Housing microfi nance loan
Eﬀ ect on borrower’s income Eﬀ ect on borrower’s assets base and possibly  income
Small loan amounts (US$100–US$400) Larger loan amounts (US$250–US$5,000)
Individual or group loans Individual loans
Repayment capacity based on generaƟ on 
of future income
Repayment capacity based on borrower’s current income
Loan maturity of 3–9 months Loan maturity of 18 months to 4 years
Source: Daphnis 2006.
Th e progressive housing approach meets the needs of the poor because they can avoid taking out large loans 
for long periods, and they can avoid other traditional bank requirements. Compared to traditional housing 
loans, housing microfi nance loans are small (US$250–US$5,000) and are amortized over relatively short terms 
(between 1 and 10 years). Th e small amount of the loan makes the debt aff ordable. Its fl exible requirements 
regarding proof of land title or income also makes qualifi cation easier.
Th is approach challenges the traditional belief that housing fi nancing requires relatively large loan amounts 
over long terms with government subsidies to keep the payments aff ordable. Although progressive housing 
microfi nance programs may face important challenges, they off er considerable benefi ts for the poor and the 
MFIs interested in diversifying their product portfolios.
Key elements of the progressive housing loan include guarantees and collateral, technical assistance, cost 
considerations, institutional arrangements, and subsidies. Th e role of government is also a critical consideration 
in designing a housing microfi nance product. Th ese issues are discussed in greater detail below.
Guarantees and collateral
Traditional microfi nance does not require formal collateral or guarantees. It guarantees payment with devices 
such as group lending, forced saving, and alternative forms of collateral. Many of these devices, however, may not 
be appropriate for the relatively higher amounts and longer terms of a housing loan. In housing microfi nance, 
collateral represents an important constraint. Th e lack of a formal land title means that the client has no formal 
collateral to off er. Given this lack of land titles and house deeds, MFIs need to be more fl exible and to allow 
clients to use other documents that prove ownership or at least demonstrate a minimum period of residence. 
Th ose documents might include tax receipts or public utilities service receipts. Housing microfi nance also 
accepts more fl exible forms of guarantee, such as a co-signer (usually with proof of formal sector employment), 
chattel mortgages, and obligatory savings. Th e principle is to hold something of value to the borrower to ensure 
on-time and complete repayment of the loan.
Technical assistance
Housing microfi nance products typically include technical assistance in the loan agreement. Some MFIs view 
technical assistance as an integral part of their progressive housing methodology. Others view this as an additional 
cost, with little eff ect on loan repayment. Technical assistance includes help in the design for improving the 
quality of the building, meeting pre-loan inspections, lowering the costs for appropriate construction materials, 
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and complying with postloan inspections. Th e MFI may require that borrowers acquire plans, estimates, and other 
construction services from a list of recommended service providers. To provide the best technical assistance, MFIs 
should rely on staff  construction specialists in addition to loan offi  cers. In either case, the best technical assistance 
can improve the relationship with the client and the quality of housing construction.
Housing microfi nance programs will use a variety of means to secure the staff  and human resources for technical 
assistance, including the following:
• Train loan offi  cers in basic construction budgeting and design.
• Train construction specialists as loan offi  cers.
• Maintain construction specialists in addition to loan offi  cers.
• Require that households acquire plans, estimates, and other construction services from a list of recommended 
third parties.
Costs and aff ordability
Interest rates for business microloans are usually higher than for traditional loans because the associated costs 
of small short-term loans are higher. Because housing credits are larger and have longer repayment terms 
than do business microloans, origination costs are lower. However, other types of risks can emerge, such as 
term mismatch and variable interest rates. If the housing loan is not linked to increased production by the 
microbusiness, the risk of nonpayment increases. To address these and other risks, MFIs must fi nd diff erent 
long-term funding sources. Most MFIs in developing countries, however, rely on short-term funds from 
deposits. As a result, housing microfi nance is more expensive than traditional microcredit.
Institutional Changes
To be able to off er housing microfi nance loans, MFIs will need to adapt themselves to the new product. 
Th ey will need to complete an internal process of building and strengthening capacities before launching the 
new product. Most microfi nance programs are based on solidarity groups. Housing microfi nance provides 
more individual lending. Th e loan offi  cers, therefore, will become multiproduct specialists, with some technical 
knowledge required. Th e mission of the MFI might change because it will no longer provide only business-
related loans.
Th e MFI’s lending methodology can also be aff ected by a decision to add a housing microfi nance product. 
For example, solidarity groups are not normally used because housing loans tend to have larger loan amounts 
and longer repayment periods. Th e MFI would need to assess the entire group’s ability to repay the loan. In 
Latin America, two exceptions to this rule are the infrastructure credits provided by Génesis Empresarial in 
Guatemala and the land purchase and titling of the Cooperativa Jesús Nazareno in Bolivia.2
Subsidies 
Subsidies can provide support for microfi nance products. However, for MFIs to reach most households, 
subsidies are not necessary. Microfi nance providers prefer subsidies that provide a small interest-rate rebate 
2. See Génesis Empresarial, http://www.genesisempresarial.com/, and Cooperativa Jesús Nazareno, http://www.jesus-nazareno.coop/. 
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tied to on-time repayment. For example, a World Bank–sponsored land fund project in Honduras rewarded 
borrowers who had a perfect on-time repayment record with savings held in accounts established at the start 
of the loan cycle. Subsidies could also be linked to technical assistance, to lengthen the grace period (lowering 
the eff ective interest rate). 
Subsidies can serve other important purposes for MFIs and their clients. For example, MFIs might want 
to use the subsidies to cover land and title formalization processes. Subsidies can also pay for investment in 
new technologies, thereby lowering loan delivery costs over time (Painter, Campa Sole, and Moser 2006: 18; 
Robinson 2002).
Th e Role of Government and Risk Management
Most governments in Latin America have adequate policies for housing microfi nance products. However, 
to mobilize suffi  cient capital to meet the growing demand for housing microfi nance, MFIs and government 
regulators must meet the challenge of reducing risks, especially after a natural disaster. By reducing the risk of 
lending to the poor, governments encourage private sector lenders to enter the market. To that end, government 
regulation should be neither premature nor heavy handed. Governments should avoid interventions that 
distort the market. Governments can also encourage private sector lenders to enter the market through special 
programs in underwriting, marketing, servicing, and collateral guarantees.
Examples from Latin America
Experiences in Mexico and Peru demonstrate that housing microfi nance can be a profi table business. As those 
examples show, the average loan size is larger, the loan term is longer, and yet, the outstanding loan portfolio is 
often smaller than microcredit for working capital. Creative alliances with services providers (such as building 
materials providers, universities with architecture and engineering students, and supermarkets) can make 
housing microfi nance more aff ordable and can streamline repayment.
Housing and Habitat Foundation in Mexico (FUNHAVI)
As microfi nance has grown and become more sophisticated, housing microfi nance has expanded. As of 2007, for 
example, the housing portfolio of the housing pioneer Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF International) 
included US$16.2 million out of a total portfolio of US$79.4 million in 11 countries. CHF International 
provides housing loans and technical assistance. Its credits range between less than US$1,000 to more than 
US$3,000. Th e repayment periods are between 12 and 18 months.3
One of CHF International’s most successful programs is the Housing and Habitat Foundation (Fundación 
Habitat y Vivienda A.C., FUNHAVI). Established in 1996, FUNHAVI began as a pilot program to support 
community banks and provide health services to the newly arrived workers in the assembly plants (maquilas) 
in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Two years later, recognizing a growing need for housing, FUNHAVI implemented 
a full-scale housing microfi nance program. Loans range from US$510 to US$2,590, with an average loan 
size of US$1,550. During its fi rst 10 years, FUNHAVI made loans worth a total of US$8.2 million to more 
than 5,300 low-income families. FUNHAVI now operates in three locations in Ciudad Juárez and one in 
3. See CHF International, http://www.chfi nternational.org. 
71Managing Risk and Creating Value with Microfinance
the city of Chihuahua, and plans to open three more locations in the following year. It is noteworthy that the 
progressive housing loans are small (average loan balance of US$716), but the short-term portfolio quality 
risks are signifi cant (with portfolio at risk over 30 days over 30 percent). Table 5.2 shows standard performance 
indicators as of December 31, 2007.
Table 5.2 FUNHAVI Performance Indicators, December 31, 2007
Number of acƟ ve loans 1,138
Value of loans US$866,516
Average loan balance US$716
Loan porƞ olio as percentage of total assets 75.6
Women as percentage of total borrowers 40
Porƞ olio at risk over 30 days (percent) 30.2
Source: CHF InternaƟ onal, hƩ p://www.chfi nternaƟ onal.org/.
FUNHAVI’s success is based on a simple, streamlined three-step process that includes technical assistance, the 
innovative use of partners, and the necessary safeguards to minimize credit diversion and misuse of funds. Th e 
loan preparation process lasts no more than 15 days. Households must demonstrate a monthly income of twice 
the minimum wage. No savings or credit history is required, but the client must be able to show recent pay 
stubs, provide the name of a guarantor, and off er proof of land (a less stringent requirement than formal land 
title). In addition, the community where the house is located must be stable. It cannot be in a fl ood plain, close 
to a river, or subject to intensive erosion. 
Technical assistance consists of a 30-minute educational presentation to ensure that clients understand 
their rights and responsibilities and basic information about suppliers and budgets and a visit by 
an architect who reviews the construction plans and provides a budget for materials and labor. Th e 
architect’s service fee of US$22 is the only charge in the loan preparation process. Most households take 
advantage of the architect’s service. Very few clients leave the program after this stage (Daphnis et al. 2002; 
Goldberg and Motta 2003; Schumann 2008).
SOFOLs in Mexico
Another successful example of the growth of the housing microfi nance market in Mexico is the Limited 
Objective Financial Society (Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Limitado, SOFOL). Th e SOFOLs emerged out 
of the reorganization of the fi nancial sector that resulted from the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
In the past decade, they have grown to cover a signifi cant part of the housing microfi nance market.
SOFOLs are specialized fi nancial institutions that grant mortgages and consumer, automotive, agricultural, 
and working capital loans, among others. Th ey serve the middle- and lower-income market. When mortgage 
SOFOLs began operations, there were no sources of funds. In December 1994, the “Tequila Crisis” resulted 
in the biggest economic crisis in Mexican history and the collapse of the Mexican banking system. Because 
the SOFOLs were just starting operations, they had no loan portfolio and were not aff ected by the crisis. As 
a result, the mortgage SOFOLs soon became the sole intermediaries of government-sponsored mortgage 
products.
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In 2006, 58 SOFOLs managed US$20 billion—2.6 percent of gross domestic product. With 10 percent of the 
credit market, they competed successfully with commercial banks that had returned to the market. Mortgage 
loans represented 63 percent of this portfolio. Less than half of the funds come from development banks; public 
markets provide 30 percent (Campos Spoor 2006).
MiCasa in Peru
Th e success of the two Mexican MFIs is mirrored in Peru’s MiBanco, the country’s fi rst for-profi t, fully regulated 
commercial microfi nance bank (and a member of the ACCIÓN International Network). MiBanco off ers an 
extensive menu of microfi nance products. MiCasa, the largest of MiBanco’s fi ve progressive housing products, 
fi nances up to 100 percent of the costs to complete a house. Th ese housing projects may also involve expanding 
or adding a microbusiness workshop. Maturities range from a minimum of three months to a maximum of fi ve 
years. Th e minimum amount of the loan depends on the credit evaluation. With a few exceptions, the maximum 
loan amount is US$10,000. As of the end of 2007, MiCasa’s portfolio exceeded US$50 million (see table 5.3).
Table 5.3 MiCasa Porƞ olio, December 2007
Loan Amt (US$) Total loans
(US$ millions)
Percentage of 
porƞ olio
Number of 
credits
Percentage of 
number of credits
< 1,000 3.20 6.5 6,703 27.2
1,001–1,660 5.50 11.0 5,347 21.7
1,661–3,330 12.70 25.3 6,596 26.8
3,331– 6,660 15.80 31.3 4,230 17.2
6,661–10,000 12.60 25.0 1,731 7.0
> 10,000 0.45 0.9 37 0.2
Total 50.25 100.0 26,644 100.0
Source: Ferreyra 2008.
Lessons Learned
Lessons learned by MiCasa and the other MiBanco progressive housing products include the importance of 
providing a demand-driven product with effi  cient service and ongoing follow-up. Moreover, the products’ sales 
staff s have learned not to push a particular product: it is more eff ective for clients to choose from a menu of 
housing loans. Finally, it is important to set realistic and progressive goals and include results-based follow-up 
plans to ensure timely completion of the work and on-time loan repayment.4
According to a survey of managers in Latin America (Mesarina and Stickney 2007), the benefi ts of a housing 
microfi nance program include the following:
• Added stability to the overall portfolio, given the seasonal fl uctuations in business lending
• Diversifi cation of risk for a portfolio dedicated primarily to working capital loans
• Increased revenue from existing (business loan) clients without incurring signifi cant additional 
operating costs
• High portfolio quality, which, in turn, implies lower costs in pursuing delinquent loans
4. See MiBanco, http://www.mibanco.com.pe. 
73Managing Risk and Creating Value with Microfinance
• Lower administrative costs per amount lent, as a result of longer loan terms
• Increased loyalty and relationships between the customer and the MFI because customers and their 
families hold strong emotional attachments to their homes
Designing a New Housing Microfi nance Program
Th e experiences of these MFIs and others have led to a number of general insights in the design and 
delivery of a housing microfi nance product. An MFI wishing to design a new housing microfi nance 
product should begin by assessing whether the new product is consistent with its mission and whether 
the product will further its goals and objectives (see also box 5.1). Th e MFI should further decide 
whether the incremental lending methodology is consistent with its own lending methodology and 
technical assistance facility and how this new product will aff ect current clientele. Th is assessment 
should further include an evaluation of the competition (or potential collaborators) and the legal and regulatory 
context. Th e MFI should have a well-established liquidity management system in place. 
Box 5.1 Can Gender be a Factor in a Housing Microfi nance Program?
In housing microfi nance, it is diﬃ  cult to establish a separate loan category based on gender—unlike other 
solidarity or communal banking programs. For the most part, a loan is made to the person who holds the Ɵ tle 
to the house or land. Gender is not relevant. The loan is based on the household’s current income. However, 
in most MFIs, women tend to benefi t more than men because they represent a lower credit risk.
Source: Authors.
Given the maturity of housing microfi nance products, the MFI will need access to long-term funding. Th is 
access will avoid maturity mismatch between its liabilities and its housing loan portfolio. Finally, the MFI 
should assess whether the new product will increase operational expenses, require new staff  members, or lead 
to important systems changes.
Th e MFI could also establish strategic business partnerships with suppliers of building materials, as in the case 
of MiBanco in Peru and FUNHAVI in Mexico. Th ose partnerships should lead to lower costs for the borrower. 
In MiBanco’s case, this arrangement might evolve into fi nancing partnerships and enhance the lender’s ability 
to reach more potential borrowers. With FUNHAVI, the partnership has led to low-cost integrated technical 
assistance on design, building materials selection, and construction inspection.
Step 1: Assess the market5
Recent experience provides some lessons learned in the design and management of a housing microfi nance 
loan program. For example, the design of the product should begin with a market assessment. Th is assessment 
should develop a household survey and include the following:6
5. Th is section is adapted by authors from Ferguson (2004). 
6. Ferguson 2004.
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• Basic information on household income and expenses
• Business income and cost information for microbusiness operators
• Conditions and amount of existing informal and formal debt
• Potential demand for microloans by loan size and type, collateral, interest, and term
• Savings
• Bank and nonbank fi nancial services used by the household
• Condition of home: number of people in house, type of home, roof type, kitchen, bathroom, bedrooms, 
other rooms, and improvements performed over past fi ve years
• Need and potential for home improvement and other real estate investment
Th e market analysis will result in estimates of the potential eff ective demand for various products and, combined 
with other data, the client’s capacity to repay. In general, housing microfi nance lenders use aff ordability ratios 
similar to those of traditional mortgage fi nance. Th e MFI should also assess the types of housing improvements 
the potential clientele are contemplating. It is also important to understand how such clientele have fi nanced 
home improvements in the past. In addition, the MFI should assess whether the target clients are willing to 
borrow the funds and under what conditions (such as interest rate, maturity, grace period, and lump sum or 
installment payments).
Step 2: Assess the MFI
Further, the assessment should include a review of the MFI, its mission, and its capacities. Given that a housing 
program is diff erent from other credit programs, the MFI should assess whether such a program is consistent 
with its mission and goals, and whether it has the capacity (fi nancial and human) to launch and maintain a 
new product. Th e MFI should consider whether redirecting fi nancial and human capital from other areas to 
housing is the best use of resources, given the need for technical assistance and the other diff erences described 
previously.
Step 3: Develop a loan product
After completing a market assessment and making the commitment to a housing loan program, the MFI should 
begin designing the appropriate loan product. Th e goal of this process should be to develop an aff ordable and 
responsive loan product while ensuring the MFI’s long-term fi nancial viability. Th is design includes the interest 
rates, loan repayment period, technical assistance, and an assessment of the real eff ective return. 
Th e repayment period largely drives credit risk—usually more than the payment amount. Best practice calls 
for repayment terms between 1 and 10 years—with an average of between 2 and 5 years—and small loan 
amounts. Low- and middle-income households can commit to monthly payments for short periods. In fact, 
the lowest middle-income families prefer to commit to the shortest repayment period possible.
Th e eff ective rate of return for these small amounts and short repayment periods results in relatively high 
returns for the MFI, as much as 27 percent in Latin America. However, this apparently excessive return is 
necessary to ensure the MFI’s fi nancial viability. Th e return is very likely to decline as competition grows with 
more lenders entering the market.
Th e new product will also aff ect the MFI’s organizational structure, management, capacities, and cost structure, 
among others. For example, the MFI should decide whether it would be more effi  cient to train a few specialist 
staff  members to manage housing loans, or to train all staff  members as generalists. Th e MFI will need to 
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review its information technology, accounting, and reporting systems. It will also need to determine the cost of 
launching the new product and how related costs of training, transport, and marketing will aff ect the institution’s 
bottom line. Finally, the MFI will need fi rst to consider external factors, such as the competitive environment, 
the potential for strategic alliances with other institutions, and the infl ation and other macroeconomic elements, 
and second to test the product with a sample of clients.
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       6  Microleasing:
                       Overcoming  
                        Equipment-Financing
                        Barriers 
Th e machine does not isolate man from the 
great problems of nature, but plunges him 
more deeply into them.
Antoine de Saint-Exupery*
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Most business owners would probably agree with Saint-Exupery—although machinery holds the key to increasing production, it comes with a cost. Acquiring new machinery can mark the evolution from 
artisan production to more specialized and effi  cient production, but it can also mean plunging the business 
more deeply into problems in the short term. Growing microbusinesses crave new equipment as a path to 
growth and greater effi  ciency, but they must confront the costs of increased fi nancial commitments, worker 
training, wasted materials during the learning process, installation costs, maintenance obligations, increased 
energy use, and more security.1
On the fi nancial side, the lack of suffi  cient collateral and audited fi nancial statements may prevent the owner from 
approaching traditional banks. Leasing off ers an alternative to a traditional bank loan. A leasing arrangement 
guarantees access to new machinery while avoiding the long-term problems of traditional loans. Leasing is a 
fi nancial product that enables businesses to rent new machinery for a defi ned period of time without providing 
collateral or increasing debt. For the microfi nance institutions (MFIs), microleasing provides new opportunities 
for long-term fi nancial relationships with growing microbusinesses.
Th e Basics of Microleasing
Th e two types of equipment-leasing arrangements are the fi nancial lease and the operational lease. In a fi nancial 
lease, the client pays the full price of the equipment, plus interest, in installment payments throughout the lease 
period. At the end of the lease period, the client may purchase the equipment outright for a nominal amount 
(usually the remainder of the asset’s cost). A fi nancial lease can be cancelled only by mutual agreement. In an 
operational lease, the client rents the equipment for a specifi ed period, at the end of which the client returns 
the equipment, buys it outright, or renews the agreement. Th e client may cancel the agreement and return 
the equipment before the end of the lease period. Because MFIs more commonly off er fi nancial leases and 
rarely off er operational leases, this chapter focuses on fi nancial leases, their advantages, taxes, regulations, and 
management considerations and provides some examples from Latin America. Th e chapter ends with some 
recommendations for a microleasing program.
Advantages of Leasing for Microbusinesses 
From the microbusiness owner’s point of view, the advantages of microleasing are related to collateral, payment 
fl exibility, and a chance to upgrade technology after a specifi c period of time. In fi nancial terms, collateral is 
far less of a constraint with a leasing contract than if the microbusiness were to apply for a long-term loan to 
purchase machinery or equipment. Collateral is built into the lease, because the title of the equipment remains 
with the lender until the end of the contract. 
Th ere are important cashfl ow advantages for the microbusiness. Th e leasing arrangement’s fi xed-
rate fi nancing makes the arrangement “infl ation friendly.” As costs for energy, rent, and labor increase, 
the client pays the same amount each month throughout the lease period. Th e upfront cash outlay is 
typically less. Because the lease usually covers 100 percent of the asset purchase, the client does not 
need to make a large initial down payment in cash. Th is arrangement means that the business can use its own 
funds for its working capital needs. Leasing payments can also be structured to match a business’s cashfl ow—
whether through a grace period, balloon payments, step-up or step-down payments, deferred payments, or even 
1. Th is chapter is based on the October 2007 dialogue with Glenn Westley (Inter-American Development Bank) and Eduardo 
Gutiérrez (National Ecumenical Development Association, Bolivia).
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seasonal payments. Leasing does not aff ect the solvency of the fi rm, because it is not refl ected in the liabilities 
of the balance sheet. 
Th e client also benefi ts in operational ways. In many leasing programs, the microbusiness operator can choose 
the supplier and the equipment without intervention or limitations placed on the choice by the MFI. Leasing 
also off ers easy-to-understand lending terms and does not require a large amount of documentation. Finally, a 
wide range of equipment can be provided by an MFI through a leasing arrangement, as the experience of the 
Savings and Agricultural Credit Cooperative Society in Madagascar illustrates (see box 6.1).
Box 6.1  CECAM’s Expanded Menu of Leased Equipment for Rural Producers
Begun in 1993 in the highlands of Madagascar, the Savings and Agricultural Credit CooperaƟ ve Society (Caisses 
d’Epargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuels, or CECAM) provides a menu of fi nancial services to its members, 
who are rural producers. One product is a credit to acquire assets such as plows, harrows, carts, weeding 
machines, seeders, grinders, husking machines, dairy cows, draught oxen, and tractors. Other products 
include tools used by carpenters, blacksmiths, mechanics, masons, tailors, and weavers. The lease price is 
set on the basis of the iniƟ al value of the equipment, plus interest and costs related to the transacƟ on. The 
ownership of the equipment shiŌ s from CECAM to the member aŌ er the fi nal payment is received. Unlike 
most leasing arrangements, CECAM oﬀ ers both individual and group-based leases of equipment.
Source: Adapted by authors from Fraslin (2003).
Advantages of Microleasing for the MFI
In microleasing, the MFI maintains the ownership of the asset until the fi nal payment is received. As a result, 
the MFI can off er fi nancing with a smaller or no initial payment, fewer external guarantees, and longer terms 
(compared to a long-term loan provided for the same purpose). In general, individual leasing arrangements are 
preferred, because a lease in the name of a community group or cooperative can lead to diffi  culties in the event 
of seizure, according to experiences in other countries. In some countries, equipment leasing is exempted from 
the interest rate ceilings imposed on lending.
Another key advantage of fi nancial leasing is the MFI’s strong legal position for repossession of the 
asset if the client fails to make the required payment. Because it is the owner, the MFI can repossess 
the equipment. Th e client is more likely to allow the MFI staff  to come onto the property if this 
right is established in the lease agreement. For this reason, the National Ecumenical Association for 
Development (Asociación Ecuménica de Desarrollo, or ANED) and Caja Los Andes (both in Bolivia) 
prefer leasing to long-term loans to fi nance new equipment.2 In addition, a court judgment is not 
necessary for the recovery of the machinery, because the MFI is free to recover and sell the equipment in a 
secondary market (for used equipment) in the event of default. Th erefore, leasing companies prefer more 
standardized goods (such as taxis, sewing machines, or tractors), which can easily be resold locally. More 
specialized equipment presents a problem if seized, because there may be far fewer potential buyers.
2. However, if the machinery is installed, this advantage could be largely lost. Th e increased physical costs may make recovery no 
longer practical.
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Th e process of repossessing the equipment can vary. In Bolivia and Ecuador, repossessing equipment takes 
only one or two months (compared to one or two years in the case of a defaulted loan). In Ecuador, the MFI 
submits a standard packet of documents to a judge and obtains an order to repossess the equipment. Th e 
process is unilateral and functions well without the need for a police escort. It is fairly inexpensive, between 
1 and 2 percent of the total lease value. In Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico, the laws and 
procedures are similar for the recovery of leased equipment.
Tax and Regulatory Considerations with Microleasing
Although leasing may make fi nancial sense, tax considerations may outweigh the benefi ts. For formally 
registered microbusinesses, the tax advantages or disadvantages change according to the country. Advantages 
are greater when accelerated depreciation is permitted for the equipment. In some cases, the tax codes favor 
equipment leasing. In other cases, they introduce a bias for equipment loans. Under some national tax codes, 
the client can deduct principal and interest from taxable income. For the MFI’s informal business clients, the 
depreciation expense deduction from taxes disappears, and loans can be more eff ective than microleasing. 
From the MFI’s perspective, the tax considerations aff ecting leases include value added taxes (VATs), equipment 
stamp taxes, and any special tax and regulatory treatment of fi nancial leases. In some countries, an MFI can 
reduce its tax burden by deducting the depreciated value of the leased equipment, because it retains formal 
ownership during the life of the lease. In other countries, taxes are charged on the total lease amount (both 
principal and interest). In addition, diff erent countries apply the VAT diff erently. In some cases, the VAT is 
applied against the lease charge but not to a loan. Examples of other taxes include a stamp tax on equipment 
with a value over US$27,000 (Colombia), an asset tax (Mexico), and a tax on imported equipment (Romania). 
Although the MFI (as the asset owner) pays those taxes, it can pass them on to the client as part of the 
transaction costs included in the lease. 
Regulatory issues can play an important role in expanding or limiting microleasing. For example, governments 
unnecessarily limit the market by requiring a subsidiary specialized in leasing. Th e lack of clear defi nitions for 
leasing and the responsibilities and rights of each party in a leasing contract also limit the market’s expansion. 
However, in some countries, equipment leasing is exempted from the interest rate ceilings imposed on lending. 
Th e advantages and disadvantages of leasing, compared to long-term lending, are summarized in table 6.1.
Table 6.1  Advantages and Disadvantages of Financial Leases
Factors Advantages Disadvantages
Legal 
enforcement
The MFI has a strong legal posiƟ on 
to repossess and sell equipment if 
the client does not pay the lease.
There can be a greater potenƟ al for 
misunderstanding and legal disputes.
Costs Enforcement costs are lower. Set-up costs are higher.
OperaƟ onal costs are higher.
Regulatory 
aspects
OŌ en, regulaƟ ons do not impose 
interest rate caps for leasing.
Banking regulaƟ ons someƟ mes prohibit 
fi nancial leasing or limit it to a special 
subsidiary, making it harder for an MFI to 
start a leasing product.
Tax issues Possible tax deducƟ on or other 
advantages are available for 
formal businesses that pay the VAT 
and uƟ liƟ es taxes.
No tax advantage occurs from leasing for 
informal fi rms.
Source: Adapted by authors from Westley (2007).
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Management of Microleasing Risks
Th e most important risk is the possibility that the client will default on the scheduled lease payments. In 
that case, the MFI, as the equipment owner, can more easily seize the equipment than under the terms of a 
defaulted loan. As discussed earlier, repossession, therefore, off ers greater security to the MFI in a microleasing 
arrangement. However, in the event of default by the client, the MFI also faces the risk of paying the costs to 
remove, store, and secure the repossessed equipment.
Another risk for fi nancial leases is damage to the leased equipment. Damages may result from any number 
of causes, including poor maintenance, improper use, or inappropriate modifi cations. For example, improper 
installation or electrical surges could aff ect the performance of the equipment. Because the client does not 
own the asset during the life of the lease, the client has little incentive to maintain the equipment or to avoid 
damaging it during the life of the lease. 
To reduce damage risks and costs, the MFI may charge a damage deposit at the beginning of the lease period, 
but this is not a perfect solution. Th e amount may not be suffi  cient to cover the costs of maintaining the 
equipment or fi xing the damage. Moreover, the client may not be able or willing to pay to fi x the equipment 
at the end of the lease period. Some MFIs address damage risk by making arrangements to maintain the 
equipment during the lease period and billing the client for the service. Th ey also make regular visits to confi rm 
that the client is using the equipment properly. Some MFIs turn to insurance policies to cover related risks, 
such as theft and injuries to workers, including life insurance for deaths related to the use of leased equipment. 
Finally, the MFI may off er to sell the equipment to the client at a low price at the end of the lease period. Th is 
option assumes that the lease has covered the initial cost of the equipment, plus interest.
Use of Microleasing in Latin America
Microleasing is a new fi eld of business and is not yet part of mainstream microfi nance in Latin America. In 
2002, a survey of 25 MFIs in 12 Latin American countries reported that equipment fi nancing (including 
leasing) represented, on average, 21 percent of business. Most of this fi nancing was in medium- to long-term 
loans. Only two MFIs reported using leasing to fi nance equipment purchases in any signifi cant way: ANED in 
Bolivia (with 6 percent of the portfolio) and Inversiones para el Desarrollo in Chile (with 52 percent). 
Other institutions in the survey reported that they had considered equipment leasing programs, but government 
policies discouraged them from moving forward. For example, in Bolivia, a new law required the creation of 
a subsidiary for leasing programs. As a result, Banco Procredit Los Andes discontinued its leasing program, 
and two other MFIs—Fundación para Alternativas al Desarrollo and Pro Mujer—never advanced beyond 
expressions of interest (Westley 2003).3 As General Manager for Financiera Arrendadora Centroamericana, 
S.A. (Finarca), Hugo Paguaga Baca said, “It is always good to have a regulatory framework in place, but 
it shouldn’t be a noose that is going to strangle the industry” (Goldberg 2008). Th e experiences of ANED 
(Bolivia), Finarca (Nicaragua), and América Leasing (Peru) show how industry leaders have launched leasing 
programs to respond to demand for asset purchases.
ANED, Bolivia
Beginning in 1997, the Bolivian MFI, ANED, developed a leasing program in response to client demand for 
resources adapted to their needs for operational and investment capital.4 In 2004, the program was redesigned 
3. See IADB (2009b). 
4. See National Ecumenical Development Association, http://www.aned.org/.
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with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).5 Th e purpose of ANED’s microleasing 
program is to improve access to medium- and long-term fi nancing, according to the productive and investment 
needs of the microbusiness sector. Equipment and machinery made available by ANED’s microleasing program 
include farm implements; machinery for carpentry shops, bottling plants, and energy; and equipment for small 
industry (such as welders and compressors). Drawing on its experiences to date, ANED is expanding the 
program to meet its clients’ demand for livestock.
ANED has assessed the advantages and problems of fi nancial leasing. Th e advantages include (1) elimination of 
guarantees, (2) the availability of a long-term fi nancial arrangement, (3) a payment schedule that fi ts the fi rm’s 
cashfl ow, and (4) lower transaction costs. ANED recognizes only two disadvantages to microleasing: those related 
to taxation and property. Th ere is a 13 percent tax on value added, a 3 percent tax on interest payments, and another 
3 percent tax on the purchase at the end of the lease. 
ANED’s leasing program resolves the problem of inadequate or no guarantees. It incorporates productive 
technology and supports and strengthens the credit products already available. Th e leasing program has 
ultimately led to the establishment of strategic alliances among providers and, ultimately, has improved the 
supply of machinery and equipment. Finally, it strengthens the relationship between the small producers and 
the farmers, who were not originally seen as a potential market. ANED’s Web site provides information on 
needed equipment across the country to enable businesses and suppliers to carry out transactions effi  ciently.
Finarca: Leasing to micro and small businesses in Nicaragua
In 1997, Finarca launched its leasing operations in Nicaragua as the fi rst leasing company licensed by the 
Superintendency of Banks and Other Financial Institutions.6 Th e International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
helped with technical assistance and investment capital.7 Th e company evolved quickly after 2000, when the 
Superintendency permitted it to off er a range of fi nancial services, including working capital loans, consumer 
loans, housing fi nance, and letters of credit. Th ree years later, Finarca’s success in leasing and lending attracted 
the attention of Corporación Interfi n, which initially bought 25 percent of Finarca’s shares (later purchasing 
a total of 51 percent). Later, Scotia Bank of Canada acquired Corporación Interfi n and eventually took sole 
ownership of Finarca as well. 
Finarca has grown in two directions: (1) it expanded its range of leases, and (2) it moved into rural parts of 
Nicaragua to fi nd new clients. With assistance from the IADB, Finarca recently launched a new program to lease 
equipment (tools, machinery, and other productive assets) to at least 300 microbusinesses and small enterprises. 
Th e client fi rms can have up to 15 workers and US$20,000 in total assets. Th e maximum fi nancing ranges from 
US$3,000 to US$8,000, with maturities from 12 months to 48 months and with commercial rates of interest. 
Eligible projects and products for leasing include industrial machinery, warehouse equipment, vehicles, hotel 
and restaurant supplies, tractors and agricultural machinery, photocopiers and other offi  ce equipment, and 
computers and communications equipment. As of June 2008, Finarca had a portfolio of US$18.8 million in 
leases, representing 85 percent of its total assets.
5. See IADB (2009a) and National Ecumenical Development Association, http://www.aned.org. 
6. See Financiera Arrendadora Centroamericana, S.A., http://www.fi narca.com.
7. Th e IFC has worked with fi nancial institutions with leasing products in a variety of countries in Africa, Central Asia, Eastern 
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.
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América Leasing, S.A., and the IFC in Peru 
América Leasing, S.A. is a specialized leasing company supervised by the Peruvian Superintendent of Banks 
and Insurance companies.8 It began operations in 1995 and currently off ers fi nancial leases to microbusinesses 
and to small and medium-size enterprises.
América Leasing is the largest company in Peru that specializes in leasing and that is not part of a 
banking group. As of December 2006, the company held a 6.5 percent share of the Peruvian leasing 
market (measured by portfolio amount) and a 14.1 percent market share (measured by number of contracts). It 
is primarily involved in the transportation, industrial, and commercial segments of the leasing market, which 
together represent 60 percent of the company’s leasing portfolio. 
América Leasing’s low average lease amount refl ects the size of its target segments—small and medium-
size enterprises. As of December 2006, 91 percent of the company’s portfolio was in business with less than 
US$21 million in annual sales. Th e average size of its contracts was US$67,700, compared to US$149,800 for 
the overall leasing market. Th e diversifi ed leasing portfolio reached US$127.5 million, with 1,877 active clients 
in transportation (26 percent), trade (18 percent), industry (16 percent), and equipment (14 percent).
In support of América Leasing’s expansion plans, the IFC provided a US$10 million loan and a technical 
assistance program in 2007. Th e project helps the company fund its portfolio growth, diversify its fi nancing 
sources, and strengthen its presence in the small and medium-size enterprise segment.
Recommendations for a New Microleasing Program
MFIs planning to off er long-term lending for equipment should consider leasing as an alternative. Th ey will 
need to evaluate the fi nancial aspects and the legal and taxation framework to assess all of the costs associated 
with a lease, both for the institution and for their clients. Surveys with experienced clients can help to determine 
whether there is enough interest to justify the development and piloting of a microleasing product. 
Government authorities should adopt a clear legal defi nition of fi nancial leasing and treat leasing and lending 
equally under the tax codes. A standard defi nition of fi nancial leasing should replace the broad array of 
defi nitions currently found in the various tax laws in Latin America, because a tax system that distinguishes 
between the two arrangements distorts the market. 
As the experiences of the three Latin American MFIs demonstrate, the challenges to launching a leasing 
product are signifi cant. Th e rewards for clients, however, can outweigh the initial costs of design and setup. 
Eff ective risk mitigation strategies limit the MFI’s exposure and provide incentives for prompt repayment 
by clients holding leases. Given the proper market and legal and regulatory conditions, MFIs should 
consider adding leasing to the list of fi nancial products they off er to existing and future clients.
8. See América Leasing, S.A., http://www.alsa.com.pe/index.html. 
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*John D. Rockefeller, quoted in Th inkExist.com Quotations, “John D. Rockefeller Quotes.” http://thinkexist.com/quotation/i_always_
tried_to_turn_every_disaster_into_an/13841.html (2010).
7 Disaster Management: 
Preparing for the Worst
 I always tried to turn every disaster into an 
opportunity.
 John Rockefeller*
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Natural disasters destroy the infrastructure that supports markets and provides basic needs. Th ey wash out roads and tear out train lines. Th ey bring down hospitals, schools, government buildings, and other 
basic health and human services infrastructure. Th ey disable telecommunications, which become overloaded as 
frightened family and friends try to locate loved ones. No one escapes these impacts, but poor households and 
small businesses and microbusinesses are more directly and disproportionately aff ected.
Th is chapter presents the diff erent kinds of costs incurred by disasters.1 In addition, this discussion focuses on 
natural disaster preparation and how microfi nance institutions (MFIs) and their staff s can respond. Preparation 
for disaster includes understanding the risks and costs of disasters, establishing proactive approaches and 
concrete responses, and knowing the additional resources and partnerships that may prove helpful in an 
emergency. Although they are often triggered by natural events, disasters are also the result of failures—failures 
of infrastructure, communications, fi nancial services, and basic government services, among others. Th is chapter 
discusses the path to successful response to the failures made worse by natural disasters.
An Unfortunate but Common Story
Imagine the manager of a MFI arriving at the main offi  ce and fi nding windows smashed; the furniture, 
computers, and fi les destroyed; and the security system off -line. Even worse, most of the MFI’s staff  members 
fail to report to work, and the police condemn the offi  ce building as structurally unsafe. Is the manager prepared 
for such a situation? Will the MFI be able to continue off ering its vital services when they are needed most? 
Th is chaotic scene has been repeated worldwide—after earthquakes in El Salvador and Peru, hurricanes in 
Nicaragua and Guatemala, fl oods in Poland and Bangladesh, and the tsunami in South and Southeast Asia. If 
the MFI is like most such institutions around the world, it is completely unprepared for the destruction the 
manager fi nds—and the price to be paid by the MFI and its clients will be extraordinarily high.
Disasters can aff ect MFIs in physical, fi nancial, and human ways. Aside from the physical destruction and 
human tragedy, disasters pose an enormous risk to the loan portfolio. For example, heavily subsidized or 
donated products—such as food and clothing from well-meaning donors—compete with the products from 
local microbusinesses. Th e aff ected microbusinesses cannot compete; they will lose potential sales and will 
be unable to make their loan repayment. Th is fi nding suggests a larger need for coordination as agencies and 
institutions come to the aid of disaster victims.
However, in the face of such tragedies, MFIs have proven that they can be important partners in preparation for 
disaster and postdisaster recovery eff orts—thanks to their systems, products, and relationships with community 
leaders and microbusinesses. If they are prepared, MFIs can contribute to timely delivery of essential goods 
to aff ected neighborhoods. Th e MFIs may also need to respond with temporary changes in client selection 
processes and loan review policies; to new policies for using reserves; to changes in collecting, rescheduling, and 
refi nancing; and even to a newly designed short-term loan product.
Costs of Disasters
Th e costs can be extraordinarily high. Damages from Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua in 1998 amounted to 
about 45 percent of the national GDP. After the short-term destruction, the eff ects linger as tens of thousands 
1. Th is chapter is based on the February 2008 dialogue with Enrique Pantoja (World Bank) and Mike Goldberg (World Bank).
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are dislocated and need new short-term or long-term housing loans and income-generating opportunities, as 
well as productive assets. Table 7.1 shows a sampling of disasters, the aff ected countries, and the costs.
Table 7.1 The Enormous Cost of Natural Disasters
Event Aﬀ ected country or region Costs
El Niño, 1999 Venezuela, R. B. de 30,000 dead from storms
US$2 billion in damage
Earthquake, 2000 El Salvador 1,100 dead
US$3 billion in damage
Tsunami, late 2004 India, Indonesia, Maldives, 
Sri Lanka
230,000 dead
US$7 billion in damage
Hurricane season, 2005 Caribbean, Central America, 
Mexico (Yucatán peninsula)
4,100 dead
300,000 dislocated
US$18 billion in damage
Earthquake, 2007 Peru 600 dead
300,000 dislocated
US$0.9 billion in damage
Source: Authors.
Human costs 
Th e human costs are the most immediate. If they survive the tragedy, workers may lose their jobs and have to 
migrate in search of work. Th e MFI’s managers, staff  members, and their families may themselves be victims. 
Th e families left behind may fi nd their homes destroyed or have no other source of housing, food, health care, 
or income to pay for those basic needs. In response, they may take their children out of school to work as day 
laborers. Th e community’s main institutions that usually provide the services that address such basic needs—
hospitals, markets, schools, daycare centers, police, fi re stations, and the like—may also be unavailable. 
In the wake of this devastation, the local MFI may be the best (or, perhaps, the only) source for immediate 
assistance. Th e nature of the clients’ needs will be diverse. Each family and each business will have its own 
circumstance. Clients may come to the MFI’s offi  ce urgently seeking cash—some or all of their savings or an 
emergency loan. Th ey will need to meet urgent household needs, replace important assets, build up inventories 
of raw materials, repair equipment, or buy new animals.
Physical costs 
Despite the great need for fi nancial services, the physical destruction may prevent or hinder the MFI’s ability 
to address its clients’ needs. Th e MFI’s physical infrastructure—the main offi  ce, branch offi  ces, and the 
information systems—may be in immediate need of repair. Mobile phones, land line phones, and faxes may all 
be useless after a disaster. As a result, the MFI will be unable to update information on clients and loans; pay 
monthly bills; or make payments to commercial banks, donors, and other fi nancing sources. Without a working 
infrastructure and the necessary information, the MFI will be unable to provide for its clients, or even manage 
the portfolio or its liabilities.
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Financial costs
Financial costs for the MFI include liquidity eff ects, repayment issues, and changes in the priorities of commercial 
and other funders. Liquidity eff ects begin with the risk that the commercial banks holding the MFI’s checking 
and savings accounts may suff er physical damage to facilities or may be overwhelmed by liquidity requirements. 
Borrowers may contribute to the MFI’s liquidity problems by failing to pay on time. Even the best clients 
can face immediate problems in meeting repayment schedules. Displaced borrowers are in the worst position, 
because they will have to relocate their families and microbusinesses with no warning and may not be able to 
continue to use key productive assets or market locations. Eventually, the loss of neighborhood clients and 
walk-by traffi  c can be devastating to a business’s cashfl ow and bottom line.
Because microbusinesses rarely have insurance coverage for income, assets, and health care needs, they may turn 
to the MFI to secure new loans or to reschedule or refi nance existing loans that will cover losses and health 
costs. Th e spike in demand for loans from trusted clients also puts pressure on the MFI’s liquidity. Decisions 
that aff ect the MFI’s liquidity could have long-term repercussions for the MFI’s reputation as a good partner 
to its clients, strategic allies, and investors. 
If rescheduling or refi nancing is permitted in the short term, MFIs should diff erentiate between those clients 
who performed well (with a reliable on-time repayment record) before the onset of the disaster and those who 
were already not living up to the loan contract agreement before the onset of the disaster. As soon as it is safe, 
loan offi  cers should visit the aff ected neighborhoods to take stock of the situation for each of their clients. 
Loan offi  cers may be in the best position to fi ne-tune the design of a short-term, relief-oriented loan product, 
because they know the cashfl ow capacity, creditworthiness, and character of each client or group of clients. Th e 
MFI should not consider a blanket refi nancing policy, because this move would reward poor performers and 
could lead to a contagion eff ect later. 
Infl ation tends to spike after a natural disaster. Th is spike ripples through the economy, hurting microbusinesses, 
their suppliers, their clients, and the MFIs. Microbusinesses rarely maintain suffi  cient inventories to withstand 
interruptions in the supply of key inputs. Even if microbusinesses have built up inventories, given the quality of 
storage facilities, there is a strong likelihood of high losses in an emergency. Add the costs of replacing hand tools 
and simple machinery, and the microbusiness faces a daunting challenge—and may turn to the MFI for assistance. 
Th e MFI may also have other fi nancial burdens. Donors may divert programmatic funds to emergency relief 
eff orts, leaving MFIs with a gap on the short-term liability side of the balance sheet. MFIs are expected to 
off er refi nancing and rescheduling options to aff ected borrowers, in some cases creating a contagion eff ect (in 
other words, unaff ected or marginally aff ected borrowers may expect similar options for extending loans or 
refi nancing). Th e MFI may have to off er grace periods for new loans to trusted clients, with both signifi cant 
liquidity and profi tability implications in a context of worsening infl ation. Th e MFI may be caught in a fi nancial 
vice, thereby being trapped between infl ationary pressures and a search for more expensive sources of fi nancing 
on the one hand and slower repayment of the outstanding loans on the other.
Proactive Approaches and Concrete Responses 
Th e opportunities and challenges for the MFI will change as the disaster cycle moves from relief to rehabilitation 
and long-term recovery. Th e study by Nagarajan (1998) of microfi nance and disasters describes fi ve stages in 
the cycle of disaster preparedness and response:
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• Predisaster planning
• Immediate humanitarian relief
• Th e restoration of sustainable livelihoods
• Th e reconstruction of infrastructure
• Economic development and growth
How can MFIs respond eff ectively and effi  ciently to such disasters when the human, physical, and fi nancial 
challenges are so overwhelming? Preparation and coordination between the various actors is the key. Th e 
MFI can assist its staff  members, clients, local and national governments, and local and national aid agencies, 
especially in predisaster planning and during recovery (the fi rst and fi fth stages). As fi gure 7.1 shows, a four-
stage framework on disaster risk management can help to visualize the stages of disaster preparedness and 
response by governments, MFIs, and other institutions.
Figure 7.1 Cycle of Risk Management
Source: Adapted by authors from Nagarajan (1998).
Predisaster planning
Before disaster strikes, the MFI’s management should develop a contingency plan. Given the losses that could 
result from the lack of preparation, the MFI board of directors may also wish to review the plan and provide 
inputs and help to establish emergency lending limitations and policies. Th e MFI’s contingency plan should 
include policies for communications, management information systems, and human resources. For instance, a 
communications plan should govern exchanges between branches and headquarters staff . Clear instructions 
should be in place for backup systems as well. Critical information should be protected—with electronic 
backups of records maintained on a regular basis in a secure location outside the MFI’s offi  ces—if the MFI 
board considers this action to be prudent. 
Th e MFI should conduct periodic reviews of its physical infrastructure and should update insurance policies 
to provide appropriate coverage of key facilities and assets. Th e contingency plan should include likely physical 
damage in headquarters, branches, and transportation links. Because insurance policies in many countries cover 
only specifi c types of damage and because they exclude “Acts of God,” it is important to compare the policies, 
costs, and coverage of various providers.
Preparation:
Develop
response
capacity. Response:
Minimize
human and
economic loss.
Recovery:
Assure return to
economic
development
activities.
Prevention and
Mitigation:
Reduce
vulnerabilities.
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Communication with clients is also important for the establishment of clear expectations of what support 
may be available in the aftermath of a disaster. Th e MFI can ensure adequate predisaster communication by 
preparing staff  members. During the orientation provided to new clients, the MFI’s staff  can present disaster 
policies and practices. When clients apply for subsequent loans, the staff  could briefl y review the policies. If 
management decides that lending and collection policies will be more fl exible in the event of a disaster, the 
staff  should receive a special operating manual. Th is approach will ensure that all clients receive the same 
information about what assistance and adjustments are available.
Contingency funds
Because liquidity is often the biggest fi nancial constraint after a disaster, the most direct approach to fi nancial 
risk mitigation is a dedicated contingency fund. A contingency fund is an earmarked fund that may be accessed 
in times of disaster to help clients and MFIs survive and recover. Donors often help in disaster preparedness 
by establishing contingency funds, which comprise three types, diff erentiated by their organization and 
management. Th e fi rst is assigned to a single MFI, usually a large institution with many years of experience, 
effi  cient administrative systems, and nationwide coverage. Th e second is operated by a special administrative 
unit. Th e third is shared by various MFIs: each one is responsible for regional coverage or specifi c communities. 
Contingency funds can be an advantageous solution for the clients, the MFI, the government, and the donors 
for fi ve reasons: 
• Clients can reestablish income streams quickly, thus getting funds for medicines, food, and temporary 
housing costs. 
• When conditions return to normal, the MFI can reduce the risks of delinquent clients and loan loss 
reserves. Long-term client loyalty climbs when MFIs respond quickly to the client’s emergency needs. 
• Th e government may be overwhelmed by the disaster and may have to focus on the logistics of rescue, 
emergency housing, and massive relocation of communities. Th e MFI with a contingency fund can be 
an important ally in short-term recovery eff orts. 
• Donors often contribute to the initial capitalization of such funds, because contingency funds for 
disaster preparedness off er signifi cant advantages to them as well.
• Administrative costs incurred by donors and local agencies decline and response time decreases when 
plans and contingency funds are in place. 
Periodically, according to a strategic target, the MFI should add to a special reserve fund for disaster recovery. 
Th is earmarked fund can be used for disaster relief in the form of short-term loans to clients or as a recovery 
fund for the MFI (for example, to repair or replace key equipment and infrastructure).
Are disaster contingency funds appropriate for all situations? Th e most successful funds have been established 
in disaster-prone areas of South Asia. Larger MFIs are more likely to benefi t from disaster contingency funds, 
because they are in a better position to make a strong case for using the resources effi  ciently and quickly. If the 
MFI can link to an existing contingency fund, such as a deferred drawdown option (DDO) that is established 
for disaster response (see box 7.1), then the reserves can be maintained at a minimum. However, in disaster-
prone areas, it would be wise to always have such funds waiting for the next round of claims. Th e example of 
Buro-Tangail (box 7.2) shows how contingency funds can be used for a number of purposes, while being ready 
for disasters.
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Box 7.1 Catastrophe Risk DDO
The World Bank Group is oﬀ ering a new fi nancial product, the catastrophe risk DDO (CAT DDO), to 
governments of middle-income countries. Similar to a line of credit, the product is designed for countries 
that have no immediate need for funds but that might need them if unforeseen events make it diﬃ  cult to 
access the capital markets. In this case, the purpose is to make fi nancing immediately available aŌ er a natural 
disaster. The CAT DDO is intended to fi ll the gap while other sources of funding, such as emergency relief 
aid, are being mobilized. A government can access funds from the facility if it declares a state of emergency 
as a result of a natural disaster. Countries that sign up for the CAT DDO must have an adequate hazard risk 
management program in place. The maximum amount available will be US$500 million or 0.25 percent of a 
country’s GDP, whichever is smaller. The funds may be drawn down over a three-year period, which may be 
renewed up to four Ɵ mes for a total of 15 years. The CAT DDO allows countries to defer disbursements for 
up to three years and, upon renewal, for another three years.
The new policy addresses certain disincenƟ ves to using the opƟ on. The revisions ensure that borrowers 
will have greater certainty of availability of funds because the World Bank will conƟ nuously monitor the 
borrower’s economy to allow disbursement upon request. The funds may be drawn down at any Ɵ me, unless 
the Bank gives prior noƟ fi caƟ on to the borrower that one or more of the drawdown condiƟ ons have not 
been met. In addiƟ on, the CAT DDO’s revised pricing eliminates the commitment fee and surcharge for the 
longer maturity and is thus aligned with standard InternaƟ onal Bank for ReconstrucƟ on and Development 
terms.
Source: Adapted by authors from World Bank (2008).
Box 7.2 Buro-Tangail ConƟ ngency Fund, Bangladesh
The Buro-Tangail Fund in Bangladesh has been a pioneer in disaster planning. While its conƟ ngency fund is 
ready for emergencies, those reserves also help the insƟ tuƟ on to deal with smaller challenges. If a borrower 
dies or becomes permanently incapacitated, the fund can be used to cancel the outstanding debt. Also, the 
fund can be used to provide supplemental loans to borrowers when their producƟ ve assets are damaged or 
stolen. Finally, when a loan is more than six months overdue, the reserve fund can be applied to the balance.
Source: Adapted by authors from Nagarajan (1998).
Th ere are also regional and international mechanisms for immediate fi nancial responses to some types of 
disasters. Six governments in the Caribbean have signed a DDO loan with the World Bank, with open credit 
lines in the case of a disaster that reaches a certain magnitude (such as hurricanes classifi ed above a certain 
category). Such facilities ensure immediate access to Bank funds in the event of a disaster, at a low cost to the 
government (see box 7.3). MFIs could investigate whether such liquidity and risk management options could 
cover their clients’ short-term needs as well. Th e Bank and governments in Central and South America are 
already discussing how to set up similar multicountry risk management and liquidity systems.
95Managing Risk and Creating Value with Microfinance
Box 7.3 Loan Product Adjustments for Disasters: The Case of the Bangladesh
Rural Advancement CommiƩ ee (BRAC)
Because of the monsoon season and the country’s huge delta basin, fl oods are a regular threat to the 
producƟ ve assets of Bangladesh’s microbusinesses. Several MFIs have developed fi nancial products that 
address this risk. One industry leader, BRAC, has made specifi c adjustments in the following loan policies and 
credit characterisƟ cs to deal with disaster situaƟ ons:
• Clients can withdraw savings up to a specifi c preestablished amount. 
• Regular loan repayments can be suspended for a period. 
• Interest rates can be reduced signifi cantly for up to two months. 
• Loans can be restructured for clients with marginal disaster losses (based on fi eld visits). 
• Loans can be refi nanced for clients with high disaster losses (based on fi eld visits).  
• New loans are oﬀ ered for producƟ ve asset replacement of up to 12 months at 15 percent interest. 
• An opƟ on of disbursement in the form of seeds, animals, and other in-kind materials is available.
Source: Adapted by Enrique Pantoja from BRAC materials.
Immediate humanitarian relief
 
At this stage, the MFI can play the role of facilitator, putting municipal and Government offi  cials in touch with 
microbusinesses and community leaders. Th e MFI can lend some of its facilities to the relief eff ort, including 
vehicles, staff , and buildings. If MFI staff  members have received the necessary training, they can also assist in 
disaster assessments. 
Restoration of livelihoods. Th e MFI should have clear, well-defi ned policies in place concerning the types of 
temporary loans to be provided—consumer loans, housing repair loans, and working capital loans. Extended 
grace periods can help microbusinesses recover more quickly. Th e MFI may use previous loan repayment 
performance as one way to prioritize which business operators receive the special business recovery loans. Th e 
MFI may also ask the communities to back a recovery loan with a character reference.
Branch offi  ces should be trained to respond to requests for emergency loans by clients and others in aff ected 
areas. Management should establish specifi c lending limits for clients, new client selection criteria, and possibly 
adjustments to collateral and other normal requirements. Management should provide the disaster relief 
guidelines in internal written communications, in case branch offi  ce staff  members are unable to contact the 
headquarters offi  ce. When branch managers know what levels of lending authority and special loan conditions 
apply in an emergency, they are better prepared to act independently to respond to clients’ needs during such 
times. 
Th e 1997 fl oods in Poland provide an innovative example of disaster management and the successful use of an 
MFI loan product to restore livelihoods. Floods from four rivers had severely aff ected 1,400 small towns, thereby 
destroying 50,000 homes, forcing the relocation of 160,000 people, and causing US$4 billion of damage. Given 
its national coverage, the MFI Fundusz Mikro was asked to manage a special disaster recovery fund. Fundusz 
Mikro opened a special lending window within its branches, thus developing a new brand and loan product just 
for the emergency situation. Th is product had a diff erent contract format and lending terms (a 24-month loan 
term, a 10 percent near-commercial interest rate, and a 6-month grace period). Even the delivery mechanism 
was adjusted, with a special window for processing loan applications. 
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Existing and new clients formed solidarity groups of fi ve members, evaluated the damage, and submitted 
loan applications. Th e solidarity group was responsible for assigning priorities to members with urgent needs. 
Fundusz Mikro disbursed the loan, monitored business performance, and collected the payment. Loan recovery 
was assisted by local municipalities. Because this change was a one-time contingency fund approach, there was 
no capitalization of the fund.
By the end of the six-month emergency period, Fundusz Mikro had not only responded to the unique set of 
circumstances, but also identifi ed a signifi cant number of new clients for a postdisaster long-term commercial 
relationship. By setting a time limit on the emergency loan product, Fundusz Mikro was able to maintain 
credit discipline, while building a reputation as a socially responsible MFI. Finally, with on-time repayment of 
93 percent, Fundusz Mikro was able to demonstrate that, even under the most diffi  cult conditions, its client 
selection methodology was sound.
Some MFIs in Latin America have prepared for and responded well to disasters, including earthquakes and 
fl oods caused by hurricanes. Examples include Katalysis and its Central American partners after Hurricane 
Mitch’s devastation in 1998 (see box 7.4) and housing loans by the Association of Micro, Small, and 
Medium Development Consultants (Asociación de Consultores para el Desarrollo de la Pequeña, Mediana, 
y Microempresa, or ACODEP) in Nicaragua. Katalysis, a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization with a 
network of Central American MFIs, gained valuable experience in the wake of Hurricane Mitch’s destruction. 
Th e focus on preparedness led to simple guidelines that were shared with member MFIs. Some of the instructions 
included (1) continually backing up loan data; (2) building a disaster fund using a small share of interest earned 
on loans; and (3) maintaining a disaster supplies kit, including a generator, fi rst-aid kits, and transistor radios. 
ACODEP has been a leading MFI in Nicaragua for 20 years. In response to several disasters aff ecting clients, 
ACODEP developed a housing product called “mi vivienda.” After Hurricane Mitch, ACODEP provided 
more than 2,000 loans for rebuilding homes, which often included microbusiness workshops. Th e loan typically 
covered building materials, with the client’s sweat equity. In some cases, ACODEP has lent to clients for their 
relocation and building of a home outside hazard-prone areas.
Box 7.4 Katalysis: Response to Disasters
In response to the personal, economic, and fi nancial disaster that followed Hurricane Mitch, Katalysis, a U.S.-
based NGO, implemented the following special loan management policies:
1. Suspend the collecƟ on of interest and principal for a short Ɵ me in major disasters.
2. Allow the most aﬀ ected clients to withdraw savings without a penalty.
3. Do not provide new loans unƟ l the MFI has fully analyzed the impact of the crisis.
4. Provide refi nancing for only the most aﬀ ected clients.
5. Develop new products, such as housing loans, to respond to damage to clients’ homes.
6. In general, do not forgive loans (thereby maintaining the MFI’s image as a professional fi nancial 
insƟ tuƟ on). However, forgive the loan balances for clients who have died.
Source: Adapted by authors from Woodworth (2006) and Hildebrand (2002).
As the examples of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Fundusz Mikro, and ACODEP show, 
beyond the adjustments to existing products, MFIs can launch new products to address some specifi c disaster-
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related impacts. Th ose new products can build client loyalty and minimize the response time to client requests. 
Such products include emergency loans, housing loans, cereal banks, remittance services, and subsistence loans 
(see table 7.2).
Table 7.2 New Financial Products, Results, and ImplicaƟ ons
Financial Product Results ImplicaƟ ons
Emergency loans Increased client loyalty occurs. Good 
repayment is recorded only with 
exisƟ ng clients.
Loans are eﬀ ecƟ ve only during 
relief stages. ParƟ al safely net is 
provided for exisƟ ng clients.
Housing loans Moderate repayment occurs. Timely 
loans based on demand and fl exible 
terms and condiƟ ons are rare. Loans 
are made only to those who owned 
houses prior to a disaster.
Loans are eﬀ ecƟ ve only when 
issued quickly during rehabilitaƟ on 
and when reconstrucƟ on stages are 
based on demand.
RemiƩ ance 
services
Services ease cashfl ow problems of 
clients and increase repayments. Client 
loyalty to MFI increases.
Services are required immediately 
aŌ er disaster up to reconstrucƟ on 
stages. A quicker return to 
normalcy is facilitated. Use should 
be demand based.
Subsistence 
loans for disaster 
preparedness
Loans are required for buying and 
storing subsistence goods during 
emergency stages and result in good 
repayments and increased client 
loyalty.
ParƟ al safety net for clients is 
provided. Loans are eﬀ ecƟ ve with 
only trusted long-term clients.
Source: Adapted by authors from Nagarajan (1998).
Restoration of sustainable livelihoods and assets. Th is is the most important time in the recovery cycle for MFIs, 
because they can play a fundamental role in assisting the recovery of microbusinesses. If predisaster planning 
has been eff ective, many decisions on clients, loans, and procedures will already be in place. However, it is 
helpful to discuss the types of products that might be of most use to clients as the livelihood restoration process 
begins and as the stock of productive assets is rebuilt. 
Th ere are also important implications for the types of products and delivery mechanisms following a disaster. 
MFIs have responded with new policies for existing products and even new loan products for limited periods. 
When new policies are put in place, they are related to client selection, contract enforcement, funds management, 
delivery methodology, and additional complementary services. For example, if the MFI provides emergency 
housing loans, it may be more effi  cient to make arrangements with large wholesalers of construction materials, 
warehouses, and delivery companies to get better prices and to pay the supplier directly in the name of clients. 
In other words, it may be sensible for the MFI to provide products it would usually avoid, like in-kind loans or 
limited loan rescheduling.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has shown the broad repercussions and huge costs of a disaster. Experts have identifi ed fi ve stages 
of disaster preparedness and recovery. Whether they are slow onset or instantaneous shocks, disasters can have 
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devastating eff ects on all aspects of a society and the economy. For this reason, disaster preparedness can save 
lives and property and can speed the process of recovery. 
Governments, donors, and MFIs have important roles to play to speed relief and begin the recovery process. 
Governments coordinate eff orts from disaster preparedness to the moment the damage reports arrive, as well 
as through midterm recovery. Donors often respond by establishing contingency funds that are dedicated to 
fi nancing recovery eff orts. MFIs have a unique combination of skills, networks, and client bases that make 
them valuable partners, from the initial onset to the sustained recovery after a disaster. 
By coordinating with other MFIs, government agencies, municipal authorities, and donors, the MFI is in a 
strong position to be an important partner in local, regional, and even national responses. With plans in place 
for the most likely human, physical, and fi nancial shocks in the aftermath of a hurricane, earthquake, or fl ood, 
the MFI can serve the immediate needs of its clients. Some eff ective responses to disasters have included new 
types of loan products, adjustments to conditions for outstanding loans, and changes in delivery methodologies 
(such as allowing groups to set lending priorities among members). Whatever the response, MFIs should learn 
from the painful lessons of the past—because the benefi ts of preparing for the next disaster far outweigh the 
costs.
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8 New Technologies:
Providing a Path to 
Lower Costs and New 
Products
Information technology and business are
becoming inextricably interwoven.
 Bill Gates*
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Introduction
In rapidly evolving fi nancial markets, applied technologies can be the diff erence between a larger share of the market or a gradual decline. Sustainable microfi nance institutions (MFIs) can use technology to reach a 
large scale of operations and can off er services to tens of thousands, even millions, of clients. With cost-eff ective 
technological solutions that meet their data management needs and match their clients’ requirements, those 
MFIs can cover their operating and fi nancial costs and the risk of loan losses without the need for subsidies.
Th is chapter explores some of the technological innovations that MFIs are using to improve service and to 
expand access to their clients.1 Th e chapter describes innovations in mobile banking, in network systems, and 
in the emerging technology of biometrics. Th e chapter also discusses the substantial costs, risks, and challenges 
of achieving eff ective technology adoption at the institutional and policy levels, and it off ers guidance to MFI 
practitioners and policy makers about how to approach and foster technological innovations in microfi nance.
Why Technology Matters
Microfi nance is a business of scale. Th erefore, it is highly sensitive to variable costs. Even a few pennies of 
savings per client matter when the MFI is serving tens of thousands of clients with short-term loans, savings 
collection, and other fi nancial products. Passing the savings on to clients helps MFIs reach their social objectives. 
In other words, returns on technology investments that lower operational costs for MFIs can be very high, thus 
benefi tting tens of thousands of clients. 
Th e fastest way to lower variable costs is to adopt new technologies that speed the analysis of client data, to 
lower transaction costs, and to make it easier for clients to use microloans eff ectively. Th e key hardware and 
software needed to apply new technologies to microfi nance are already in place, especially point-of-sale (POS) 
and mobile phone systems, as fi gure 8.1 illustrates.
1. Th is paper is based on the August 2007 dialogue with Hannah Siedek (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor), Alice Lui 
(Development Alternatives, Inc.), and Santiago Saavedra (Red Transaccional Cooperativa).
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Figure 8.1 PenetraƟ on of Services and Technologies
Source: Siedek 2007.
Mobile Banking
Th e advent of mobile phone payment technologies—whereby users can receive and transfer value in small 
amounts through the mobile phone network—has the potential to revolutionize access to fi nancial services. 
As table 8.1 reveals, mobile phone penetration is a worldwide phenomenon. Beyond standard communication 
services, mobile phones off er four characteristics that directly aff ect banking transactions: (1) fast message 
transmission speed, (2) a high degree of reliability, (3) low costs, and (4) security. 
Whereas only about 25 percent of all households in developing countries have formal relationships with 
banks, more than 40 percent use mobile phones, and that number continues to grow rapidly. More than 
1 billion people without formal banking relationships already have mobile phones. India had 370 million 
active mobile phone cards for connections (known as subscriber identity modules, or SIMs) at the end of 
January 2009 and is adding about 15 million per month. Pakistan has about 90 million connections and is 
adding 2 million per month (ITU 2009; Mas and Kumar 2008; Mas and Siedek 2008).
Table 8.1 Wireless PenetraƟ on Rates, 2003–12
Region 2003 2008 2012 (esƟ mated)
Africa 4.7 30.6 50.1
Asia and Pacifi c 13.1 39.1 60.8
Eastern Europe 20.5 102.8 134.7
LaƟ n America 19.7 70.4 90.8
Middle East 17.8 61.9 98.3
Source: Mas and Kumar 2008.
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Mobile banking still faces important challenges—from the perspective of technology development to operator 
skills and client perceptions. Practical issues with mobile phones include small screens, tiny keyboards, limited 
connectivity, and unreliable connections in remote areas. Operators control the security of the system and must 
cope with unreliable wireless connections from remote areas. Th eir interaction with wary clients can be the 
diff erence between rejection and technology adoption on a large scale. Clients are typically resistant to new 
technologies and may be especially reluctant to trust their funds to a wireless system. However, client education 
eff orts can help to overcome such concerns. Th ose operational problems do not limit the potential for a broad 
microfi nance revolution (covering loans, savings, payments, and remittances) through mobile phones.
Th e Philippines’ fi nancial sector, for example, has been a leader in leveraging mobile phones and networks 
to deliver cost-eff ective, high-volume, low-value transfer capabilities. Two of the country’s mobile network 
operators off er the functional equivalent of small-scale transaction banking to an estimated 5.5 million 
customers (Lyman, Pickens, and Porteous 2008). One service provider, Globe Telecom, has partnered with the 
Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines to off er its “GCash” service, which enables customers to use text 
messaging to repay loans and to make deposits, withdrawals, or transfers from their savings account, thereby 
using the network of GCash agents to deposit or withdraw cash. 
Th e Wizzit Bank in South Africa is another promising example of the use of mobile phones to transfer value to 
and from a fi nancial intermediary. In 2002, Wizzit was conceived as a virtual commercial bank relying heavily 
on mobile phones—there are no buildings or branch offi  ces (Ivatury and Pickens 2006a). Wizzit allied itself to 
the South African Bank of Athens to secure a banking license, and it began operations in 2005. Customers can 
use their mobile phones, automated teller machines (ATM), POS terminals, and offi  ces in the South African 
Bank of Athens to make deposits, withdrawals, loan payments, transfers between accounts, and international 
and domestic remittances and to eff ect payments for goods and services. As of January 2009, Wizzit had 
250,000 customers who are able to deposit and withdraw cash through their mobile phones (Lapper 2009). 
Th rough an alliance with Beehive, a rural MFI, Wizzit is also expanding to provide services to clients in more 
remote rural areas.
Network Systems
POS terminals are often part of a network that is shared by fi nancial intermediaries; clients from a number of 
institutions can use the same terminals and agents to make payments. Sharing network infrastructure enables 
fi nancial institutions to achieve collectively the volume of transactions needed to cover the costs of the software, 
hardware, and the connectivity required to provide distributed payments services. Some MFIs, particularly in 
the cooperatives sector, are working together to create economies of scale that enable them to reduce costs and 
to expand services by investing in new payment technologies.
Th e Red Transaccional Cooperativa (also known as Red Coonecta), is a credit cooperative network formed 
in 2006 in Ecuador with help from the World Council of Credit Unions (Saavedra 2007). Th e high cost of 
setting up an offi  ce had limited the expansion of cooperatives. In addition, strong competition from commercial 
banks limited the ability of the small MFIs to expand their portfolios. In response, the cooperatives decided to 
establish a network to facilitate members’ nationwide access to services. Th e goal of the council’s support was 
to use technology to integrate as many cooperatives as possible and to provide access to new service delivery 
technologies.
Th e growth of the network has been impressive. During the fi rst 16 months (through August 2007), the network 
incorporated one agency per week and developed a network of 153 offi  ces and 15 fi nancial cooperatives (about 
Chapter 8 - New Technologies:  A Path to Lower Costs and New Products
one-third of the fi nancial cooperatives in the country). Th e services currently off ered by the Red Coonecta to its 
members include a network of shared branch offi  ces, a POS network, debit cards, remittance distribution, and 
payment of public utility services. Th e network was recently integrated into the national ATM network as well, 
with more than 2,000 machines across the country. As a result, a member of a cooperative can use any ATM 
in the country to obtain funds, make deposits, and check transactions. Red Coonecta has recently expanded 
to include service links with national and international networks—with neighboring countries and the Credit 
Union Service Corporation of the United States. Th is U.S. connection facilitates sending remittances from 
immigrants in the United States to family members in Ecuador.
Remote Data Processing
From Mexico to India, MFIs use mobile devices—personal digital assistants (PDAs), smart phones, and 
laptops—to analyze a client’s risk and to determine creditworthiness in the fi eld. Th ose improvements can result 
in important reductions in paperwork and the time to deliver the loans and can improve client selection. Setup 
and operating costs are low, with software development ranging from US$20,000 to US$80,000. Hardware 
costs are around US$100 per unit, and annual software maintenance contracts are less than US$10,000.
Th e use of mobile applications represents a savings to clients, because they may not have to leave their place 
of business to apply for or receive a loan. It also means that loans offi  cers are more productive in terms of 
the number of clients they can serve and the quality of their loans. Th e evaluation and approval of a credit 
application, for example, requires detailed information on the client, the business, the family members, and 
other relevant aspects of the operation. Using a mobile device, the loan offi  cer can enter information directly 
into the system and can reduce the number of errors or incomplete applications. Optimally, loan offi  cers can 
also access all prior information on a client and can run credit scoring programs on existing clients with new 
loans and on new clients, oftentimes generating a credit decision on the spot.
PDAs
PDAs can help MFIs to standardize lending methodologies, to lower transaction times, to improve loan 
offi  cer effi  ciency, and to increase data accuracy. PDAs have been used by ADOPEM (Dominican Republic), 
SKS Microfi nance (India), BanGente (República Bolivariana de Venezuela), Banco Solidario (Ecuador), and 
Compartamos and Fincomun (both in Mexico).
One of the early adopters of PDA technology for microfi nance applications was Compartamos, a specialized 
microfi nance provider using village banking for female clients in Mexico. Compartamos found that PDAs 
raised loan offi  cer effi  ciency and data access in the fi eld (Waterfi eld 2004). Th e example of Compartamos, 
however, reveals a potential problem with early adoption of new technology. Th at is, the effi  ciency of using 
PDAs can be sustained only if the overall management information system (MIS) is stable, if it permits high-
speed data transfer between branches for consolidation, and if it has ongoing technical support. As a result 
of software development issues and MIS-PDA interface problems, Compartamos later suspended the use of 
PDAs. Th e Compartamos example also suggests that PDAs require mature loan products to avoid constant 
adjustments because loan specifi cations and data requirements change over time. 
However, for Banco Solidario in Ecuador, using PDAs has resulted in signifi cant improvements in productivity 
and effi  ciency. During the fi rst 10 months that loan offi  cers used PDAs, the loan portfolio grew from less than 
US$2 million to almost US$10 million, as fi gure 8.2 demonstrates. Th ere was a direct correlation between the 
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use of PDAs and the drop in problematic loans. PDAs may also help to reduce the level of risk in the loan 
portfolio and, as a result, may improve the institution’s risk management (see fi gure 8.3).
Figure 8.2 Porƞ olio Expansion and PDA Use
Source: Liu 2007.
Figure 8.3 PDA Use and Porƞ olios at Risk
Source: Liu 2007.
POS Terminals
Th e mobile phone is one interface to the banking system. It requires high penetration rates and reliable, well-
connected networks to be eff ective. POS terminals are another potentially very effi  cient means to eff ect low-
value transactions in a highly distributed manner. POS terminals generally use card swipe technology, bar code 
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readers, and modems to transmit data from debit or credit cards to fi nancial intermediaries, thus enabling 
fi nancial transactions or the sale of products or services. Th e minimum specifi cations for POS terminals are 
outlined in box 8.1.
Box 8.1  Minimum Requirements for a POS Device
A POS device requires the following minimum specifi caƟ ons:
• A card reader that can read the informaƟ on stored on the magneƟ c stripe or chip of a card (The 
reader also may be able to write informaƟ on into the chip, if it is oﬀ  line and the card is virtual—that 
is, embedded in a mobile phone.)
• A numeric keypad, through which users can enter their personal idenƟ fi caƟ on number and 
transacƟ on amounts
• A screen large enough for the users to view and to validate informaƟ on pertaining to the transacƟ on
• A set of encrypƟ on keys held in highly secure memory, with all communicaƟ ons between the POS 
terminal and the bank’s server conveyed securely—with no possibility of decrypƟ on by a third party 
(The standard is keys of a minimum length of 128 bits.)
• A printer to issue receipts for each (successful or aƩ empted) transacƟ on
Source: Adapted by authors from Mas and Siedek (2008).
POS partners may include supermarkets, pharmacies, gas stations, post offi  ces, or other businesses that have 
reliable access to communications networks and contact with the target audience. Agents must be selected 
carefully, however, because they are (1) providing customer service for the fi nancial intermediary, (2) carrying an 
MFI’s transactions on their own balance sheet while funds are settled, and (3) intermediating what may be large 
sums of cash between clients and institutions. Th e client’s trust must be ensured for eff ective intermediation. 
For that reason, a strong client orientation and clear understanding of client needs and limitations are requisites 
for eff ective representation of a MFI. 
MFIs have successfully developed and leveraged large networks of POS agents in Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, 
Maldives, Mongolia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, among others.2 In Brazil, banks have partnered with more 
than 95,000 local merchants, post offi  ces, and lottery dealers equipped with POS terminals to off er fi nancial 
services in 1,600 municipalities that previously had little or no bank presence (Mas and Siedek 2008).
Biometrics
Biometrics refers to the measuring of a person’s unique physical characteristics, like fi ngerprints or facial features, 
to verify identity. Th e technology records the clients’ biometric features—fi ngerprints are most commonly 
used—and stores this information on the MFI’s database and, usually, on a smart card the client carries for 
transactions (Whelan 2003).
Biometric readers can be installed on ATM machines (creating biometric ATMs, or BTMs) and on handheld 
devices, so clients can verify their identities by simply touching (in the case of fi ngerprints) the reader’s scanner. 
2. See Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/tech/, and Barton and others (2007).
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Th e scanned image is then compared to the client’s recorded biometric feature, either located on the client’s 
smart card or accessed through a network connected to the MFI’s servers. Authentication is guaranteed when 
the scanned image matches the original biometric feature.
Biometric solutions enable clients and MFIs to conduct secure transactions remotely, because they reduce 
the need for staff  members to be present. When they replace signatures, biometrics can also signifi cantly 
cut down on the paper records that must be processed and archived, which is often one of the most labor-
intensive components of information management. Biometrics work better than signatures because they are 
nearly impossible to forge. Th ey provide a secure means even for illiterate clients to authorize a transaction. 
Biometric technology also has an advantage over passwords and personal identifi cation numbers, which are 
easily forgotten or can be transferred from person to person. Biometric and smart card technologies have been 
deployed in Indonesia’s PT Bank Danamon, India’s ICICI Bank, and Bolivia’s Prodem Fondo Financiero 
Privado (FFP), which have also reportedly lowered the costs of administering high-volume, low-value 
microfi nance transactions (Yeo 2008).
Th e case of Prodem FFP in Bolivia illustrates the potential of biometrics to reduce costs and to increase the 
security of microfi nance transactions. Prodem FFP fi rst introduced its biometric solution in 2000, writing its 
own software to integrate the biometric readers and smart cards with its MIS. At Prodem FFP’s 54 branch 
offi  ces, computers were equipped with card readers and fi ngerprint scanners. Tellers were able to verify 
customer identity more quickly and to speed up transaction times. BTMs have also been set up at many 
Prodem FFP offi  ces so clients can securely conduct savings, transfer, and loan disbursements without having 
to wait for a teller.3
Costs, Risks, and Challenges
Implementing new technologies can be hugely rewarding to MFIs and their clients, but they are often very costly, 
risky, and disruptive to the institution. Th ose challenges occur whenever new technologies are introduced in 
fi nancial intermediation. Managing a successful technology implementation program requires careful planning 
and attention to many factors. Management will need to determine the specifi c objectives of a technology 
project, to assess the variables that will drive costs and benefi ts, and to evaluate whether the project is likely to 
pay off . In addition to the upfront hardware and software costs, the costs of training, maintenance, and upgrades 
must be included in the planning.
Before deciding to adopt new information and communications technology, the MFI should examine its goals 
and should evaluate the state and use of its existing systems. If the management expects to reengineer the entire 
system, a phased approach is usually best. For example, innovative solutions for loan processing and payments 
distribution require a robust MIS. Learning how to analyze the information coming from that system and how 
to apply it to business decisions is often a big institutional challenge itself.4 
To assess a technology project’s return on investment, MFIs must pay close attention to the costs and benefi ts 
they accrue on a transactional basis. Oftentimes, technology investments in microfi nance require large economies 
of scale to become viable. Given the volume of expected transactions or the average amount of each transaction, 
the communications cost of authorizing payments over land line, mobile phone, or broadband networks, for 
example, may be too high to justify the costs of a POS network. In regions with low population density or low 
3. Th e information presented on the Prodem FFP case study comes from Whelan (2003), with contributions from the staff  of 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and from eChange, LLC.
4. For resources on planning and implementing technology projects, see Progressive Technology Project (2009) and TechSoup (2009).
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economic activity, achieving high enough transactional volume often requires institutions to cooperate and 
coinvest in new technologies.
MFIs must also consider the users’ willingness and ability to take advantage of new technologies, given the 
clients’ preferences and circumstances. For example, if clients fi nd bank branches to be conveniently located 
and effi  cient, the clients may not appreciate the possible benefi ts from new ways of doing business (like 
mobile phones or ATMs). In such cases, the MFI’s investment in remote processing devices may not justify 
the investment, staff  training, and client education costs. Th ere are also elements of new technologies that 
may discourage clients from adopting them. Clients may not be comfortable enough with mobile phones to 
navigate multiple menu sequences with tiny buttons on a small screen. Field staff  members may not have access 
to reliable power supplies for recharging handheld devices, or POS agents may experience regular interruptions 
in telephone service, which disrupt transactions.
In addition to the technological and operational risks, MFIs will need to plan for new risks that emerge. For 
example, an institution or its terminal agents might be unable to maintain adequate levels of liquidity, if clients 
make unusually high withdrawals in a given area. In the case of distributed payments systems, the MFI must 
guard the security of transactions and must know how to identify and stop illicit transfers of funds. 
For governments, there is a broad range of complex policy and regulatory issues to consider in determining how 
to create the conditions for new technologies in microfi nance to fl ourish, especially with respect to distributed 
payments systems. Regulators will need to modify the legal environments aff ecting the telecommunications, 
fi nancial, and retail sectors. Box 8.2 outlines the necessary preconditions for establishing electronic micropayments 
networks. It includes a number of next generation issues and basic principles for regulators and policy makers 
to consider so they can enable the safe development of new payments channels.5
Box 8.2  Regulatory and Policy Guidelines for Branchless Banking
The guidelines provide the following:
• Permit nonbank retail outlets to serve as agents, and consider carefully any restricƟ ons on the range 
of permissible agents and types of relaƟ onships.
• Develop a counterterrorism and anƟ -money-laundering approach adapted to the realiƟ es of small, 
remote transacƟ ons conducted through network agents.
• Clarify the legal boundaries between retail payments, e-money, and other stored-value instruments 
and bank deposits.
• Create a regulatory category for electronically stored value that allows nonbank parƟ cipaƟ on on 
defi ned terms.
• Create robust but simple mechanisms for consumer protecƟ on, covering problems with retail 
agents, redress of grievances, price transparency, and consumer data privacy.
• Consider the likely longer-range compeƟ Ɵ ve landscape today and the way to reach the goal of 
interoperability implicaƟ ons.
Source: Adapted by authors from Lyman, Pickens, and Porteous (2008).
5. Th e Philippines’ low-cost, competitive market is a favorable environment for mobile phone solutions. See Ivatury and Pasricha 
(2005) and Ivatury and Pickens (2006b).
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Th e introduction of a new technology in microfi nance must meet regulatory concerns. For example, the use of 
retail agents equipped with POS terminals for cash transactions (both cash in and cash out) must be regulated 
carefully to avoid abuses. Also, with the advent of risk-based anti-money laundering rules and regulations 
caused by the risk of fi nancing terrorism or the illicit drug trade, new fi nancial transaction technologies such 
as mobile banking can become an area of concern. It can be challenging to adapt existing regulatory practices 
to the realities of rapidly evolving microfi nance technologies, especially given the low-value, high-volume 
transactions involved. Th e current discussion of regulatory frameworks for fi nancial transactions covers stored 
value devices (such as mobile phones), consumer protection, payment systems oversight, and ways to increase 
competition among providers of similar services.
Conclusion 
MFIs are adopting a number of diff erent technological innovations with demonstrated potential to dramatically 
lower the cost of serving a large number of clients with low-value fi nancial transactions, and new applications 
are being developed constantly. In the best cases, as Banco Solidario of Ecuador found, the adoption of new 
delivery technologies can improve earnings and can expand outreach to new clients. Deploying technology 
successfully involves much more than simply acquiring the equipment. As the Compartamos case reveals, it 
requires a clear understanding of business goals, priorities, and requirements—and careful evaluation of costs 
and benefi ts. Even then, many challenges are associated with the successful adoption of such technologies, 
including (1) institutional and client capacity, (2) access to reliable communications infrastructure, (3) suffi  cient 
economies of scale, and (4) ways to enable regulatory environments.
From the government’s perspective, new technologies applied to fi nancial transactions can raise serious 
regulatory concerns and can challenge standard supervision approaches. However, as experiences from several 
countries have shown, clients and MFIs can gain dramatically from the application of new technologies to 
fi nancial service provision. Th e benefi ts for the MFI in using those agents include reduced costs; greater 
productivity and effi  ciency; improved convenience and lower transactions costs for the clients; and, ultimately, 
a larger client base.
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Glossary
Access to fi nance—Access to fi nance is the ease with which businesses and households are able to qualify for and 
get credit and other fi nancial services in a timely and reliable manner and at an aff ordable cost. For example, access 
to fi nance by poor people can be aff ected directly by the level of collateral and documentation required for loans, by 
the formal presentation of a business use of the funds, and by minimum balance requirements for savings accounts.
Assembly or general assembly—Th is governing body is used by some nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) to select, appoint, or approve members of the board of directors. In some cases, the assembly may be 
a representative body elected by members of the NGO. In other cases, each NGO member may have its own 
voice on the general assembly.
Biometrics—Biometrics is the measuring of a person’s unique physical characteristics, such as fi ngerprints or 
facial features, to verify identity. Th e technology records the clients’ biometric features—fi ngerprints are the 
most commonly use—and stores this information on the MFI’s database and, usually, on a smart card that the 
client carries for transactions.
Board of directors—A board is a group of individuals elected or appointed to establish institutional management 
policies and to make decisions on major issues. In NGOs, the board is often elected by the general assembly or 
appointed by NGO founders. In shareholder-owned institutions, the board is elected by shareholders. 
Deferred drawdown option—A deferred drawdown option (DDO) allows a country borrowing funds from 
the World Bank to postpone disbursement of a loan for a defi ned period, instead of drawing down funds 
immediately after approval. A catastrophe risk DDO (CAT DDO) provides liquidity immediately following a 
natural disaster which results in a declaration of a state of emergency.
Financial lease—Under the terms of a fi nancial lease, the client pays the full price of the equipment, plus 
interest, in installment payments throughout the lease period. At the end of the lease period, the client may 
purchase the equipment outright for a nominal amount (usually the remainder of the asset’s cost).
Institutional shareholders—Shareholders are persons or entities that own shares or equity in a microfi nance 
institution (MFI). Shareholders may include individual private investors, NGOs, or other institutional investors. 
In credit unions, shareholders are commonly referred to as members.
Institutional stakeholders—Stakeholders represent owner and nonowner groups with a legitimate interest 
in the company’s performance and with infl uence that might have a positive or negative eff ect on a company’s 
commercial performance and long-term sustainability. Stakeholders include regulators, providers of fi nancing, 
employees, clients, and the larger community. 
Management information system—A management information system (MIS) is the system of collecting, 
archiving, retrieving, and using information. In microfi nance, the MIS tracks loan offi  cer productivity and 
clients’ repayments schedules and balances, among others. A good information system is vital for making timely 
assessments of the quality of the loan portfolio and other variables that most aff ect cost and risk.
Microcredit—Microcredit is the provision of loans tailored to the needs and capacity of microbusinesses 
and low-income households. Institutions providing microcredit are usually prohibited by national laws from 
mobilizing savings or providing other fi nancial services beyond credit. 
Microfi nance—Microfi nance is the provision of basic fi nancial services (such as loans, savings, money transfers, 
and microinsurance) to microbusinesses and poor people. People living in poverty, like everyone else, need a 
diverse range of fi nancial services to run their businesses, to build assets, to smooth consumption, and to 
manage risks. (See Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, http://www.cgap.org). 
Microfi nance institutions—MFIs are fi nancial intermediaries that off er specialized products (such as 
loans, savings, and payment services) that match the needs and capacity of low-income households and 
microbusinesses. Some are regulated, supervised fi nancial institutions (such as banks and credit unions) while 
others are more informal (such as rotating savings and credit associations, village banks, and nongovernment 
microcredit institutions).
Microinsurance—Insurance is “a risk management system under which individuals, businesses, and other 
organizations or entities, in exchange for payment of a sum of money (a premium), off er an opportunity to 
share the risk of possible fi nancial loss through guaranteed compensation for losses resulting from certain 
perils under specifi ed conditions.” (http://www.microfi nancerisk.org/pages/Glossary.asp?SectionID=10). 
Microinsurance is the set of products and services that match the needs and capacity of microbusinesses and 
low-income households as a specifi c client target group.
Nonprudential regulation—Th is regulation is the set of government rules that apply to microfi nance and that 
do not measure the fi nancial soundness of the MFI. Examples include screening out unsuitable owners and 
managers or requiring transparent reporting and disclosure.
Outreach—Outreach is the scale of operations of a fi nancial service provider, usually measured in terms of the 
number of active clients, active loan accounts, active savings accounts, or other measurements of client coverage.
Point-of-sale system—In terms of microfi nance, the point-of-sale (POS) system consists of terminals that 
belong to a network shared by fi nancial intermediaries. Clients from a number of institutions can use the 
same terminals and agents to make payments. Sharing network infrastructure enables fi nancial institutions 
to achieve collectively the volume of transactions needed to cover the costs of the software, the hardware, and 
the connectivity required to provide distributed payments services. POS terminals generally use card swipe 
technology, bar code readers, and modems to transmit data from debit or credit cards to fi nancial intermediaries, 
thus enabling fi nancial transactions or the sale of products or services.
Prudential regulation—Th is regulation protects the fi nancial soundness of an MFI to prevent it from losing 
depositors’ money or damaging confi dence in the fi nancial system or both. Examples include capital-adequacy 
requirements and rules for provisioning for loan losses. MFIs subject to prudential regulations are sometimes 
referred to as “regulated MFIs,” while MFIs subject only to nonprudential regulations are sometimes referred 
to as “nonregulated MFIs.”
Risk management—Risk management is the structured approach to managing uncertainty related to a threat, 
by way of (1) identifying potential sources of loss, (2) measuring the fi nancial consequences of a loss occurring, 
and (3) using controls to minimize actual loss or their fi nancial consequences. Risk management strategies 
include transferring the risk to another party, avoiding the risk, reducing the negative eff ect of the risk, and 
accepting some or all of the consequences of a particular risk.
Supervision—the process of enforcement of government rules. Financial institutions that are licensed and monitored 
(supervised) by the government must comply with all requirements and regulations. If they comply, they can accept 
deposits from the public. Failure to comply may result in penalties or the loss of the banking license.
Triple bottom line—measurement of institutional success and sustainability according to three “bottom lines”: 
economic, social, and environmental benefi ts.
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